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Abstract
Effective board governance of safe care: a (theoretically
underpinned) cross-sectioned examination of the breadth
and depth of relationships through national quantitative
surveys and in-depth qualitative case studies
Russell Mannion,1* Tim Freeman,2 Ross Millar1 and Huw Davies3
1Health Services Management Centre, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
2Business School, University of Middlesex, London, UK
3School of Management, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK
*Corresponding author r.mannion@bham.ac.uk
Background: Recent high-profile reports into serious failings in the quality of hospital care in the NHS
raise concerns over the ability of trust boards to discharge their duties effectively.
Objectives: Our study aimed to generate theoretically grounded empirical evidence on the associations
between board governance, patient safety processes and patient-centred outcomes. The specific aims were
as follows: (1) to identify the types of governance activities undertaken by hospital trust boards in the
English NHS with regard to ensuring safe care in their organisation; (2) in foundation trusts, to explore the
role of boards and boards of governors with regards to the oversight of patient safety in their organisation;
(3) to assess the association between particular hospital trust board oversight activities and patient safety
processes and clinical outcomes; (4) to identify the facilitators and barriers to developing effective hospital
trust board governance of safe care; and (5) to assess the impact of external commissioning arrangements
and incentives on hospital trust board oversight of patient safety.
Methods: The study comprised three distinct but interlocking strands: (1) a narrative systematic review in
order to describe, interpret and synthesise key findings and debates concerning board oversight of patient
safety; (2) in-depth mixed-methods case studies in four organisations to assess the impact of hospital
board governance and external incentives on patient safety processes and outcomes; and (3) two national
surveys exploring board management in NHS acute and specialist hospital trusts in England, and relating
board characteristics to whole-organisation outcomes.
Results: A very high proportion of trust boards reported the kinds of desirable characteristics and
board-related processes that research says may be associated with higher performance. Our analysis of the
symbolic aspects of board activities highlights the role and differences in local processes of organising
the governance of patient safety. Most boards do allocate a considerable amount of time to discussing
patient safety and quality-related issues and were using a wide range of hard performance metrics and
soft intelligence to monitor its organisation with regard to patient safety. Although the board of governors
is generally perceived to be well-meaning, they were also considered to be being largely ineffective in
helping to promote and deliver safer care for their organisations. We did not find any statistically
significant relationship between board attributes (self-reported) and processes and any patient safety
outcome measures. However, we did find a significant relationship between two dimensions of the Board
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Self-Assessment Questionnaire and two specific-and-related national staff survey organisational ‘process’
measures: (1) staff feeling safe to raise concerns about errors, near-misses and incidents and (2) staff
feeling confident that their organisation would address their concerns, if raised. We also found that
contracting and external financial incentives appeared to play only a relatively minor role in incentivising
quality and safety improvement.
Conclusions: Our research is the first large-scale mixed-methods study of hospital board activity and
behaviour related to the oversight of patient safety in the English NHS and the key findings should be used
to influence the design of future governance arrangements as well as the training and support of board.
Our finding that board governance/competencies appear to be linked to staff feeling safe to raise concerns
about patient safety issues, and also their confidence that their organisation would address their concern,
is worthy of further and more sustained exploration, particularly in the context of the current focus on
improving whistleblowing policies in the NHS.
Funding: The National Institute for Health Research Health Services and Delivery Research programme.
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Glossary
Dramaturgy A theatrical metaphor applied to the operation of social life. For Goffman (Frame Analysis.
An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press; 1974), the framing
of the stage – the separation of front of stage, backstage and audience, together with a reciprocal
acceptance of the roles of audience and players – shapes the performativity of utterances onstage. In an
extension of earlier work on the presentation of self (Goffman E. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.
New York, NY: Doubleday; 1959) he applies this metaphor to the operation of social life, in which
performativities are made possible through framing. Frames are essentially classification systems that actors
use to order and make sense of diverse social phenomena, so that the performative potential of an
utterance depends upon the frames available to actors within the specific setting.
Eigenvalues Used in factor analysis and explain the proportion of variance explained by a given variable.
With five variables, the sum of the eigenvalues will be 5. Sorting the factors by eigenvalue thus results in
the first factor having the greatest importance (i.e. explaining the greatest amount of variance).
Patient safety Safety of patients in the context of the presentation of avoidable errors and adverse
effects to patients associated with health care.
Performativity A technical term used in sociological analysis. It refers to the capacity of speech or other
communication to constitute an action or perform an identity: a simultaneous ‘saying’ and ‘doing’ with
creative potential which, once the intention of the utterance is recognised, requires others to act in
accordance with its implications. Austin’s (How to Do Things with Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press; 1962) example is the phrase ‘I do’ when spoken within the context of a marriage
ceremony; a phrase with implications beyond indicating acceptance and requiring the people exchanging
the vows to act, and be acted upon by others, as a married couple from that point forward. Performative
utterances are thus meaningful actions that create a social reality; in themselves they are neither true
nor false.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04040 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 4
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
xix

List of abbreviations
A&E accident and emergency
BSAQ Board Self-Assessment
Questionnaire
CAT Clinical Assurance Toolkit
CCG Clinical Commissioning Group
CEO chief executive officer
COO chief operating officer
CQC Care Quality Commission
CQUIN Commissioning for Quality and
Innovation
FT foundation trust
GMC General Medical Council
GP general practitioner
HCAI heath-care-associated infection
HR human resources
HSMR Hospital Standardised Mortality
Ratio
ICD-10 International Classification of
Diseases, Tenth Edition
IHI Institute for Healthcare
Improvement
IPC infection prevention and control
KPI key performance indicator
LA Litigation Authority
MaPSaF Manchester Patient Safety
Framework
MD medical director
MRSA meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus
NAAS Nursing Assessment and
Accreditation System
ND nursing director
NED non-executive director
NSG Nationalist Specialist Group
NSS National NHS Staff Survey
PCT primary care trust
QI quality improvement
QRP Quality Risk Profile
RAG red/amber/green (traffic-light
ratings system)
SUS – CDS secondary user service –
commissioning data sets
TGI The Governance Institute
(San Diego, CA, USA)
TH teaching hospital
VRE vancomycin-resistant enterococci
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Plain English summary
Health-care scandals, such as the most recent at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, havedemonstrated that uncaring practices can flourish in hospitals when the organisational context goes
wrong. When this happens, patients not only have unpleasant experiences during care but can be hurt or
even die as a consequence. Hospital boards have ultimate responsibility for safeguarding the care provided
in their organisation, yet recent high-profile reports on serious failings in the quality of hospital care in the
NHS have raised concerns over the ability of boards to discharge their duties effectively in this area. This
research seeks to better understand the processes associated with the effective board governance of safe
care. Based on a review of the available evidence and research in hospitals we examine in detail what
hospital boards actually do in relation to safeguarding care in their organisation; for example, how much
time they spend discussing patient safety issues, the types of information boards use to assess the quality
of care in their organisation, what training and skills board members have in relation to patient safety and
how factors, such as external financial incentives, influence what boards do in relation to patient safety.
We found that what boards do and focus on is related to how their hospital reacts to and deals with
patient safety issues. In particular, we found a link between self-assessed competencies of boards and
whether or not its staff felt able to openly report patient safety-related problems and incidents.
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Scientific summary
Background
Hospital trust boards in the NHS have statutory responsibility for upholding quality and safety of care in
its organisation. However, recent high-profile reports into serious failings in the NHS, most notably the
standards of care at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, raise concerns over the ability of trust board
to discharge these duties effectively. Despite a plethora of guidance available to NHS boards on effective
governance, significant gaps remain in our understanding of what board governance looks like and the
organisational processes through which safer care is accomplished and sustained. Prior to this study, most
of the research on hospital board governance originated from the USA, was theoretically underdeveloped,
focused on the more generic concept of service quality rather than on patient safety and was almost
entirely of a quantitative nature. Against this background we wanted to strengthen the theoretical and
empirical evidence base that underpins board governance of safe care in the NHS.
Objectives
Our study aimed to generate theoretically grounded empirical evidence on the associations between board
practices, patient safety processes and patient-centred outcomes.
The specific aims were:
1. to identify the types of governance activities undertaken by hospital trust boards in the English NHS
with regard to ensuring safe care in its organisation
2. in foundation trusts, to explore the role of boards and boards of governors with regard to the oversight
of patient safety in its organisation
3. to assess the association between particular hospital trust board oversight activities and patient safety
processes and clinical outcomes
4. to identify the facilitators and barriers to developing effective hospital trust board governance of
safe care
5. to assess the impact of external commissioning arrangements and incentives on hospital trust board
oversight of patient safety
6. on the basis of findings relating to points 1–5, to make evidence-informed recommendations for
effective hospital trust board oversight and accountability and board member recruitment, induction,
training and support.
Methods
The study comprised three distinct but interlocking strands:
1. A narrative systematic review in order to describe, interpret and synthesise key findings and debates
concerning board oversight of patient safety. In selecting papers, we focused on those that considered
board oversight in the context of quality and safety, and the research team and expert panel suggested
seminal works and advised on search terms. The team then reviewed titles and abstracts for relevance,
using broad inclusion criteria to identify studies of hospital board directors’ or boards of trustees’
oversight of quality and patient safety. Our initial search uncovered 187 articles and after review we
identified a subset of 66 papers for detailed study, which we added to those identified by earlier
reviews, removing duplicates. Finally, we used snowballing techniques to augment papers for review.
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These searches were adapted iteratively to ensure maximum capture of empirical work, and at the end
of the process 124 publications were deemed relevant for detailed review.
2. In-depth, mixed-methods case studies in four organisations were used to assess the impact of hospital
board governance and external incentives on patient safety processes and outcomes. We used
background statistical data on quality/safety indicators to select case study sites that were indicated as
getting worse (in the light of overall improvement of other hospitals) or getting better, and comprising
two foundation hospital trusts with a ‘downwards’ performance trajectory, and two foundation hospital
trusts with an ‘upwards’ performance trajectory. We then made sure that the sample was drawn from
across the country and included large teaching hospitals and a district general hospital. We carried out
semistructured interviews with the board of directors at each site. In addition to these interviews, the
research team undertook overt non-participant observation at four management board meetings at
each case study site. This totalled nearly 50 hours of observation. Descriptive free-text field notes were
taken by both observers at each meeting, supplemented with documentary data, including the agenda,
supporting papers and (retrospectively on completion) the minutes of each meeting. Data included an
overview of comments made, questions raised and by whom and a log of the time spent on each
agenda item. We supplemented our analysis of board ‘conformance’ and board ‘performance’ activities
with further analysis of observation field notes.
3. Two national surveys were undertaken about board management in NHS acute and specialist hospital
trusts in England. The first of these surveys was issued to 150 trusts in the financial year 2011/12
as part of the annual trust survey carried out by Dr Foster (Dr Foster Limited, London, UK). The
questionnaire was completed online via a dedicated web tool. This survey gathered data on each trust’s
board and activities related to the oversight of patient safety; 145 replies were received, making for
an overall response rate of 97% (unusually high, we suspect, because of high levels of engagement
with Dr Foster). The second survey targeted individual board members from these trusts. We used an
adapted version of the Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire (BSAQ). This survey was also completed
through online means and data were gathered between May 2012 and April 2013. A total of
334 responses were received from 165 executive and 169 non-executive board members, providing at
least one response from 95 of the 144 (66%) NHS trusts in existence at that time. After constructing
the factor scores representing the six BSAQ dimensions and the total BSAQ score, we explored
whether or not these were correlated with patient safety measures. In doing so, we estimated various
multivariate models regressing patient safety measures (from Dr Foster) and measures of hospital ability
to handle errors, near-misses and incidents, taken from the National NHS Staff Survey (NSS) for 2012
on the total BSAQ score, controlling for a number of hospital-level characteristics.
Results
This section takes each of the research objectives in turn and integrates findings from across all parts of
the study.
Research objective 1: to identify the types of governance activities
undertaken by hospital trust boards in the English NHS with regard to
ensuring safe care in its organisation
In the national survey a very high proportion of trust boards reported the kinds of desirable characteristics
and board-related processes that research says may be associated with higher performance, with all having
quality subcommittees and proactive procedures in place to address patient safety concerns, and almost
all having explicit objectives related to improving patient safety. However, only 87% of trusts reported that
board members had actually received any received training in patient safety issues. Our analysis of the
symbolic aspects of board activities highlights the role and differences in local processes of organising in
relation to the governance of patient safety. Although each case study identified different approaches
in different situations, it was clear that the setting(s) in which board decisions and deliberation take place
have an important bearing on how organisations approach the oversight of patient safety.
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We also found that most boards do allocate a considerable amount of time to discussing patient
safety- and quality-related issues. The responses obtained by the NSS indicate that only one-fifth of trust
boards reported that ≤ 30% of its time was spent discussing safety and quality issues. In the case studies
we found similar evidence, with only one study site allocating < 30% of its board time to debating quality/
safety matters. However, we also identified (through the case study sites) that boards used this time
rather differently.
In the national survey we found that hospital boards were using a wide range of hard performance metrics
and soft intelligence to monitor its organisations with regard to patient safety, including a range of clinical
outcomes measures, infection rates and process measures, such as medication errors and readmission
rates. Softer intelligence, used organisationally and reported at all board meetings, was also more variably
reported, with discussions with clinicians and executive walkabouts being most often reported, alongside
use of patient stories. However, in only about two-thirds of trusts did board members shadow clinicians
and report back to the board.
Research objective 2: to explore the role of boards versus boards of
governors in foundation trusts with regard to the oversight of patient
safety in its organisation
A strong theme from across study sites was that, although the boards of governors are generally perceived
as well meaning, they were also considered to be largely ineffective in helping to promote and deliver
safer care for its organisations. Boards of governors seemed to serve a useful educative role and
community linkage role, but with limited challenge or holding of executives to account. Meetings
frequently resembled seminars for information sharing, rather than a formal board meeting where key
organisational strategies were debated and discussed. Thus, while governors typically reported good
relations with the executive board, there was often a lack of awareness and understanding of respective
roles. Although some sites did report engagement of governors in quality assurance work in relation to,
for example, non-executive director (NED) appraisal and committee work, there were also frustrations at
what was seen as only limited active engagement from NEDs.
Research objective 3: to assess the association between particular hospital
trust board oversight activities and patient safety processes and
clinical outcomes
The headline finding here is that we did not find any statistically significant relationship between board
attributes and (self-reported) processes and any patient safety outcome measures. However, we did find
a significant relationship between two dimensions of the BSAQ and two specific-and-related NSS
organisational ‘process’ measures: (1) staff ‘feeling safe’ to raise concerns about errors, near-misses and
incidents and (2) staff ‘feeling confident’ that their organisation would address their concerns if raised.
In particular, the correlational results are positive and significant for staff ‘feeling safe’ in the contextual,
analytical, political and strategic domains of the BSAQ, although the effect is strongest in the contextual
dimension. This contextual dimension explores how the board takes cognisance of the organisation’s
values and norms, and positive orientations here may support a more open and transparent culture around
whistleblowing, thus enabling staff to feel safe to raise quality concerns. Results were also positive and
significant for staff ‘feeling confident’ for the contextual and strategic BSAQ dimensions, suggesting that a
focus on the organisational values and institutional direction gives staff a sense of security and assurance
that patient safety concerns will be dealt with. These findings then do suggest some association between
board governance and staff ability to address issues around patient safety, but we found no evidence to
support the view that board governance directly affected patient safety outcomes. The finding linking
board orientations to staff attitudes from our large-scale quantitative work are further substantiated by the
qualitative findings, especially those that were gleaned from the following of ‘tracer conditions’ from
board to ward.
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Research objective 4: to identify the facilitators and barriers to developing
effective hospital trust board governance of safe care
In the case studies we explored these dimensions and identified a range of facilitators and enablers to
effective board governance of safe care. For example, a key facilitator at one of our study sites appeared
to have been the development and implementation of a clear corporate strategy and operational plan
focused on enhancing the quality and safety of care in the organisation. At other sites, the stability of
board membership over time was considered to be an important facilitator of patient safety governance,
and the detailed knowledge of, and connection with, clinical staff by the CEO was also thought to be
crucial. Strong and committed clinical leadership was also considered to be an important facilitating factor
in supporting board governance, even when there were persistent concerns over the so-called bullying of
junior professionals by senior clinicians. We identified a range of other organisational barriers to effective
board governance of safe care across the case study sites. Problems and disputes over the validity and
reliability of summary performance indicator data, and apparent difficulties in communication between
clinical units and the board, for example, led to a sense of confusion over the meaning and the correct
interpretation of performance indicator data received and reviewed by the board. In addition, problems
were seen to arise because of a perceived lack of engagement among senior medical staff, resulting
in impaired communication between corporate teams and ward level in many parts of the organisation.
Research objective 5: to assess the impact of external commissioning
arrangements and incentives on hospital trust board oversight of
patient safety
Across the case studies we found that contracting issues appeared to play only a relatively minor role in
incentivising quality and safety improvement. Building strong and trustworthy relationships between
commissioners and providers was often viewed as a better way of stimulating positive change, rather than
focusing on incentives and sanctions. Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) appears to have
had a mixed impact across the case study sites and were generally perceived to be a low-powered
incentive for quality and safety improvement, as well as possibly inducing a range of unintended and
dysfunctional consequences.
Concluding remarks
There remains a challenging governance- and management-focused research agenda around safer care.
Specific methodological issues and substantive areas that warrant further and more sustained investigation
might be considered in the following areas:
1. Our finding that board governance/competencies appear to be linked to staff feeling safe to raise
concerns about patient safety issues, and also their confidence that their organisation would address
their concerns, is worthy of further and more sustained exploration, particularly in the context of the
current focus on improving whistleblowing policies in the NHS.
2. It would be useful to undertake empirical research to explore the scope, range and impact of systematic
group decision-making bias in board settings on patient safety processes and outcomes.
3. There is a real need for more and better-tested bespoke instruments and tools for assessing and
informing hospital board governance and competencies.
4. A challenge lies in understanding how different levels of organisational hierarchy articulate together.
Understanding how the dialogue and discourse creation at one level informs and influences the cultures
and practices at another is key, as is identifying and elucidating the key conduits through which the
governance of safety plays out.
In summary, this is the first large-scale mixed-methods study of hospital board activity and behaviour
related to the oversight of patient safety in the English NHS. As such, we believe that it has much to
contribute to an understanding of boards, its influence and its operation.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Policy context
The UK NHS is widely acknowledged as providing some of the best health care in the world, with the vast
majority of patients receiving care which is safe and effective.1 However, as in every other health system,
not all care is as safe as it could be and, although estimates vary, there is growing evidence to suggest that
about 1 in 10 patients admitted to hospital may be harmed as a result of their care.2 This harm is not
limited to minor events but is often serious, including major iatrogenic disability, health-care-associated
infection (HCAI) and avoidable deaths. In addition to human suffering, this results in significant financial
costs, with prolonged hospital stays alone costing over £2B per year.3 In response to evidence of
widespread harm there has been a concerted effort to make health care safer, and numerous initiatives
and significant resources are being invested in developing national and local strategies to improve patient
safety in NHS organisations. However, change has proved difficult to effect and the optimal mix of
strategies remains unclear, with the NHS acknowledging that it is not yet able to prevent errors and major
service failures recurring.4,5
Over the past decade it has become increasingly recognised that most harm to patients in hospital settings
is not deliberate, negligent or the result of serious incompetence. Instead, harm more usually arises as
an emergent outcome of a complex system in which typically competent clinicians, professionals and
managers interact in inadequate systems and unsafe organisational environments. Yet we still know
very little about the role of organisational and governance processes in developing safer health-care
environments. More specifically, we know very little about how hospital trust boards can contribute to
safer patient care, although such boards have been the focus of increasing scrutiny for shortcomings in its
governance role. Most recently, the report of the public inquiry into Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation
Trust concluded that unnecessary suffering and neglect of patients was primarily caused by a serious
failure on the part of the hospital trust board, which ‘did not listen sufficiently to its patients and staff or
ensure the correction of deficiencies brought to the trust’s attention. Above all, it failed to tackle an
insidious negative culture involving a tolerance of poor standards and disengagement from management
and leadership responsibilities’.4 Similar failures in hospital board leadership and governance are a recurring
theme of earlier inquiries into hospital scandals in the English NHS, including the tragic events at Bristol
Royal Infirmary in the 1990s, and date as far back as the late 1960s, with the inquiry into the mistreatment
of long-stay patients at Ely hospital.6
The changing role of hospital boards in the English NHS
Hospital trust governing boards, as corporate entities with statutory oversight responsibilities, are
accountable for the overall quality and safety of the care its organisations provide. These boards therefore
have a fundamental governance role in the oversight of quality and safety, which involves defining
priorities and objectives, crafting strategy, shaping culture and designing systems of organisational control.
Hospital boards in the English NHS have traditionally shared many similarities with the Anglo-Saxon private
sector unitary board model, which typically comprises a chairperson, chief executive, executive directors
and non-executive directors (NEDs).7 All board members share corporate responsibility for key strategic
decisions, including the effective oversight of health-care quality and patient safety. Members of the board
have specific duties, with the chairperson leading the board [for foundation trusts (FTs), the chairperson
also chairs the Council of Governors]. Alongside the chairperson, the chief executive leads the executive
arm of the organisation and takes lead responsibility for service delivery.
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Within the English NHS, FTs now make up the majority of organisations, with an expectation that all other
trusts will follow in due course. At the end of 2013, 147 out of 230 NHS providers in England (64%)
(including acute and mental health hospitals and ambulance services) operated as NHS FTs, which
have greater freedoms than other types of hospitals and are based on co-operative and mutual
traditions.8 Governance arrangements in FTs are locally determined within a national framework and
non-executive board members are appointed by the governors of the hospital, rather than by the
NHS Appointments Commission.
The FT ‘social ownership’ model of governance incorporates three tiers of accountability: (1) the membership,
(2) the board of governors and (3) the management board. Eligibility criteria for membership include
residency (‘the membership community’), patients in the preceding 3 years, staff and representatives of
partner agencies on the board of governors. Members have voting rights for electing representatives to the
board of governors and have the right to be consulted on key strategic issues. The management board is
accountable to members for ensuring developments consistent with the needs of its community of
stakeholders across ‘the local health economy and wider NHS’ and for ensuring that a trust’s activities comply
with the terms of its licence. The board of governors is charged with acting as a vehicle for influencing
change and development – essentially a strategic rather than an operational role. Governors are required to
represent communities and hold a responsibility for feeding back discussion to these communities, serving
a twofold role of community liaison and linking with members (downwards) and oversight and accountability
of FT activities (upwards). There has been no previous research exploring the relative role and influence of
boards versus boards of governors in FTs with regard to patient safety.
Recent years have witnessed a stream of formal guidance designed to strengthen NHS board governance
in the light of lessons learned from private sector corporate scandals and failures, including:
l The Healthy NHS Board: Principles for Good Governance9
l The NHS Integrated Governance Handbook: a handbook for executives and non-executives in
health-care organisations10
l The Intelligent Commissioning Board: understanding the information needs of Strategic Health
Authorities and primary care trust (PCT) boards11
l Governing the NHS: A Guide to NHS Boards.12
Despite a plethora of guidance available to NHS boards on effective leadership and governance
arrangements, both in general terms and with specific reference to safe care, we nonetheless still have a
meagre evidence base (i.e. drawn from empirical study) on which to offer guidance of effective board
practice of patient safety.
Previous work in this area
Prior to this study, what limited evidence existed on board roles and impacts in terms of patient safety and
service quality originated mostly from the USA, where several studies have investigated the relationship
between governance practices and quality processes and clinical outcomes (see Chapter 3 for a detailed
review of the literature and evidence). However, a degree of caution is required when attempting to
extrapolate recommendations for effective governance to the NHS context. First, hospitals in the USA
operate within a very different economic and political environment, which will necessarily impact on the
relative priorities and objectives of boards. Second, all these studies are based on large-scale questionnaire
surveys and, although they provide an overview of broad patterns and trends in board practice, they
nevertheless fail to capture fully the messy internal processes and behavioural dynamics through which
board governance is actually played out and which are best explored through more interpretive and
qualitative research designs. Third, these studies have tended to be purely empirical and lack clear
theoretical and conceptual frameworks for guiding the collection, analysis and interpretation of data.
Finally, these studies focus on the more generic topic of ‘service quality’ rather than the more narrowly
defined topic of patient safety.
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Contemporary issues and challenges
Effective hospital board oversight in the English NHS currently faces a number of challenges. Changes in
the policy landscape, particularly in response to the first Francis public inquiry13 and the Darzi review in
2008,14 have seen quality and safety move up the political agenda. However, the oversight of patient
safety is often compromised by the number of competing priorities faced by boards. Recent reports
conclude that board discussions concerning patient safety often take second or third place after efforts to
ensure that hospital finances and central performance targets are met.15 Within this context, a key
challenge facing board oversight of patient safety is the use of risk-based ratings and measures, which are
set by Monitor and the Care Quality Commission (CQC). This has the potential to ‘dilute the message’ of
patient safety for boards, in being effectively reduced to a series of national standards and priorities or
specific issues and campaigns related to infection control, such as meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) and Clostridium difficile infection rates.16 Challenges to effective board oversight may also be
attributed to boards’ limited knowledge and understanding of patient safety issues and concepts, and
many boards currently lack the necessary skills and understanding to make sense of emerging trends in
patient safety. Limited knowledge and understanding of patient safety among board members, particularly
non-executives, also means they are often inhibited when challenging and posing critical questions about
safety issues and concerns. This is particularly the case for NEDs who tend not to have a clinical or
operational background in health-care quality.17
In light of these current challenges facing boards, discussions with key informants in the scoping phase of
this study (see Appendix 1 for details) raised a number of suggestions about how board oversight of
patient safety could be improved. At the centre of these proposals were concerns about strengthening and
building trust through the development of better interpersonal connectedness within its organisation.
Rather than a ‘tick-box’ focus on meeting particular targets, it was suggested that oversight needed
to become ‘value driven’ in the development of relationships that were more sensitive and responsive to
organisational needs and concerns. To accomplish this, particular board activities and practices were
highlighted for enhancing trust in organisational relationships. These included providing a greater amount
of time and emphasis on board discussions and dialogue about patient safety, developing enhanced
leadership skills that allow patient safety to be more visible and seeing board members as ‘stewards’ with
a responsibility for developing a culture of partnership within the organisation. Leadership here was seen
as critical to ‘set the tone’ for the organisation with regard to prioritising the quality of care.
Moreover, although board oversight was seen as a collective effort, individual board members with specific
roles were noted as being key catalysts for action. For example, the chief executive is central in setting the
tone, and the chairperson is key to facilitating open discussion. Medical and nurse directors, acting as
custodians for clinical governance, also have an important role to play in setting the patient safety culture of
the organisation, as do finance directors in supporting patient safety initiatives. Using NEDs to actively
challenge executive decisions and to hold the board to account provides important checks and balances. Some
boards needed greater input from NEDs in providing the necessary critical reflection in ‘holding up a mirror’
to the organisation by asking critical and probing questions. An additional suggestion for fostering greater
interconnectedness with the wider organisation was opening up board business to greater staff, patient and
public scrutiny. This is seen as having the potential, not only to further hold the board to account but also
to create connections and interactions with the organisation and the community that the hospital served.
Scoping discussions also raised a number of points about the potential over-reliance on formal quantitative
performance measures in relation to patient safety, which possibly came at the expense of ignoring
insights gleaned through soft intelligence networks. Boards need to have access to different types of
information concerning patient safety in order to increase its intelligence about the issues at hand.
Greater reliance on dashboards could help to disaggregate information about particular trends within the
organisation rather than simply relying on an aggregated picture of the organisation as red, amber or
green ratings. For example, the Quality Risk Profiles (QRPs) capturing mortality data, readmission data, and
outlier data combined with data on patient outcomes in relation to dignity, nutrition and privacy can
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provide a useful basis for hospital board discussions. In addition, scorecards and metric-based approaches
can be supplemented with narrative or ‘reality checks’ that connect staff concerns and patient experience
to quantitative data.
Collectively, these observations demonstrate the potential to support the development of internal board
dynamics to facilitate greater dialogue related to patient safety, alongside external board communications
to improve the connection with patients and staff. The insights gathered in the scoping discussions thus
informed the development and refinement of the research design and the research questions as set
out below.
Defining patient safety
As the focus of this study is on patient safety, it is important that we are clear about how we have
interpreted the term and used it in our research design and analysis and how it differs from other
quality-of-care issues. Charles Vincent defines patient safety as ‘The avoidance, prevention and
amelioration of adverse outcomes or injuries stemming from the process of healthcare’.18 This definition
clearly differentiates patient safety from more generic quality-of-care issues by focusing on the ‘dark side
of quality’18 and highlighting care that causes harm to patients rather than merely being of a poor or
inadequate standard. It also draws attention to attempts to prevent and reduce errors and adverse patient
outcomes in recognition that simply trying to avoid error is not in itself enough and one must seek to
reduce errors of all kinds. In this study, we have adopted an approach based on Vincent’s definition of
patient safety. We also recognise that safety resides in health-care systems (at all levels) as well as people
working within such systems. During the fieldwork for this study, and in particular the case studies, it was
often difficult to clearly distinguish patient safety from the broader concept of quality. Indeed, the two are
synonymous and often conflated in common usage and expression. Although in our analysis we have
attempted to separate out issues related to patient safety, in some areas we have found it very difficult to
provide a clear-cut distinction between issues specifically related to quality and those specifically related
to safety. This should not necessarily be viewed as a deficiency of the study but rather as a reflection of the
complexity and ambiguity inherent in the concept and the many ways in which it can be interpreted and
applied in health-care contexts.
Aims and objectives of the study
Against this background, our study aimed to generate theoretically grounded empirical evidence on the
associations between board practices, patient safety processes and patient-centred outcomes with
the aim of improving NHS hospital boards’ understanding, effectiveness and accountability in relation to
safeguarding care. The study was undertaken between October 2011 and September 2014.
The specific aims were:
1. to identify the types of governance activities undertaken by hospital trust boards in the English NHS
with regard to ensuring safe care in its organisation
2. in FTs, to explore the role of boards and boards of governors with regards to the oversight of patient
safety in its organisation
3. to assess the association between particular hospital trust board oversight activities and patient safety
processes and clinical outcomes
4. to identify the facilitators and barriers to developing effective hospital trust board governance of safe care
5. to assess the impact of external commissioning arrangements and incentives on hospital trust board
oversight of patient safety
6. on the basis of findings relating to points 1–5, to make evidence-informed recommendations for
effective hospital trust board oversight and accountability and board member recruitment, induction,
training and support.
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Research design and project overview
In essence, the study comprised three distinct but interlocking strands:
1. a literature review of the theoretical and empirical literature relating to hospital board oversight of
patient safety (undertaken between December 2011 and December 2014)
2. in-depth mixed-methods case studies in four organisations to assess the impact of hospital board
governance and external incentives on patient safety processes and outcomes (undertaken between
September 2012 and September 2014)
3. two national surveys of hospital board oversight of patient safety which were then linked to routine
data on patient safety processes and outcomes (undertaken between March 2012 and April 2013).
Structure of the report
Chapter 2 provides a detailed explanation of the theories and research methods underpinning the study.
Chapter 3 presents the findings from the literature review of theoretical and recent empirical work in this
area. The next five chapters present the main findings from fresh empirical studies in the NHS: first from
case study work in four purposefully selected NHS foundation hospital trusts (see Chapters 4–7) and
then from national quantitative surveys of board activity/competence and patient safety performance
linkages across English NHS hospital trusts (see Chapter 8). The report concludes (see Chapter 9) with an
integration and discussion of the findings and a look forward at the emerging research agenda around
these issues.
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Chapter 2 Theories of board behaviour and
research design
This chapter outlines the theories of board behaviour that underpinned the study and sets out theresearch design and methods of data gathering and analysis used in the empirical part of the study.
Theories of board behaviour
Several theoretical frameworks of board governance have been developed,19,20 and here we make the
distinction between whether boards are conceptualised in either instrumental or symbolic terms. Guidance
on the role and conduct of NHS boards is most usually informed by instrumentalist assumptions of the
role of boards as forums for deliberation, conciliation and decision-making. On these terms a ‘successful’
board is one that is able to take decisions on corporate strategy in an efficient and effective manner and
can monitor its implementation through to organisational success. Four key instrumentalist frameworks can
be discerned in the literature:
1. Agency theory is based on the assumption that, unless scrutinised, staff will seek to pursue their own
interests rather than wider organisational objectives (opportunism). Here the board is conceptualised as
a monitoring device set up to ensure compliance by developing systems of checking, monitoring and
control to hold staff accountable for their actions. This approach has previously been used to
understand and classify clinical governance strategies in UK hospitals.21
2. Stewardship theory works on the assumption that staff are motivated by more than their own narrow
self-interests and that managers want to do a good job and serve as effective stewards of an
organisation’s resources.22 The theory assumes a high degree of trust, with the focus of the board being
on creating a framework for shared values and enabling staff, rather than monitoring and
coercing performance.
3. Stakeholder theory assumes a multiplicity of competing and co-operative interests within organisations
and focuses on how various stakeholder interests can be addressed, integrated and balanced.23 The role
of board members within this framework is to understand and represent the views of all those with a
stake in the organisation, and it is recognised that the board may need to manage complex trade-offs
between stakeholders, including staff, patients and the public.
4. Resource dependency theory derives from the strategic management literature and Zahra and Pearce
played a significant part in its original development.24 From this perspective the organisation is seen as
an amalgam of tangible and intangible assets and dynamic capabilities. The main function of the board
is to successfully manage internal and external relationships to leverage influence and resources. Board
members are selected for their background, contacts and skills in mediation and boundary spanning.
In spite of their differences, all four of these instrumentalist theories assume that board members are able
to exercise influence over staff and that, via this influence, they lever beneficial change and enhance
organisational performance. Garratt25,26 has integrated the insights from both agency and stewardship
theories and posits two main areas of board foci, which he terms ‘conformance’ and ‘performance’ (Table 1).
Conformance has both external and internal dimensions: external accountability includes compliance with
regulatory and legal requirements, as well as accountability to external stakeholders. In contrast, the internal
dimension is associated with management control. The conformance dimension, therefore, shares many
similarities with the agency theory perspective on governance. The performance dimension, according to
Garratt,25 involves governing the organisation to enhance its achievement of goals and objectives. This, again,
consists of two main functions: policy formulation and strategic thinking. The performance dimension is thus
closely linked to the stewardship theory of corporate governance. This framework (illustrated in Table 1)
suggests that boards need to focus on both conformance and performance aspects of corporate governance
and that blended perspectives on agency/stewardship may be necessary.
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A number of board assessment tools have been developed and used in empirical research to assess the
instrumental activity of boards and to guide and inform board development programmes.19,27 For example,
the 65-item Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire (BSAQ) has recently been used in studies of hospital
boards in the USA28 and a small-scale study of FTs in England.29 The benefit of theoretically informed
instruments such as the BSAQ is that they have predictive power and can be used to assess the
implications of adopting different board strategies (rather than merely taxonomic uses). The BSAQ
instrument was used in the national surveys of NHS boards (see below).
Although popular management literature and government documents tend to idealise board members’
activities through the use of ‘heroic’ narratives,30 there is considerable debate over the extent to which
boards undertake the classic instrumentalist functions of establishing objectives and core strategies.
Within the empirical and critical theory literature, boards have been characterised as performing largely
non-instrumental roles by acting primarily as legitimating institutions that formally declare decisions
negotiated elsewhere.31 These perspectives indicate the potential importance of the symbolic and
ceremonial value of boards and the need to explore efficacy of board performances in a more
dramaturgical sense. In this regard, Hajer32,33 and Hajer and Versteeg34 have outlined a framework for
the analysis of the performative dimension of board governance. The approach opens up the day-to-day
interactions of board members for analysis through consideration of the setting in which deliberation takes
place; the scripting in terms of the actors involved in the decision-making forum; the staging in terms of
deliberate attempts to organise the interaction between participants by drawing on existing symbols; and
the performance in terms of the way in which the interaction constructs new knowledge, understandings
and power relationships that project forward to shape future interactions and provide opportunities for
challenge and change over time.
These diverse theories provide multiple and complementary perspectives on board governance and each
has been used at various times in the analysis to make sense of the data gathered.
TABLE 1 The main functions of hospital boards (adapted from Chambers and Cornforth19 and Garratt26)
Focus Short-term focus on ‘conformance’ Long-term focus on ‘performance’
External Accountability
Ensuring external accountabilities are met,
e.g. to stakeholders, funders, regulators
Meeting audit, inspection and reporting requirement
Policy formulation
Setting and safeguarding the organisation’s
mission and values
Deciding long-term goals
Ensuring appropriate policies and systems
are in place
Internal Supervision
Appointing and rewarding senior management
Overseeing management performance
Monitoring key performance indicators
Monitoring key financial and budgetary controls
Managing risks
Strategic thinking
Agreeing strategic direction
Shaping and agreeing long-term plans
Reviewing and deciding major resource
decisions and investments
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Research design for the empirical work
The empirical strand of the study was informed by a review of the theoretical and empirical literature
relating to board governance of quality and safety, and explores both instrumentalist and performative
aspects of boards. Given the diversity of views and approaches to understanding board governance
of patient safety, and the intrinsic complexity of any relationships between board governance and patient
safety processes and outcomes, we adopted a multimethod approach, integrating qualitative and
quantitative elements in order to examine these relationships in both breadth and depth in the empirical
strand of the study. In order to capture the breadth of any associations between board activity and patient
safety we conducted a national survey of board practice with regard to patient safety. This was linked to
routine national performance data sets on patient safety processes and outcomes. The combined data
set was used to explore board practice–patient safety associations at the organisational level. In addition,
to contribute depth and richness to our understandings, we used comparative case study methods and
qualitative approaches to explore board dynamics and the governance of patient safety in four hospital
trusts. We next elaborate on each of these strands in turn, beginning with the case studies, followed by the
national quantitative survey and analysis.
Case studies: sampling, data gathering and analysis
We utilised a comparative case study design across multiple study sites to generalise theoretically within
and between cases.35 Although each case has its own integrity in terms of theory building and generating
policy implications, we developed common themes across case study sites using comparative case
study methods.36
Case selection
As we intended to consider the enactment of internal governance arrangements and the effects of
external financial and regulatory mechanisms with reference to patient safety, each case study had as
its centre of investigation an acute foundation hospital trust through which links between governance and
patient safety were explored. We selected FTs because this organisational form was the policy direction
for acute sector organisations at the time of planning the study. The unit of analysis is thus the FT rather
than the wider health economy, with a focus on the operation of the board and its effects within the
specific ‘tracer condition’ area of infection control.
It is important to acknowledge that FT boards operate within a national and regional context, and for this
reason we undertook some scoping of context with key commissioners and stakeholders. However, our
focus on the board as the seat of governance ensured a focus on the formal enactment of governance
within board structures.
In addition to normal requirements of ethical approval, cases were selected on the basis of their
performance trajectory over the last 3 years on a range of safety and quality indicators selected from the
Dr Foster (Dr Foster Limited, London, UK) database. Every year Dr Foster publishes a hospital guide that uses
publicly available statistics to measure and assess what is happening in hospitals in England to increase the
transparency around variations in performance. The data focuses on indicators in three domains of quality
obtained from the available statistics, combined with information from self-reporting of safety aspects from
an annual questionnaire, and is informed by the National Patient Safety Agency organisational feedback
reports and CQC ‘alert’ lists. We used these data to select case study sites that were indicated to be getting
worse (in the light of overall improvement of other hospitals) or getting better, as follows:
l two foundation hospital trusts with a ‘downwards’ performance trajectory, as indicated above
l two foundation hospital trusts with an ‘upwards’ performance trajectory, as indicated above.
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We then made sure that the sample was drawn from across the country and included large teaching
hospitals (THs) and a district general hospital. Throughout the analysis and reporting, trust sites have been
anonymised by being renamed after Scottish islands. The two upwards-performing trusts are identified as
Lewis and Arran, and the two downwards-performing trusts are known as Islay and Skye. Appendix 2
contains the case study invitation letter and Appendix 3 contains the participant information sheet.
Brief description of the four selected case studies
Lewis is one of the bigger NHS trusts in the UK, delivering services across several sites within a single city.
It offers many specialist services, with a large consultant body seen as being at the cutting edge of clinical
care. Its long-standing reputation for high-quality clinical care is reflected in it consistently being in the
upper quartile of hospital ratings.
Arran is a renowned TH providing general and specialist services across multiple sites. Over the last 5 years
the board has been characterised by relative stability, with low levels of turnover. The trust aims to continue
to build its ‘brand’ as a provider of leading specialist services, and it is undertaking large-scale redevelopment
in order to deal with excess demand within accident and emergency (A&E) services. Organisational
performance against the Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio (HSMR) is very good, but the trust has
faced some performance issues with regard to expressed staff satisfaction and, more recently, infection
control rates.
Islay is an integrated provider of hospital, community and primary care services. It has a well-documented
profile for its achievements in relation to quality and safety, with the board in particular receiving a number
of awards and plaudits for these efforts. The trust holds high scores for both patient and staff satisfaction.
Skye is a district general hospital trust providing services across two sites. It was one of the earlier NHS
trusts to be awarded foundation status. Over the past 5 years, the board has been characterised by
continuous change, with the arrival and departure of several chief executive officers (CEOs), medical
directors (MDs) and two nursing directors (NDs) during this period. The trust has one of the highest patient
demands in the country and has faced a number of challenges related to bed capacity. Organisational
performance is currently a cause for concern, with the HSMR above average, high A&E demand and
increasing infection rates.
Data collection in the case studies
In the context of board governance, the focus of our data collection in the case studies was to explore the
following areas:
1. to examine board of director oversight of patient safety
2. to understand the relationship between the board of directors and governors with respect to overseeing
patient safety issues
3. to understand how the board complies with a particular patient safety issue (conformance)
4. to understand how the board responds to a specific patient safety issue during the course of
fieldwork (performance)
5. to explore the commissioning relationships related to patient safety.
Data gathering consisted of interviews and observations at management boards and the governing board.
Exploring board oversight of patient safety
Our research carried out semistructured interviews with the board of directors at each site. This included
the executive and NEDs as well as other board directors deemed relevant to the research and included
directors of quality and risk. These interviews built on what was understood to be the key themes and
issues related to the subject area17 (see Chapter 3) in examining how board members understood their role
in terms of strategic vision and leadership activities, to understand how members understood particular
board mechanisms associated with effective oversight, to understand how board members understood,
THEORIES OF BOARD BEHAVIOUR AND RESEARCH DESIGN
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
10
analysed and interpreted the information they provided, and to understand how board members
understood their relationship with the wider health economy in terms of commissioning and regulation
associated with patient safety.
In addition to these interviews, overt non-participant observation was undertaken by the research team at
four management board meetings at each case study site. This totalled nearly 50 hours of observation
(Table 2). Descriptive free-text field notes were taken by both observers at each meeting, supplemented
with documentary data including the agenda, supporting papers and (retrospectively on completion) the
minutes of each meeting. Data included an overview of comments made and questions raised and by
whom, and a log of the time spent on each agenda item. These have been summarised to provide an
overview of patient safety issues within the context of all board activity. Data from field notes were
compiled across multiple board meetings within each trust to detail board operations and identify the
manner in which patient safety-related issues were discussed.
We supplemented our instrumentalist analysis of conformance and performance with a dramaturgical
analysis of observation field notes following the framework developed by Hajer33,34 and previously used by
members of the team in a study of partnership boards.37 Reported in Chapter 7, this analysis explores the
scripting, setting, staging and performance of patient safety governance, revealing the manner in which
such work was conducted and the ability (or otherwise) of board members to ensure action.
Exploring board of governors’ oversight of patient safety
Interviews were undertaken with a variety of governors across the case study sites in order to understand
their experiences of working with their board and holding the executive to account in relation to patient
safety matters. These interviews asked governors to reflect on their abilities to exercise this function
and also explore different ways in which the role of governors could be improved.
In addition to these interviews, overt non-participant observation was undertaken at nine board of
governor meetings, totalling over 21 hours of observation (Table 3). This total number was less than the
board of directors observation owing to practical difficulties, as board of governor meetings tended to take
place only once every 3 months or so. Such a length of time between meetings meant it was difficult to
capture four meetings at each site within the study time frame.
TABLE 3 Summary of board of governor observations
Case study site Number of board of governor meetings Time observed
Islay 1 2 hours 21 minutes
Skye 2 4 hours 16 minutes
Arran 2 3 hours 43 minutes
Lewis 4 11 hours 7 minutes
Total 9 21 hours 27 minutes
TABLE 2 Summary of board observations
Case study site Number of board meetings Time observed
Islay 4 12 hours 46 minutes
Skye 4 14 hours 52 minutes
Arran 4 6 hours 1 minute
Lewis 4 14 hours 5 minutes
Total 16 47 hours 44 minutes
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As with the board observations, descriptive free-text field notes were taken by both observers at each
meeting, supplemented with documentary data including the agenda, supporting papers and
(retrospectively on completion) the minutes of each meeting.
Following ‘tracer’ issues in the trusts
In each trust we followed two ‘tracer’ issues on patient safety from board to ward. One of these (called a
‘board conformance issue’) was the same in each trust and reflected a patient safety issue requirement for
all trusts imposed by external regulators. The second (called a ‘board performance issue’) was different in
each trust and reflected the board’s response to a local issue requiring performance improvement.
This approach was informed by the work of Garratt.26 As discussed in Chapter 6, Garratt suggests that an
effective board is able to balance tasks simultaneously, with a ‘learning board’ having two sides: board
conformance (sometimes termed compliance) and board performance. Conformance itself involves
two aspects: ‘ensuring accountability’ through appropriate regulation and ‘supervision of management’
through conformance to key performance indicators. Similarly, performance also involves two aspects:
‘policy formulation and foresight’ and ‘strategic thinking’ to drive the enterprise forward by allowing it to
survive and grow by maintaining, learning and developing its position in its energy niches.
The tracer condition analysis looked to analyse the different ways in which these four board tasks
(policy formulation, strategic thinking, supervision of management and ensuring accountability) interacted
with each other.
Board ‘conformance issue’ analysis
In order to explore conformance to requirements within the governance of patient safety, each case study
focused on a specific ‘tracer’ related to patient safety activity. The selection of this tracer condition was
inductively derived from our initial observations of board and governor meetings, as well as our interviews
with board members. What became apparent from these observations and interviews was how boards
were required to conform to a range of performance indicators devised by the regulator Monitor. One of
the central targets related to patient safety was the monthly performance in relation to cases of C. difficile
infection. Across all of the sites, C. difficile infection rate was the central patient safety performance
indicator that boards were required to conform to.
As a result, our analysis of board ‘conformance’ related to the management of C. difficile infections as a
key performance indicator of infection prevention and control. Such a focus allowed us to explore the
manner in which the case study site incorporated patient safety requirements from external agencies
within its governance structures (i.e. how it undertook compliance).
Data collection for our conformance analysis built on a series of semistructured interviews with a variety
of stakeholders involved in the oversight and delivery of C. difficile infection prevention and control.
To achieve this, our research team contacted members of the infection prevention and control (IPC)
committees within each of the sites. A purposive sample of stakeholders was interviewed from each
committee, which included board members, managers, doctors, nurses and microbiologists. The selection
of these stakeholders was made on the basis that they had detailed understanding of the C. difficile
infection issue and were in charge of working with the board to successfully achieve the required level
of performance.
Board ‘performance issue’ analysis
In order to explore the performance aspect of governance, our research analysed how each case study site
dealt with a patient safety issue or incident identified during fieldwork, from ‘board to ward’. As with our
board conformance data collection, these issues were inductively derived from our observations of board
and governor meetings, as well as interviews with board members. From these we were able to ascertain
a number of examples of ‘policy formulation and foresight’ and ‘strategic thinking’ by the board, which
looked to respond to and improve patient safety. The eventual selection of issues and interventions would
THEORIES OF BOARD BEHAVIOUR AND RESEARCH DESIGN
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
12
be wide ranging and provided our analysis with the additional benefit of exploring in real-time board
development and response to patient safety issues. The selected issues were as follows:
l board development of a ‘staff stores’ initiative
l board development of the ‘bed plan’
l board development of the ‘After Francis’ initiative
l board development of junior doctors’ dissatisfaction.
A purposive sample was used to identify key stakeholders who were involved in the oversight and delivery
of these initiatives. This tended to start with the particular board members who were leading these
initiatives. Following on, our research then identified key stakeholders involved within each initiative across
the organisation. The eventual sample for each of these ‘performance’ tracers included managers, nurses,
doctors and allied health professionals.
Commissioning for patient safety
Where possible, interviews with commissioners were carried out to further understand the external
environment in relation to the governance of patient safety. These interviews reflected on the experience
of commissioners in their interactions with the FT boards regarding patient safety issues and concerns,
as well as documenting any important issues regarding the governance processes associated with
commissioning for patient safety.
Investigation of all of these issues entailed numerous interviews in each trust, as detailed in Table 4.
Manchester Patient Safety Framework
We had originally intended to administer the Manchester Patient Safety Framework (MaPSaF) to provide
further supporting information on the maturity of board safety culture within each case study site.
Designed as a diagnostic and development tool, the MaPSaF identifies dimensions related to working
practices, such as risk management training, the investigation of patient safety incidents and staff
education. However, during the course of fieldwork it became evident that most of the case study sites
were undertaking assessments of patient safety culture commissioned by external third parties,
and the decision was taken to avoid the risk of ‘culture assessment overload’ occasioned by further
summary assessment.
TABLE 4 Summary of research interviews undertaken by the project
Case study site
Executive
board
interviews
Conformance
tracer issue
(C. difficile
infection)
Performance
tracer issue
(local board
initiative) Governors Commissioners Totals
Skye 16 4 10 2 3 35
Lewis 15 9 7 4 4 39
Islay 13 5 3 2 2 25
Arran 13 1 3 0 0 17
Case study totals 57 19 23 8 9 116
Scoping interviews 11
Grand total 127
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Approach to qualitative data analysis
Our approach to qualitative data analysis proceeded through the three flows of activity, as outlined by
Miles et al.38 Here, a ‘data condensation’ process was used to select, focus, simplify and abstract data from
field notes of observations and interviews transcripts. A thematic approach to qualitative data analysis was
taken, whereby the data were coded, labelled and clustered into themes that both emerged from data as
well as directly related to our research questions and theoretical frameworks influencing the study.39
Approach to thematic analysis
For the interviews with board members, our analysis built on our literature review,17 which highlighted a
number of issues for boards in relation to the governance of patient safety. These would form the central
codes for the analysis (deductive); however, our analysis was also open to a variety of emerging themes
that occurred during the course of the fieldwork (inductive). The response to the Francis Inquiry findings
was an example of a code which emerged from the interview data.
Data analysis for the observation of board meetings was informed by Hajer33 and Hajer and Versteeg’s34
governance framework; their analytic dimensions of scripting, setting, staging and performance were used
as a deductive, a priori template (‘code book’) against which qualitative material within field notes were
organised. Thematic analysis revealed patterns (similarities and differences) within the data that were
important to the operation of governance,40,41 showing the divergent dramaturgies at play within each
specific site.
The tracer condition interviews were analysed using a combination of deductive and indicative approaches.
Our analysis was informed by the research questions (deductive); for example, our conformance data
analysis was particularly interested in the role of performance targets and measurement for C. difficile
infections. Our analysis was also inductive, particularly for the ‘performance’ interviews, as this sample
of interviews was one that emerged from the fieldwork as examples of board activity in relation to
patient safety.
The interviews with governors and commissioners would also proceed through a thematic approach,
whereby codes were generated specifically from the research questions (deductive); for example, from
analysing the experience of these groups in holding each hospital board to account. Our analysis would
also generate a selection of emergent codes (inductive) from the data. For example, the dynamic and
often turbulent environment of recent changes to the commissioning environment was something that
emerged as important to our research area. Our approach to these interviews was also iterative in that our
fieldwork had already carried out many of the board interviews and observations. These caused a number
of points worthy of further investigation to surface, which we then looked to explore.
Our ‘data display’ organised and compressed the transcribed interviews using the NVivo software
programme (QSR International, Warrington, UK). An example of each of our interview coding frames can
be found in Appendix 4. To provide inter-rater reliability, two members of the research team independently
coded data and discussed the application of the coding frames.
The case study analysis presents data drawn from multiple sources (interviews with a range of internal and
external stakeholders, observations and secondary documents), with a reporting structure organised in
relation to our main research questions. Data analysis proceeded in parallel with collection to iteratively
inform subsequent collection and refine the emerging analysis. Data from multiple sources was initially
coded against our main research questions drawn from the literature, the coding categories for individual
case study analysis being strategic vision; leadership activity; board mechanisms; governor relations;
assessment of performance; relationships with commissioners and regulators. These concerns are
presented as detailed individual case studies, with the initial research questions used as a point of
departure to explore the range of concerns revealed inductively within each case. The individual case
studies were then aggregated thematically to provide a summary overview chapter, with a subsequent
analysis offered of emergent themes across the case studies – principally concerning getting and using
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hard and soft intelligence (as opposed to data) and exploring resulting concerns and tensions between
conformance and performance.
Our purposive sampling strategy meant that decisions regarding data saturation point were made based
on practical purposes.
For the board interviews, our sample was the executive board. Saturation point was reached when all of
these interviews were included, with the exception of those members who declined to participate.
For the governor interviews, our sample criteria were built on capturing a subsection of governors who
could outline the central issues facing governors. We spoke to a selection of public governors at each
site. We did try to contact staff governors; however, we were unsuccessful in getting any to agree
to participate.
For the tracer condition interviews, our purposive samples and decisions about saturation point varied.
The conformance tracer condition (C. difficile infection) saturation point was reached when we had
interviewed all or near to all members of the IPC teams. The performance tracer condition would reach a
saturation point when we had spoken to range of stakeholders.
Surveying English NHS boards
Given the paucity of information available on English NHS boards, we used the BSAQ tool (discussed
shortly) along with other survey instruments as a means of providing an account of board composition,
activities and orientations. Our goals were as follows: first, to provide a basic descriptive account of English
NHS boards in acute hospitals, which is currently lacking in the literature; second, we wanted to provide
a snapshot of the BSAQ six-dimensional structure applied to English NHS boards; and, finally, we sought to
explore whether there were major differences between different types of hospitals, looking at FTs versus
non-FTs and THs versus non-THs.
Two national surveys were undertaken about board management in NHS acute and specialist hospital
trusts in England. The first of these surveys was issued to 150 trusts in the financial year 2011/12 as part of
the annual trust survey carried out by Dr Foster. The questionnaire was completed online via a dedicated
web tool. This survey gathered data on each trust’s board and activities related to the oversight of patient
safety; 145 replies were received, making for an overall response rate of 97%. We believe that this
response rate is unusually high because of the levels of engagement of NHS trusts with Dr Foster (in some
cases responses were omitted from individual questions, making the effective response rate slightly lower
for some data items). The national survey questions are contained in Appendix 5.
The second survey targeted individual board members from these trusts. We used an adapted version
of the BSAQ questionnaire that had been tested previously with a small sample of FTs in the English NHS29
(see Appendix 6 for the BSAQ questions). This survey was also completed through online means and data
were gathered between May 2012 and April 2013. By this time period, trust numbers were reduced to
144 because of merger activity in the sector. A total of 334 responses were received from 165 executive
and 169 non-executive board members, providing at least one response from 95 of the 144 NHS trusts
then in existence (66%). In order to gain trust-based estimates on each of the six BSAQ dimensions,
replies from individuals from the same trust were aggregated.
For all of the main indicators calculated across both surveys we explored differences between FTs and
non-FTs and between THs and non-THs.
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Assessing boards with the Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire
As interest has grown in understanding the effectiveness of boards, both inside and outside health care, a
range of board assessment tools have been developed and applied. Most prominent among these, and
a tool that has seen some use in health care, is the 65-item BSAQ. The BSAQ is derived from research
highlighting the characteristics of effective non-profit governing boards in the USA.42,43
The initial research on the BSAQ examined the practices of boards identified by a panel of experts on
board development as either reputedly very effective or reputedly very ineffective. On the basis of this
dichotomy of board development, the researchers isolated observable behaviours that were distinctive to
the more effective boards and, using the critical incident technique as part of a qualitative study, identified
six dimensions or competencies of effective board performance.42 Following the qualitative phase,
structured interviews with boards of trustees were used to aid the development of a self-administered
65-item questionnaire, in which each item is answered using a 4-point Likert-type scale. The BSAQ has
subsequently been subject to extensive testing for validity, reliability and sensitivity, and this process
confirmed that the six theoretically derived dimensions also had some empirical distinctiveness.44,45
These six dimensions are labelled: contextual, educational, interpersonal, analytical, political and strategic
(Box 1 provides more details). Four of these dimensions relate directly to Garratt’s instrumental board tasks
(located in Table 1) and the remaining two (educational and interpersonal) are more behavioural, reflecting
recognition of the need for boards to develop group cohesion, reflection and development.
Evaluating the Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire in the English
NHS context
Because the BSAQ has seen only limited use in the UK context, we revalidated the data structure of the
instrument using the data from English NHS boards. Factor analysis was performed at the respondent level
to explore underlying factors that characterise boards. This analytic strategy is more fully explored in
Chapter 8, in which the eigenvalues and item loadings are also presented.
BOX 1 The six BSAQ dimensions of board competencies
1. Contextual dimension. The board understands and takes into account the culture, values and norms of the
organisation it governs.
2. Educational dimension. The board takes the necessary steps to ensure that all board members are well
informed about the organisation and the professions working there, as well as the board’s own roles,
responsibilities and performance.
3. Interpersonal dimension. The board nurtures the development of board members as a group, attends to the
board’s collective welfare and fosters a sense of cohesiveness.
4. Analytical dimension. The board recognises complexities and subtleties in the issues it faces and draws upon
multiple perspectives to dissect complex problems and to synthesise appropriate responses.
5. Political dimension. The board accepts as one of its primary responsibilities the need to develop and
maintain healthy relationships among key stakeholders.
6. Strategic dimension. The board helps envisage and shape institutional direction and helps ensure a strategic
approach to the organisation’s future.
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Relating board-level variables to organisation-level quality and safety
After constructing the factor scores representing the six BSAQ dimensions and the total BSAQ score, we
explored whether or not these were correlated with patient safety measures (although we did not explore
a priori hypotheses). In doing so, we estimated various multivariate models regressing patient safety
measures (from Dr Foster) and measures of hospital ability to handle errors, near-misses and incidents,
taken from the National NHS Staff Survey (NSS) for 2012 on the total BSAQ score, controlling for a
number of hospital-level characteristics. The full range of dependent variables are described and presented
in Chapter 8 and more fully in Appendix 7.
Integrating quantitative and qualitative data
The implications of the findings from the literature review, qualitative case studies and the national surveys
were discussed at meetings of the whole research team. The original research objectives were used to
structure the discussion; for each of the five keys objectives the relevant qualitative data were discussed
and a consensus achieved regarding how to interlock the findings relating to each objective. Chapter 5
presents the ‘integrated’ findings relating to each research objective.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter we have set out the basic theoretical framings used to shape data collection and interpret
the findings, and we have laid out the various stages of qualitative and quantitative data gathering.
Subsequently, Chapters 4–7 present various aspects of the qualitative data and Chapter 8 provides a full
account of the quantitative data. The qualitative data have been structured in the following way: Chapter 4
provides an overview of findings across all four case sites; Chapter 5 provides more detailed analysis on a
case-by-case basis; Chapter 6 displays the findings from our tracer issues (two for each trust site); and,
finally, Chapter 7 takes a dramaturgical view of board performance to explore the more symbolic aspects
of board practice(s).
First, however, we turn to the literature that underpins the work: Chapter 3 provides a synthesis of existing
empirical work and a systematic narrative review exploring board composition and activities alongside
organisational performance.
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Chapter 3 Systematic narrative review and
synthesis
Introduction
Although standards and guidance on board oversight have been produced, as have summaries of evidence
of the effectiveness of board oversight of quality and safety, the research base in relation to board
oversight of patient safety has not yet been fully exploited. The purpose of this chapter is to review and
synthesise this evidence base. It begins with an overview of the literature review methods employed,
before presenting the results, which are connected to four discernible storylines regarding board
governance of patient safety.
Review methods
The research carried out a narrative systematic review in order to describe, interpret and synthesise key
findings and debates concerning board oversight of patient safety.46 We also produced a synthesis of these
findings with the intention of supporting the development of our empirical work and contributing to wider
debates regarding policy and practice within this area.
An initial systematic search of the area (Table 5) enabled us to map the broad parameters of the literature
and map their development over time. To ensure rigour, we followed accepted practice in identifying the
review focus, specifying the review question, searching for and mapping the available evidence and
identifying studies for inclusion.46 In selecting papers, we focused on those that considered board oversight
in the context of quality and safety, and the research team and expert panel suggested seminal works and
advised on search terms. The team drew up a list of key terms and searched the published literature from
1991 to 2012 across a number of databases, excluding non-English-language articles.
The team then reviewed titles and abstracts for relevance, using broad inclusion criteria to identify studies
of hospital board directors’ or boards of trustees’ oversight of quality and patient safety. Our initial
search uncovered 187 articles and, after reviewing the titles and abstracts, we identified a subset of
66 papers for detailed study, which we added to those identified by earlier reviews,47 removing duplicates.
Disagreements about whether or not to select a reference for full review were resolved by discussion
within the team. Finally, we used snowballing techniques to augment papers for review – manually, by
searching references of included papers, and electronically, by using citation-tracking software to identify
papers that cited already included papers. These searches were adapted iteratively to ensure maximum
capture of empirical work; at the end of the process 124 publications were deemed relevant.
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We followed guidance on narrative synthesis from Popay et al.48 in our data extraction and appraisal of
study quality. Our key concern was to understand the effectiveness of oversight in terms of board
composition and interventions with boards, such as the setting of standards and benchmarks. In particular,
we were keen to explore any evidence for improved performance and patient outcomes, such as
reductions in mortality and morbidity, from board interventions, as well as identifying factors that impact
on the effective implementation of those board interventions. The synthesis phase of the review explored
key aspects of board oversight of quality and patient safety and identified four common storylines:
l leading for safer care
l measuring safe care
l internal board oversight
l external regulation and accountability.
After a brief historical account of the growth of the field, we will examine each storyline in turn and
present a narrative synthesis.
TABLE 5 Systematic search of board governance and patient safety
Search title and abstract from 1991 to 2012
Board governance
Hospital board
Board of trustees
Boards of management
Management boards
Board members
Board chairpersons
AND patient safety or safety
AND quality
Database searched Number of results
HMIC 11
EMBASE 103
MEDLINE 32
ASSIA 20
EBSCOhost (CINAHL and Business Premier) 52
SSCI 39
Total with duplicates removed 187
ASSIA, Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts; CINAHL, Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature;
EBSCOhost, Elton B Stephens Company; HMIC, Health Management Information Consortium; SSCI, Social Sciences
Citation Index.
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The literature uncovered
A growing field of enquiry
The US Institute of Medicine’s reports, To Err Is Human: Building a Safer Health System49 and Crossing the
Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century,50 and the UK Chief Medical Officer’s report
into learning from adverse events, An Organisation with a Memory,51 were hugely influential in calling for
changes to health-care systems and organisations that would improve quality and safety. It is, therefore,
unsurprising that our results show large and rapid growth since 2000 in the number of published articles
that relate to hospital board oversight of quality and patient safety (Figure 1), a trend that reinforces
the increased policy salience of board oversight of safety.
The study of board oversight in relation to quality and patient safety can be situated within the broader
literature that addresses the role of leadership in improving quality in US hospitals.52–56 With variable
successes achieved by hospitals in implementing quality improvement programmes and initiatives,57,58 the
publication of empirical studies of US hospitals emerges from 2004 onwards, revealing variation in the
adoption of board practices that are thought to be associated with higher performance and better patient
outcomes (Table 6).53,66 These cross-sectional surveys of predominantly non-profit hospitals indicate the
importance of examining the leadership actions that are thought to influence the effectiveness of quality
improvement activities in hospital settings.71
From 2008, larger-scale studies covering wider geographical areas begin to feature. Building on the
cross-sectional survey of the prevalence and impact of board activities in US hospitals,52 Jiang et al.64
developed the scope of their evaluation of board oversight to include impact on clinical outcome measures
such as mortality, morbidity and complications, as well as differences in the processes of care. Jha and
Epstein57 carried out the first national survey of board chairpersons in the USA to analyse board
engagement with clinical quality and identify differences between board activities in high- and
low-performing organisations.
From 2010, studies have emerged that seek to differentiate and explore board activities related to patient
safety in specific socioeconomic, organisational and geographical contexts. Jha and Epstein62 pursued an
explicitly socioeconomic focus to compare boards of directors’ priorities and practices in serving the
interests of minority-group patients. Prybil et al.68 examined specific board structures, practices and cultures
that relate to good governance in US non-profit community health systems. Baker et al.59 carried out the
first significant study of board governance and quality and safety in Canadian health-care organisations,
and studies from the UK have emerged that analyse the formal governance arrangements for HCAIs and
medication errors.70 More recently, Jha and Epstein63 conducted the first national survey of English hospital
board activities, providing an international comparison with their survey of non-profit acute care hospital
boards in the USA. In addition, studies have also been published examining health board oversight of
quality and safety in the Netherlands,72 Scotland73 and Australia.74
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
FIGURE 1 Results of the systematic search of board oversight and patient safety.
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TABLE 6 Summary of major empirical studies exploring board oversight of safe care
Author (year)
country Participants Context (aims)
Board assessment
(methods) Summary of findings
Baker et al.
(2010),59
Canada and
the USA
15 governance experts,
average of 10 board
members across four
case studies, survey of
Quebec and Ontario
health economies
To identify governance
practices and improve
governance related to
patient safety
Semistructured
interviews, documentary
analysis and survey
Effective governance is in
its early stages. Better
information, expertise,
plans, skills and
relationships still required
Grey and Weiss
(2004),60 USA
98 CEOs and trustees
from 16 non-profit
hospitals in the New
York area
To learn about how
trustees define their
responsibilities, how
they relate to hospital
activities and their
decision-making
processes
Structured, open-ended
interviews with trustees
and CEOs
Governance by boards
was a strength and
weakness for non-profit
hospitals. Fundamental
ambiguities in the ethical
significance of the trustee
role were identified
Goeschel et al.
(2011),61 USA
35 boards from
cross-section of
hospitals across
Tennessee and
Michigan
To identify effective
measures to monitor
quality
Survey and voluntary
site request for safety
scorecards
Measures varied widely
with uncertain validity.
More valid outcome
measures required
Jha and Epstein
(2010),57 USA
722 chairpersons from
non-profit acute care
hospitals
To determine board
engagement and
activities in relation to
quality of care
Survey and composite
measures of hospital
performance
Quality of care often not
a top priority. Differences
in quality-related activities
between high- and
low-performing
institutions
Jha and Epstein
(2012),62 USA
722 chairpersons from
‘black-serving’ and
‘non-black-serving’
non-profit hospitals
To compare how
boards at black-serving
and non-black-serving
hospitals engage in
quality-of-care issues
Survey and composite
measures of hospital
performance
Board chairpersons of
black-serving hospitals
report fewer expertise
and priorities regarding
quality issues than
chairpersons of non-black
serving hospitals
Jha and Epstein
(2013),63 UK
132 chairpersons from
a cross-section of
English hospitals
To compare governance
practices among English
and US hospital boards
Survey and composite
measures of hospital
performance
English board
chairpersons report more
expertise and emphasis
on quality-of-care issues
than the USA; however,
hospital performance
against quality metrics
not as substantial as
the USA
Jiang et al.
(2008),52 USA
562 hospital
presidents/CEOs across
50 states selected from
the 2006 TGI survey
To examine the
prevalence and impact
of particular board
activities
Survey and composite
measures of hospital
performance
Governing boards are
engaged in quality
oversight, particularly
through internal data and
national benchmarks
Jiang et al.
(2009),64 USA
Based on a data set
from Jiang et al.
(2008)52
To examine differences
in hospital quality
performance associated
with particular practices
Based on Jiang et al.
(2008)52
Better performance
associated with having a
board quality committee,
strategic goals, a
quality agenda, safety
dashboards/benchmarks
and involvement of
physician leaders
Jiang et al.
(2011),65 USA
445 hospitals selected
from the 2007
TGI survey
To explore the practices
of governing boards in
quality oversight
through the lens of
agency theory
Survey and composite
measures of care
and mortality
Regular review of quality
performance is the most
common practice
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TABLE 6 Summary of major empirical studies exploring board oversight of safe care (continued )
Author (year)
country Participants Context (aims)
Board assessment
(methods) Summary of findings
Joshi and Hines
(2006),66 USA
47 CEOs and board
chairpersons from
cross-section of
30 hospitals across
14 states
To determine whether
or not hospital leaders
understand safety
and quality issues and
activities
Interview survey and
composite measures of
clinical quality
Overall level of knowledge
low. Significant differences
between perceptions. Mild
association between board
engagement and hospital
performance
Kroch et al.
(2006),53 USA
Convenience sample of
139 hospitals across
nine states
To analyse hospital
board dashboards and
its relationship to
leadership engagement
Online dashboard
implementation survey
and performance
data analysis using
composite measures
Variation and
commonalities in the way
dashboards are created
and used. Improved
quality linked to shorter,
more focused dashboards
Machell et al.
(2010),15 UK
Nurse executives and
boards in six English
NHS hospital trusts
To examine board focus
on clinical quality and
nurse executives in
supporting this
Observations Clinical quality occupied a
fragile position. Nurse
executives are well placed
to help
Mastal et al.
(2007),67 USA
73 hospital chief
executives, CNOs and
chairpersons from
63 hospitals
To analyse board
engagement in quality
and safety and the role
of nursing within this
Telephone interviews
and focus group
Significant differences in
perceptions between
CNOs, chairpersons and
CEOs. Boards had limited
comprehension of salient
nursing quality issues
Prybil et al.
(2010),68 USA
CEOs from 123
non-profit community
health systems
To examine oversight
of patient quality at
non-profit community
health systems and
compare with
benchmarks of
good governance
Survey and benchmark
analysis
Activities associated with
effective governance
include standing
committees and safety
targets/reports. Gaps
continue between
present reality and
current benchmarks
Prybil et al.
(2013),69 USA
Senior trustees and
CEOs from 14 private
non-profit health
systems
To examine board
oversight of quality in
private non-profit
health systems and
compare with
benchmarks of
good governance
Documents, interviews
and benchmark analysis
Effective governance
identified in majority of
boards with presence
of standing committees,
system wide quality
measures and action
plans directed at
improving quality
Ramsay et al.
(2010),70 UK
Case study of 21
personnel, including
board members
from a hospital trust
in England
To describe the external
and internal governance
systems for HCAIs and
medication errors in a
NHS trust
Documentary analysis
and interviews
Nationally, HCAIs a
higher priority than
medication errors.
Governance of
medication errors took
place at divisional or
ward level
Vaughn et al.
(2006),71 USA
CEOs and senior
executives from a
cross-section sample
of 413 hospitals in
eight states
Identify characteristics
of hospital leadership
engagement in quality
improvement
Survey and composite
measures of clinical
quality
Better quality associated
with boards spending
more than 25% of time
on quality issues;
that received formal
measurement reports;
and communicating a
quality strategy to
medical staff
CNO, chief nursing officer (US); TGI, The Governance Institute (San Diego, CA, USA).
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The theoretical and conceptual dimensions of board oversight have also received more explicit attention.
Jiang et al.65 employ the agency theory perspective as a lens through which to explore the role and
practices of hospital governing boards, while Ford-Eickoff et al.75 explore how concepts such as complexity
absorption and requisite variety can support hospital board governance and oversight, hypothesising that
boards with greater variety and breadth of expertise among its membership can better respond to complex
environments and have greater potential for sense-making and learning.
Emerging storylines
Our review of board oversight of patient safety identifies a variety of empirical evidence and expert advice
that suggests that specific board activities are associated with improvement in the quality and safety of
hospital care. However, the results also suggest that the adoption of such activities remains variable and
that our understanding of boards’ impact on patient safety is currently limited. We present the findings
thematically, as four storylines derived from the narrative review: (1) leading for safer care, (2) measuring
safe care, (3) internal board oversight and (4) external regulation and accountability.
Leading for safer care
Board oversight of patient safety tends to reflect a key message from the quality improvement literature as
a whole; that is, that strong and committed leadership from the CEO and the board is vital to the success
of quality improvement and safety programmes.56,76–79 A review by Clarke et al.80 suggests that leadership
on patient safety should learn from the characteristics and behaviours of high-reliability organisations,
such as those found in the nuclear and aviation industries. In health care, leadership is associated with
perceiving lapses in patient safety to be a problem of the system rather than individual employees, and
with words and actions that promote a culture that encourages the identification of mistakes, emphasises
system improvements that reduce variability and makes safety a given.
Empirical evidence from cross-sectional surveys in the USA suggests that boards that demonstrate such
leadership have a positive impact on the safety performance of its organisations. Boards that place a high
priority on quality and safety are associated with higher performance,64 as are boards that set strategic
goals for quality improvement and demand reports on the progress of action in response to adverse
events.52,72,81 A US national survey of 722 chairpersons in 2007 and 2008 by Jha and Epstein found
that respondents from high-performing non-profit hospitals were more likely than respondents from
low-performing non-profit hospitals to establish and publicly disseminate goals and to perceive themselves
as influential throughout the organisation.57
Although such practices have been found to be associated with effective leadership on patient safety,
empirical evidence suggests significant variation in the implementation. Drawing on the 2006 TGI (The
Governance Institute, San Diego, CA, USA) survey of 562 chairpersons and CEOs from hospitals across the
USA, Jiang et al.52 found that fewer than half the CEOs regarded their organisations’ governing boards as
very effective in overseeing quality. Similarly, Baker et al.59 found in case studies of Canadian and US
health-care organisations that, although most boards had established strategic goals for quality
improvement, many did not have specific objectives with clearly defined targets, which suggests that
words are not necessarily backed up by actions. Observational research by Machell et al.15 of how nurse
executives and boards work in acute care hospitals and mental health trusts across England found that
many chief nursing officers (CNOs) perceived board members to be only moderately engaged in quality
improvement initiatives. This was attributed to members’ lack of knowledge about quality and patient
safety issues, the limited time available for participating in quality initiatives and to a lack of quality
champions at board level. Such a view is echoed in qualitative research of non-profit hospitals in the USA.
Interviews with CEOs and trustees by Grey and Weiss60 in 1998 and 1999 found that the two most
important issues for local non-profit hospital boards in the New York area were mergers/acquisitions and
financial management, with hospital quality and safety receiving far less attention. These findings are
consistent with US national survey data from Jha and Epstein,57 which revealed that approximately half of
the non-profit hospital boards did not rate quality of care as a top priority for board oversight or for
CEO performance evaluation. Most boards were primarily focused on financial issues, assuming that its
quality of care was adequate.
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Measuring safe care
Board oversight of quality and patient safety rests on directors’ ability to obtain, process and interpret
information, assess current performance and set strategic direction using a range of metrics that are
tailored to local circumstances. A variety of expert advice has been produced to encourage boards to
understand the big picture on quality and safety performance through the use of checklists and
dashboards.82–87 Reinertsen88 summarises the steps that trustees can take to manage quality in their
organisations by focusing on a limited number of internal quality measures, or ‘dots’, and argues that
such an approach can generate significant improvements, particularly in terms of building organisational
buy-in, maintaining constancy of purpose and nurturing collaborative effort.
Empirical evidence from US hospital surveys suggests that boards that engage in reviewing and tracking
its organisation’s performance through the collection and analysis of internally generated data (quality
dashboards or scorecards) and national benchmarks are likely to have better outcomes in relation to
quality.52,64,65 This finding is supported by US research by Kroch et al.,53 whose analysis of hospital
board dashboard composition found that higher-performing organisations were more likely than their
lower-performing counterparts to have dashboards that were shorter and more frequently reviewed and
that focused on areas that are critical for quality. In England, single case study research conducted in 2008
by Ramsay et al.70 found that scorecard data in a hospital offered a view of the organisation as a whole
and facilitated division- and ward-specific analysis and feedback on the governance of HCAIs. Empirical
studies and expert advice also emphasise, alongside the use of formal performance metrics and
quantitative data sets, the role of soft intelligence in capturing the qualitative experience of patients
and staff, which often defies simple coding and quantification.59,89 In the USA, interviews with board
chairpersons and CEOs by Joshi and Hines66 identified measurement of patient centredness as a key issue
for board oversight of quality of care and recommended tapping into informal and soft intelligence
channels as a key means for safeguarding care, including through executive walkabouts, patients telling
their stories at board meetings and board members shadowing clinicians so that they might better
understand frontline challenges in delivering safe care.
Patient safety metrics are clearly important in any strategy that is designed to improve care, but the
empirical evidence suggests a need for considerable effort to increase board members’ proficiency in the
use and interpretation of metrics and to improve the credibility, validity and reliability of data. Baker et al.59
found that many Canadian health-care organisations had struggled to develop useful measurements for
board oversight of quality and patient safety. Their survey of board chairpersons from hospital, as well as
regional and community, organisations reported that, despite boards receiving and discussing a range of
quantitative indicators, only half rated the information as good or excellent in enabling them accurately to
assess its organisation’s performance. In England, research found that the information that was accessible
to hospital boards generally fell short of the then NHS regulator’s recommended range of quantitative and
qualitative material90 and that more needed to be done to cascade information about safety performance
to frontline staff.78 The recent survey of 132 chairpersons in England by Jha and Epstein63 also reported
variable use of quality metrics among English hospital boards and found that boards of hospitals with
foundation status were more likely than non-profit boards in the USA to use quality dashboards, request
quality reports and review specific quality data as part of its oversight activities. Variation in the use of
metrics by US boards is illustrated by the survey and scorecard analysis of Goeschel et al.,61 which show
significant differences in the use of scorecards across the participating hospitals in Michigan and
Tennessee. In contrast, interview and documentary research by Prybil et al.69 found a high degree of
consistency in measurement, with 11 of 14 large, non-profit health systems in the USA formally adopting
system-wide quality measures and standards.
Expert advice has sought to address the need for board members to have greater awareness of and
understanding about quality and safety, recommending that quality expertise be included in board
member competency profiles and suggesting that boards receive training and continuing education in
areas to do with quality and safety.90 Evans91 suggests that exams for board members on the use and
implementation of quality measures could improve quality and accountability of care in hospitals.
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Empirical studies have assessed the quality literacy of hospital boards by considering members’
participation in formal training programmes and setting time aside to develop knowledge and capability in
relation to improving patient safety.73,74 Some of this work has revealed the limited time and resources that
many boards devote to such activities. US and Canadian research found a ‘remarkably low’ degree of
knowledge among hospital boards about published quality reports and best-practice guidance in relation
to safe care,66 with many board members having only limited expertise in using and implementing such
information.59 Formal training for boards on clinical quality also appears to be underdeveloped.57 Reflecting
on the findings of the 2006 TGI survey in the USA, Jiang et al.64 suggest that the lack of formal training
poses specific difficulties for board members who are drawn from sectors outside health care, who are less
likely to have the technical skills that would enable them adequately to address clinical quality issues. More
recently, comparative research by Jha and Epstein63 has found that chairpersons in NHS hospitals make a
higher assessment of their own expertise in relation to quality than do their US counterparts. Moreover,
the surveys suggest that board chairpersons’ assessments of their hospitals’ quality performance (in both
England and the USA) are over-rated when compared with the external assessments undertaken by the
Hospital Quality Alliance (in the USA) and the CQC (in England).
Internal board oversight
The role of hospital board members in overseeing quality of care has been characterised as being to
monitor the strategic plans that senior management develop or to act as advisors and work at the
periphery of the decision-making process.75,92 Baker et al.59 note that health boards historically tended to
delegate the oversight function to medical staff and did not consider quality and safety issues to be its top
priority, which might reflect a recognition on the part of board members of clinical leaders’ expertise and
the traditional separation between the responsibilities of administrative and medical staff.
The increasing interest in board oversight of patient safety has also focused on formal organisational
structures and processes for safeguarding care, as well as the informal relationships and dynamics between
boards and professional groups. One aspect of this is board agendas and the extent to which patient
safety is discussed at board meetings.73,74 Findings from US hospital settings suggest that having quality
and safety as standing items on the board agenda provides a critical lever for engagement in quality and
safety issues.57,66 Jiang et al.52 found that most board meetings had agenda items on quality, but only 41%
of boards indicated that they spent > 20% of meeting time on quality. Hospitals in which boards spent
≥ 20% of meeting time on quality had better process-of-care rates than hospitals in which boards spent
less time on quality.64 This research supports earlier findings on variability between hospitals in relation
to the amount of time that boards give to quality and safety. In England, qualitative research from the
Healthcare Commission90 found that safety is rarely the first item on the board agenda. This is supported
by the observational research of English hospital boards by Machell et al.,15 whose main conclusion was
that considerations of clinical quality were accorded a low priority in boardrooms, compared with financial
matters, organisational restructuring and the need to meet central government performance targets.
The formal structure of boards has also been found to be related to the effective oversight of patient
safety.93 US national survey data show that boards with a separate quality committee are more likely than
those without to be high performing. High-performing organisations are more likely to use quality
dashboards or scorecards, issue written policy throughout the organisation and establish strategic goals for
quality improvement.52,63,64 However, qualitative research into a hospital trust in England by Ramsay et al.70
found differing opinions about the effectiveness of subcommittees. Although there was concern about
potential duplication of messages, which might lead to mistakes in reporting, duplication of key messages
was also seen as necessary to sustain staff engagement in safety-related issues.
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Effective board oversight of safety also requires attention to be paid to dynamics and tensions within and
between boards, medical staff and senior leaders.94 In particular, expert advice advocates having a
physician leader on a board quality committee to enhance performance by facilitating communication and
building trust and confidence.88,92,94 The empirical analysis of the 2007 TGI survey by Jiang et al.64 found
that hospitals in which representatives with clinical expertise served on the board quality committee
performed significantly better on process and outcomes of care than did hospitals that had no such
expertise on its boards. Collaborative retreats with multidisciplinary staff groups95 and internal
collaboratives, built around safety initiatives, have also been found to enhance safeguarding processes.55
Although such intergroup dynamics are associated with benefits, expert advice and empirical research
highlight the need for board development in the area. Nursing leadership, for example, remains
conspicuously absent from many board deliberations and decision-making.15,67,96–99 Grey and Weiss60 note
that further discussion is required about the ethical conflicts and ambiguities that can arise when board
members combine professional and clinical interests with corporate roles and duties. Boards’ relationships
with the wider patient community also need consideration. A survey of US non-profit hospitals by Jha and
Epstein,57 conducted in 2008, suggested that board chairpersons in hospitals that predominantly serve
black populations reported less expertise and prioritisation of quality issues than chairpersons of boards in
non-black-serving hospitals.
External regulation and accountability
Our primary focus has been on internal processes for board oversight of patient safety, but we also
considered research into the external accountability of boards. Case study research by Baker et al.59 found
that Canadian organisations grappled with the challenge of reconciling the information needed for
external accountability with that required to inform local improvements. One dilemma was about whether
or not to make performance data publicly available. Some hospitals had made available information on
incidence of C. difficile, MRSA and vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) infections, while others were
approaching the issue more cautiously.
In the English NHS, a case study of a hospital by Ramsay et al.70 considered the board’s accountability in
relation to national targets and regulatory bodies for HCAIs and medication errors. Although the
researchers could not categorically conclude that stronger external governance resulted in more effective
local governance, they found that, at the time of data collection in 2008, rates of HCAIs such as MRSA
and C. difficile infections were amenable to meta-regulation, for example through target setting.
Medication error data based on incident reports were identified as being more difficult to govern, because
such events tended to be more open to interpretation and to suffer from substantial under-reporting.
Qualitative research by the Healthcare Commission90 in England found that, despite the onus on
commissioners or purchasers of services to drive up quality and safety through contracting and payment
systems, there were local variations in the extent to which commissioners had robust information systems
in place for holding hospitals to account for the quality of care that they provided. Commissioning practice
in holding provider organisations to account varied across health economies from ad hoc requests to
providers for reports of serious untoward incidents to the systematic benchmarking of providers against
indicators of quality and safety. The research found that the most effective accountability arrangements
between commissioners and providers were those that were supported through ‘relational contracting’
and which built on strong personal relationships and collaborative, rather than competitive, partnerships
between organisations.
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Synthesis and discussion of findings
Studies of board governance and patient safety have identified a wide range of governance practices that
are associated with higher performance. Some are to do with routine feedback and monitoring in the
corporate board environment, such as spending time on quality issues, using quality performance reports,
reviewing dashboard indicators regularly to monitor quality and setting quality goals at the theoretical ideal
level rather than average levels or national benchmarks. Others are more strategic in focus, such as
involving medical staff in the quality strategy, having a quality subcommittee and developing new clinical
programmes and services to meet quality-related criteria. Finally, approaches to do with wider systems of
governance have a part to play, such as the exploration of different ways of producing public reports to
enhance transparency and accountability to the community, and the equal involvement of board
(corporate) and medical (professional/collegiate) staff in setting the agenda.57,64,65,71
Taken together, the findings suggest that empirical studies of patient safety governance are informed by
the broad assumption that failures in safety (adverse events) are not brought about solely by individual
human error but are conditioned, precipitated and exacerbated by wider systemic and latent factors in the
work environment and organisational context,100 and are therefore amenable to control and prevention.
This assumption functions as a latent programme theory in the field of enquiry, and its influence is clearly
seen in the nature of the dependent and independent variables selected in the more recent large-scale
quantitative studies considered above. To summarise, empirical studies of board governance of patient
safety are clearly situated within a quality and safety paradigm.18
Methodological and theoretical development
Despite such apparent coherence in a relatively new and emergent empirical literature, the field remains
methodologically and theoretically underdeveloped. The empirical study of board governance and patient
safety consists largely of cross-sectional surveys, predominantly undertaken in US acute health-care
settings. The limitations of this study design are acknowledged and include poor generalisability and an
inability to substantiate causal relationships between study variables, as opposed to statistical correlations.
Although cross-sectional empirical studies have increasingly specified board processes and reporting
arrangements in addition to expected outcomes of good patient safety governance, such as low
readmission rates and avoidance of adverse events,52,64 hypothesised relationships between dependent
and independent variables generally remain ill-defined. The implicit assumption that aspects of board
oversight lead to high-performing organisations66 is plausible, but this relationship is likely to be
multidirectional and is potentially confounded by a variety of factors that are currently not well described
in the literature or elaborated within multivariate empirical models.
Although empirical studies document the structural characteristics of hospitals in terms of size, ownership,
teaching status, urban/rural location and region within its respective samples, the cross-sectional design
has often left implicit or been unable to attribute differences in processes and outcomes of patient care
quality and safety between different types of hospitals (e.g. for profit/non-profit/community/acute care)
and hospital boards (e.g. local/multiunit systems). The analysis of these causal relationships is likely to be
important when we consider the current environmental and organisational pressures facing hospitals,
particularly those in the USA, given the increasing consolidation of hospitals into multiunit systems
noted earlier.
Theory could play a much more explicit role in the development of hypothesised relationships between
independent and dependent variables for empirical testing in this field of enquiry. In addition, a closer
relationship between theory and empirical work would strengthen the credibility of advice on how best to
govern for patient safety. This is an important consideration, given that the corporate governance literature
makes conflicting normative claims about how board members should behave, some of which originate
in the assumptions of the theoretical model rather than in empirical verification of the behaviour’s ability
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to achieve a specified outcome. In short, although plenty of advice is available to boards regarding what
they should do, the advice is conflicting because of different expectations of what boards are for. The rival
theoretical traditions that inform competing schools of corporate governance are summarised well by
Chambers and Cornforth,19 but it might be helpful briefly to consider the rival theoretical framings of
agency and stewardship perspectives on corporate governance, to illustrate its potential for explicit
hypothesis generation to underpin empirical enquiry and to provide an example of how the implicit use of
theory may lead to conflicting advice on what boards ought to do.
Agency theories of corporate governance require the board to develop processes to ensure the effective
scrutiny of executives, on the assumption that the interests of citizens and officials are not aligned and
officials will act to secure their own interests. In contrast, stewardship models assume greater alignment of
interests between executives and citizens and emphasise the importance of board processes in improving
performance.19 From an agency perspective, one might reasonably hypothesise that boards that hold
executives to account through elaborate systems of audit (checking) will achieve better patient safety
outcomes. Alternatively, from a stewardship perspective one might hypothesise that such systems are likely
to reduce the creativity that committed executives require if they are to drive superior performance
(trusting).101 Agency and stewardship framings are both found in the patient safety literature, the former in
the study by Jiang et al.65 and the latter by Prybil et al.68 where it is suggested that boards appear to be
embracing the stewardship of quality and safety as a fundamental duty. However, in neither case are these
models explicitly used to generate testable hypotheses that underpin the empirical work.
Although we strongly argue for more explicit use of the corporate governance literature to guide empirical
work, we also encourage greater attention to be paid to the potential limits of the corporate governance
literature in relation to patient safety. Specifically, we draw attention to the implications of cultural
theory102 for governance for patient safety. Hood’s model identifies markets and professional clans as
bases of authority (modes of governance) that potentially compete with the corporate board, the
implication being that the operation of insurance markets and/or professional bodies may limit a board’s
ability to govern. Contextual differences are important in terms of the institutional arrangements that
characterise health-care systems. Comparative evidence of such differences is emerging, most notably Jha
and Epstein’s63 recent observation of substantial differences between boards of directors in England and
the USA, which were accounted for by the different roles and resources allocated to board members, as
well as the different health-care systems in each country.
Therefore, board governance as a mechanism for change is likely to lead to different outcomes according
to the context. Critical reflection is required on the extent to which the current field of corporate
governance is appropriately conceptualised and applicable to the complex quasi-markets, multiunit systems
and professional bureaucracies that tend to characterise health care. In short, greater attention to the
theoretical and conceptual basis of board governance would help the development of the empirical field
and help to prevent, for example, the making of simple prescriptions for strong leadership without first
defining such leadership, how it is to be obtained and the nature of the causal mechanisms that lead to its
desired effects.
Given the methodological and theoretical limitations noted, it is clear that the quantitative study of board
oversight for patient safety requires further work, in terms of developing new measures and relationships,
underpinned by crisper theorising. It is especially important to test assumed causal relationships between
practices that are associated with good governance and desired outcomes in terms of safer care;
moreover, evaluation programmes will need to assess the extent to which interventions are implemented
as intended, as well as to search for unintended consequences. In addition, further study of the
microprocesses associated with board governance is required.103 Although qualitative and case study
research is beginning to emerge in this area,59,70 further study of the practices undertaken in the
boardroom would provide much-needed insight into exactly how patient safety governance is exercised
and experienced.
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Concluding remarks
Despite growing pressures for boards to improve and emerging evidence that more effective board
oversight is associated with higher quality of care, efforts to create effective governance for quality and
patient safety are in its early stages. Many boards have focused largely on financial performance and
access issues and are still developing the broader skills needed to assume a more corporate role while
assembling the necessary expertise in quality and patient safety.
In the context of increasing expectations and pressure to deliver better care more safely, it is more urgent
than ever that hospital governing boards take action to strengthen its oversight of patient safety. The
review has captured some of the key areas where boards may be able to develop greater expertise, for
example through the provision of better information and education for board members in the use of data
to inform decision-making. However, our review also suggests that efforts to create effective governance
for quality and patient safety remain variable and are in the early stages of development. The findings from
the review, including the emerging storylines, were used to inform the theoretical basis of the study and
structure the empirical work undertaken as part of the present study and outlined in Chapters 4–8.
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Chapter 4 Overview of cases and emerging
themes
Introduction and guiding research questions
This is the first of five chapters presenting new empirical findings, the first four of which cover the
qualitative case study work, and the fifth and final of which explores findings from the
quantitative surveys.
This opening chapter presents a synthesis of material from all four case study sites to address each of our
five main research objectives in turn:
1. identify the governance activities undertaken by hospital trust boards with regard to ensuring safe care
in its organisation
2. explore the role of boards and boards of governors in FTs with regard to the oversight of patient safety
in the organisation
3. assess the association between particular hospital trust board activities and patient safety processes and
clinical outcomes
4. identify the facilitators and barriers to developing effective hospital trust board governance of safe care
5. assess the impact of external commissioning arrangements and incentives on hospital trust board
oversight of patient safety.
For each research question, a brief summary of similarities and differences between case study sites is
provided and important emergent themes within the data explored.
Governance activities
In this section, we present an account of the governance activities of the board, examining strategy,
leadership and attention given to patient safety issues by boards.
Strategic activity
In our study sample, all the trusts were greatly exercised by strategic concerns, but case study sites were
highly differentiated in the robustness of its strategic approaches to the governance of patient safety.
Skye was perhaps the least developed, lacking a coherent strategy because of extensive recent periods of
turnover in executive board membership and beset with financial difficulties which, understandably,
focused the attention of the board during the period of observation. Although there was much scope for
development at this site, there was also cause for optimism given more recent board membership
reconfiguration and the potential for strategic focus that this brings. In contrast, Islay had developed a
patient safety and quality improvement strategy that was closely integrated into the business of the trust.
The board saw themselves as quality and safety strategy pioneers; this was reflected in highly developed
leadership activities (see below) as well as more strategically in its translation of strategic goals into
summary indicators and reporting systems which were reviewed within board meetings. Therefore,
although the trust was able to track its compliance with performance indicators related to patient safety
monitored by regulatory agencies, this was done in the context of the quality monitoring and improvement
activity required to meet internal strategic goals. This emphasis was reflected in the structure of the board
meeting agenda, which was designed to support a focus on continuous improvement to meet internal
strategic goals.
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Lewis and Arran are both widely acknowledged as elite organisations, a significant proportion of their
work involving the provision of specialist clinical services. Consequently, both have highly organised
medical workforces who inform strategic developments within their fields. At Lewis, the overall strategic
direction of the trust is built on a very strong CEO who effectively personifies the trust. The emphasis is on
securing the legacy of the organisation as the local and regional provider of choice, and board meetings
during the period of observation firmly focused on issues of estates and finance to support this legacy.
Performance indicators of patient safety monitored by external regulators were routinely reported to the
board. However, board discussions centred on the need to challenge targets set for reductions in infection
rates and the associated penalties for failure to comply, rather than the service redesign required for
compliance under the regulatory regime.
Strategic planning arrangements at Arran are undergoing development, moving away from emergent and
evolutionary processes of strategic decision-making towards more formalised approaches, envisaged as an
annual process. These more formal arrangements have developed in response to an acknowledged lack of
team cohesion with regard to strategic direction; although the global aspirations of the trust were always
clear, there was perhaps less clarity or shared understanding in relation to its strategic implications. These
more formal arrangements are designed to increase coherence and shared understandings between staff,
with the intention of securing actions to address identified difficulties. The trust has a highly detailed
performance indicator reporting framework (see below) which is used to monitor performance in relation
to external regulatory requirements.
Leadership activities
Given the highly turbulent nature of board membership over recent years, it is perhaps unsurprising that
leadership at Skye is experienced as ‘staccato’. Board dynamics were acknowledged as troubled; although
NDs were often vocal in their challenges to executives, this was not universally the case, with some
concern expressed over possible scapegoating and the existence of ‘favourites’ who were challenged less
often. The adversarial nature of the board was experienced negatively by some participants and was felt to
foster defensiveness and covert behaviour, with the consequence of continued uncertainty over clinical
practice. This feeling of unease was exemplified in the operation of the infection control strategy; although
it had helped to identify and address a long-standing quality issue, concerns continued to be raised over
the engagement of medical staff because of the frequent non-attendance of executives at infection control
meetings, to the extent that, following a breach of Monitor targets, they were unaware of the issues.
Limited staff engagement was also evident in planning to address the ‘bed crisis’, which was hampered by
a lack of involvement of medical and nursing staff, both at consultant and ward staff levels.
In contrast, leadership of patient safety activity at Islay was clearly attributed to the board and principally to the
CEO, who had ensured that quality improvement infrastructure and methodologies were embedded within
the organisation to the point that coaching and these methodologies were ‘mainstream’ activities within the
trust for all levels of staff. The board had been developed over a period of 10 years, with a stable membership
and the support of external quality improvement specialists over the long term. Board dynamics were
experienced as ‘supportively challenging’; that is, depersonalised and intended to stimulate further
improvement in patient services. This dynamic was supported by charging NEDs with free-ranging scrutiny
roles, rather than the more usual committee roles. High staff engagement and an improvement-oriented
approach were exemplified in the trust’s response to C. difficile infection, which was characterised by
division-based (local) targets to drive internal competition; charging the MD with responsibility for infection
control; and the direct involvement of quality improvement personnel in planning reductions. Similarly, the use
of ‘staff stories’ (an extension of the quality improvement approach of ‘patient stories’) of experience of care
within the trust fostered staff engagement and trust that their insights and contributions were valued.
At Lewis, board leadership of patient safety, as with strategy, was dominated by the CEO, who was highly
visible within the organisation and known for ‘unannounced’ inspections, an approach also favoured by
other directors. Although the benefits of this approach were acknowledged, some concern was expressed
over the limited scope for clinical presence within the board, especially in light of the level of responsibility
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given to the medical and nursing directors with regard to patient safety. The limited nature of clinical
engagement in patient safety issues was identified within the infection control strategy implementation,
particularly in relation to work at the interface of primary and secondary care. Although the monitoring of
external infection control targets had driven interest in and support for infection control in some quarters,
many senior clinicians remained unengaged, which was hampering improvement in C. difficile infection
management. Similarly, some resistance had been noted to the medical appraisal systems that had been
instituted in the wake of the Francis report. The concern was that without increased engagement, the trust
risked sanctioning disrespectful behaviour to patients, with inevitable negative consequences for
patient experience.
Arran has devolved considerable responsibility for patient safety into its clinical boards, each of which is
supported by a single medical directorate for quality and safety that brings together activity across the
clinical boards and reports upwards to the board. This structure reflects clinical leadership for patient safety
and charges the board with oversight. Given this arrangement, board anxieties chiefly related to the extent
to which staff feel able to report incidents within the devolved structure, the concern being the extent to
which staff feel that it is safe to do so (i.e. that their concerns will be heard and acted on and that no
negative reputational consequences will follow from expressing such concerns). This possibility is at least
tacitly acknowledged by a number of respondents at various tiers within the organisation; cultural
interventions concerning values have been made to address such fear and incorporated into staff appraisal
systems to provide a means of raising and challenging such behaviours. Although these interventions have
been welcomed, fears over the possible negative consequences of raising issues continue to be expressed,
and there is evidence from junior doctors’ responses to the General Medical Council (GMC) survey of a
fear of bullying by some senior medical staff. The main issue is that this constitutes a latent patient safety
problem, with potentially damaging consequences for patients (and, indeed, the trust). Similarly, in relation
to infection control, although the trust has a clear, well-resourced system and a specialist team to
co-ordinate activity across clinical boards, fear of negative reputational damage associated with identifying
problems is reported as hampering the reporting of issues. This has led to the development of specific
practices in reporting of routine data to identify potential future problems and thus speak a language of
‘response required’ that can be heard at board level before problems arise.
Allocation of board time to patient safety
Observational and documentary data identified the time spent on patient safety, the supporting
information provided and the nature of these discussions. Detailed summary tables are presented for each
board meeting observed at each site in Appendix 8, and narratively summarised here. Across all four
observed board meetings, Skye allocated 379 minutes out of 892 (42% of the total time) to matters
directly concerned with service quality, patient safety, performance measurement and risk; considerably
more than that allocated to strategy and capacity (185 minutes, 21% of time), human resources (HR)
(79 minutes, 9% of time) and finance (55 minutes, 6% of time). Detailed supporting information was
provided to board members within their briefing materials, including internal and external benchmarking
data, line graphs of monthly and quarterly trends and ‘traffic-light’ indication of breaches of targets. This
information was used by board members to frame their discussions, with much time being taken up in
ascertaining the accuracy of the information presented and its implications for service delivery.
In contrast, the board at Lewis spent comparatively less of its time on matters of service quality, patient
safety, performance measurement and risk. Of a total of 845 minutes over four board meetings,
236 minutes (28% of time) was spent on these matters. Although this was longer than other topics,
time allocation was more evenly allocated between priorities, with 198 minutes (23% of time) allocated to
estates, 158 minutes (19%) to capacity and strategy, 105 minutes (12%) to finance and 13 minutes (2%)
to HR. Extensive documentation was provided in relation to quality and safety, as at Skye. However, in
contrast, this was often not directly referred to in discussions or used to frame discussion/debate/challenge
by directors; discussion was largely framed narratively by the CEO, with little direct recourse to the
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04040 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 4
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
33
documentation provided. Indeed, some materials included within directors’ briefing materials were not
discussed at all including the staff survey, patient-reported outcome measures, the National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidelines, quarterly monitor returns, a red–amber–green (RAG)-rated
end-of-life care outcomes report, a safeguarding review in learning disabilities services, minutes from the
complaints panel, pressure ulcers, patient falls and, on one occasion, the previous board minutes for
approval. This reflects the more narrative style of the board at Lewis, and the dominance of the CEO in
board meetings. The overall impression is one of a stark contrast with Skye, with hardly any reference to
the different information provided in directors’ briefing packs and limited direct discussion of performance
targets except concerning C. difficile infections, which focused mostly on the financial consequences of
breaching compliance, rather than the quality improvement needed to ensure it. Many of the documents
included in directors’ briefing packs but not discussed cover patient experience, human dimensions and
safety, which only Islay discussed in any detail.
Board meetings at Arran were considerably shorter than at the other sites, owing in part to the
continuation of a closed (private) part of the meeting to which the research team was not granted access.
In total, the four board meetings lasted for 421 minutes. Most of this time was spent on quality, safety
and performance (252 minutes, 60% of the total time), the vast majority of which was spent in relation to
assurance activity against external performance targets and frameworks. In total, 83 minutes (20%) were
spent on finance, 56 minutes (13%) on HR and only 30 minutes (7%) on strategy and capacity. All of the
time allocated to strategy was spent during a single board meeting; typically, strategic discussions were not
held within the public board meeting. Although a wide range of performance data were made available
to directors, attention tended to be concentrated closely on those showing shortfall and the board had a
very ‘assurance-heavy’ feel. Furthermore, there was little discussion of quality improvement activity in
relation to these indicators.
Islay board meetings lasted 830 minutes in total. Of this, 448 minutes (54% of total time) was spent on
quality, safety, performance management and risk. Of the remainder, 315 minutes (38%) was spent
on strategy and capacity, 31 minutes (4%) on HR, 28 minutes (3%) on finance, and 8 minutes (1%) on
estates. Board meetings were split into two halves, the first of which was open to the public. Much of
the strategic discussion was done in the second (closed) half of the meeting because of commercial
sensitivities; consequently, the two halves had a very different balance of material. In contrast to the other
sites, directors discussed the human dimensions of patient safety explicitly, each meeting starting with a
‘patient story’ narrative to focus attention. A wide range of statistical data in addition to performance
management indicators were discussed, including quality improvement data from run charts. Indeed, the
emphasis was largely on quality improvement (improve performance further) than assurance (conform
to standards).
The roles of trust boards and trust boards of governors
The common narrative at all sites in relation to the board of governors was of a largely ineffective, if
well-meaning, body that received information from the executive. Indeed, all sites indicated a largely
educative environment with limited challenging or holding to account; meetings tended to resemble
seminars rather than board meetings. Although governors typically indicated cordial relations with the
board, there was often a sense of bemusement from board members concerning the governor
contribution beyond acting as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the board within governors’ constituencies. Skye
and Lewis both reported engagement of governors in assurance work in relation to NED appraisal and
committee work, respectively, but the latter was experienced as frustrating by governors, despite the
availability of training to support the process, with little engagement from NEDs. Overall, governor
meetings appeared to contribute little to effective governance of patient safety at any of our sites.
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Oversight activities, patient safety processes and
clinical outcomes
All sites were subject to external oversight by Monitor and, predictably, this external regulatory framework
informed internal mechanisms at each of our sites. However, a range of orientations towards the use of
performance indicators associated with patient safety (and the systems and practices adopted) was evident.
Although Skye had adopted a ‘RAG’ indicator reporting system to the board, concerns were expressed
over the validity and reliability of data presented, with ongoing concerns over inconsistencies in
measurement between clinical service areas which made aggregations of indicator data difficult and
hampered escalation of issues to the board. Standardisation of performance measurement indices formed
part of an ongoing pathway redesign process that was intended to address the issue. In contrast, board
members at Lewis expressed greater confidence in the validity and reliability of data embedded into
assurance mechanisms, which incorporated a wide range of clinical indicators beyond those required for
Monitor compliance, including a modified Clinical Assurance Toolkit (CAT). Indicators were also
benchmarked against ratings of other Shelford Group Trusts (10 multispecialty academic health-care
organisations). Although indicator summaries were thus valued, it was expressed that there was concern
over the lack of contextual (qualitative) information in relation to specific issues, such as the HSMR, and
that presentations and/or briefings would be welcomed. Similar concerns about the over-reliance on
quantitative summaries were expressed at Arran; high-level performance data, supplemented with
lower-level clinical ‘care-thermometer’ information, was well developed. The concern was that such
aggregated data could be used to respond to risks only after problems had manifested; what was required
was more qualitative contextual analysis of performance indicator data that enabled potential risks to be
predicted before they manifested. This difference lies at the heart of distinctions between assurance
and improvement-oriented behaviour; reacting to solve problems once they manifest rather than
redesigning systems to avoid unnecessary risk. Islay was attempting to combine the requirements of
external assurance with ongoing quality improvement through development of national- and local-level
data sets, quality improvement data from projects linked to strategic priorities and qualitative information
from reports by clinical service areas. Despite these efforts, respondents indicated the need for further
training of NEDs to understand the implications of run-chart data, and the need for further disaggregation
of data at ward level.
Facilitators and barriers to board governance
Facilitators
The main facilitator at Islay was understood to be a clear strategic mission (5-year plan) focused on care
quality, which had been translated and codified into performance measures and incorporated in an
organisational quality dashboard. Objectives were clearly identified against the plan, with risk assessment
of the likelihood of the delivery and devolution of responsibility for achievement to service areas. This
ensured continuous focus on organisational objectives, notwithstanding the requirements of external
performance management regimes. The strategic focus was buttressed by board dynamics characterised
by ‘supportive challenge’; airing of issues was not interpreted as disloyalty and openness was valued
(always subject to respectful framing) in order to maintain focus and momentum towards strategic
objectives. At Lewis and Arran, the stability of board membership over time was considered to be an
important facilitator of patient safety governance; the detailed knowledge and connection with staff of the
CEO was accorded a high value. At Arran, the extent of clinical leadership was considered an important
factor in board governance, notwithstanding persistent concerns (identified above) about the bullying
of juniors by senior medical staff. In contrast, it was accepted at Skye that facilitators were relatively weak;
the focus here was on optimism regarding the possible impact of recent board reconfigurations and the
increased emphasis on care quality over finance evident in board meetings.
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Barriers
All sites faced considerable barriers to the appropriate escalation of issues, that is, how best to act
following identification of a potential concern. At Skye, this was primarily caused by disputes over the
validity/reliability of summary indicator data (information deficit) and communication difficulties between
clinical units and the board, and between board members (executives and non-executives), leading to a
sense of confusion over the meaning of indicator data received at the board. At Lewis, the difficulties were
mainly caused by perceived lack of engagement of senior medical staff, resulting in little communication
between corporate teams and ward level staff in many parts of the organisation. Although reporting
systems for major events at Arran were judged to be robust, respondents indicated concern that staff may
not come forward with issues related to patient safety for fear of negative implications for their career; this
was in relation to an acknowledged problem of bullying of junior medical staff to the extent that staff
were not prepared to speak out. An additional issue at Arran concerned fears of oversensitivity to financial
considerations, leading to poor decisions over safety, such as failure to provide adequate cover to meet a
financial target exposing patients to unnecessary risk, rather than acting as a trigger for redesign work to
make efficiency savings safely. Islay also manifested concerns over appropriate escalation at point of
concern, in its failure to identify a hygiene problem within its kitchens (rather than directly in clinical
services). This raises the prospect that, while its planning arrangements are well developed, it risks being
caught out in services areas that do not feature within the planning schedule.
Impact of external commissioning arrangements and incentives
Commissioning
Relationships with commissioners at Islay were acknowledged by all to be excellent, and the trust was
considered an exemplar provider in terms of the depth and subtlety of its documentation and analysis.
The only reported difficulty concerned managing the reactions of other local providers who did not always
believe their reported outcomes. Skye reported cordial relationships with commissioners and good
involvement of commissioners in clinical governance committee work, although closer working was
required over proposed reconfigurations to reduce secondary care demand that would have negative
repercussions for the trust. Similarly, relationships with commissioners at Lewis were coloured by the trust’s
ambitions for expansion and large capital development projects, in the context of proposed expansion of
integrated care. Commissioners indicated that they found the trust to be aggressive with regards to
defending its interests, yet had reached accommodation of the financial consequences of breaches in
infection control targets.
Incentives
Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) was experienced at both Islay and Lewis as too
unwieldy in operation to act as effective incentives, and negatively perceived as ‘taking money off’ rather
than incentivising improvement activity. At Skye, CQUIN were perceived as having a positive impact on
stroke pathway redesign, but a distraction from other areas that also required redesign work. Although
compliance frameworks were generally welcomed for the effect on focusing attention on aspects of
patient safety, concerns were raised in relation to the negative unintended consequences, such as reduced
focus on areas not covered under the framework (e.g. environmental health). Penalties also proved difficult
to apply at both Skye and Lewis, as they could have potentially bankrupted the former and led to bitter
dispute with commissioners at the latter.
Emergent themes
Our summary of data in relation to the research questions above identifies four important analytic themes
related to patient safety governance: (1) the identification and attribution of patient safety issues,
(2) escalation of concerns over patient safety, (3) the dynamics of whistleblowing and (4) the tensions
between assurance and improvement. We consider each in sequence.
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Identification and attribution of patient safety issues
Detailed reporting of summary performance indicator data related to patient safety is common to all of our
sites, informed by the requirements of external regulatory regimes and, in some instances (Islay and Arran),
considerably exceeding them in scope and scale. Although such summary reporting concentrates board
members’ attention and allows breaches to be clearly indicated, a number of factors were identified which
caution against over-reliance on such systems. Experience at Skye shows the importance of the perceived
validity and reliability of the underlying data if action is to follow, otherwise time may be spent on
debating what the data reveals, feeding tensions between board members rather than acting upon the
implications of summary measures. Similarly, detailed observation of board activity at Arran showed that,
even where there are clear breaches of targets in RAG summary indicators accepted as appropriate, it does
not necessarily follow that the data will be interpreted as showing a patient safety failure requiring action;
rather, the attribution ‘patient safety problem’ is dependent on acceptance that the breach really is a
breach and not a misinterpretation. Respondents at Arran and Lewis also draw attention to the important
role of qualitative data in contextualising and making subtle judgements in relation to summary data.
Specifically, ‘green’ indicator ratings may conceal manifesting failures in risk management that will, if left
unchecked, eventually result in ‘red’ figures. Summary reporting of ‘traffic lights’ on a single page of
A4 paper may offer assurance that all is well, but such assurance will be illusory.
Escalation of concerns over patient safety
In addition to accurate identification of performance shortfalls, service improvement requires the
engagement of staff to identify underlying problems and implement changes. Where staff engagement is
lacking, initiatives may not embed or embed only partially; this is a particular problem where there are
concerns about the bullying of staff. Escalation requires the existence of a reporting structure, conditions
of trust and support between staff and a quality improvement orientation to address underlying problems.
Dynamics of whistleblowing
Despite the acknowledged importance of whistleblowing for preventing unsafe clinical practice, staff
reporting such events face a dilemma where they fear negative repercussions for their career for doing so,
placing the individual in the invidious position of ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’. Such fears are
more likely to flourish in an environment in which such action is considered to be an act of disloyalty to
the organisation or profession; this is especially the case within elite organisations where such action
threatens the self-image of high performance. Where such practices exist, the fear is that formal policies in
relation to whistleblowing will prove ineffective and opportunities for identifying safety issues before they
manifest will be lost.
Tensions between assurance and improvement
Despite the availability of quality improvement infrastructure, three of our sites operationalised the
governance of patient safety largely in terms of assurance, in which performance indicator systems were
used to alert the board about poor performance in relation to specific clinical indicators ‘after the fact’.
Major problems with this approach include that it may foster non-reporting to avoid the blame and shame
that goes with underperformance, that disputes may arise over the reliability and validity of the indicators
on which judgements of performance are made and that it does not provide guidance on how best to
address the manifesting poor performance. In short, in seeking to identify problems it may paradoxically
make it harder to report them. Islay sought to counter such negative unintended consequences through
strategic focus on service improvement and embedding performance indicator reporting systems
within quality improvement cycles, even to the extent of structuring the board agenda around strategic
quality improvement.
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Concluding remarks
This chapter has begun the analysis of the four case study sites by examining board dynamics against our
pre-specified research questions. In doing so, a number of key issues have emerged that highlight the
challenges for boards in getting and interpreting information (as opposed to data) on quality and safety
issues. In particular, the balance and congruence between ‘hard’ quantitative data and ‘softer intelligence’
(staff and patient accounts) remains poorly determined. Core concerns in this latter category are the risks
and challenges of staff raising concerns, either through formal clinical governance channels or through
whistleblowing. Finally, in developing appropriate responses, boards struggle to balance quality assurance
needs (conformance attainment) with more proactive improvement (performance enhancement).
Chapter 5 digs deeper into each case, building on these cross-case emerging themes.
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Chapter 5 Site-by-site case study narratives
Introduction
This second of four chapters on the qualitative findings presents an in-depth account of each of the
four case study organisations. The discussion is structured around seven key themes that emerged from
the cross-case analysis (see Chapter 4) and the review of the theoretical literature (see Chapter 3).
These are:
l Strategic vision. This theme explores how boards seek to develop and deploy a range of resources
(e.g. intellectual, financial, social, technological and political) to oversee safe care.
l Leadership activities. This relates to the way in which board members interact and engage with the
wider organisation, patients and the public as part of their approach to governing patient safety.
l Board meetings and mechanisms. Here we outline the specific practices that were seen as being
integral to board governance.
l Governor relations. Observations here relate to the relationships seen between the management
boards and its respective boards of governors.
l Assessing organisational performance. This theme explores how board members perceive, interpret and
react to patient safety performance information.
l Relationship with commissioners. We explore the relationships between the board and its
key commissioners.
l Relating to regulation. This final theme gathers insights into the regulatory environment and how
boards react to externally set performance targets and incentives.
Each of these themes is now discussed as they played out within each of the four case study sites: Islay,
Skye, Lewis and Arran.
Islay
Islay is an integrated provider of hospital, community and primary care services. It has a reputation for its
achievements in relation to promoting quality and safety and the organisation has received several awards
in recognition of its performance in this area. The trust is also a leading organisation in terms of both
patient and staff satisfaction.
Strategic vision
The Islay ‘success story’ was attributed to the fact that they had a clear a strategic vision ‘to be become
one of the safest hospitals in the NHS’. Inspired by the CEO and ND, the strategic vision was triggered by
‘a road to Damascus moment’ during a visit in 2004 to the Institute of Healthcare Improvement (IHI) based
in the USA. This subsequently led to the adoption of the IHI quality collaborative methodology in the trust,
including signing up to the Saving 1000 Lives programme and the introduction of patient stories at board
meetings. The board attributed its high performance in quality/safety in part to the ability to translate its
mission into hard performance measures, which were summarised in a quality dashboard. The board’s
5-year strategy was linked to specific performance objectives that were disseminated across organisational
divisions. These objectives were also subject to risk assessment to determine the extent to which they
could be delivered:
We launched our quality improvement strategy 4 years ago and we were, as I say, ahead of the game
for what that was worth . . . with clear aims and objectives, time frames, responsible officers . . .
And we’ve demonstrated that time and time again.
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Board members appeared confident that they had nurtured a strong patient safety culture across the
organisation. Indeed, they were so confident about this that it was reported that external patient safety
improvement initiatives, such as the implementation of recommendations for the Francis Inquiry, had little
impact in changing its ongoing strategy. The introduction of a Nursing Assessment and Accreditation
System (NAAS) in 2008, which was used to assess hospital ward-level quality and patient experience, was
cited as an example of the organisation being ‘ahead of the curve’ in its efforts to improve quality and
safety. The successful adoption of the quality improvement (QI) collaborative methodology, which was
responsible for the elimination of high-grade pressure ulcers, was another reported example of the way in
which continuous quality improvement methods were embedded within the organisation.
Despite these much vaunted successes, there remained scepticism among some board members as to
whether or not the high performance could be attributed to the approach to quality improvement taken in
the organisation. The director of development, for example, suggested that the performance was not the
result of the quality improvement programmes but rather of wider factors and, in particular, of the income
generated from a mixture of tariff and non-tariff services:
I think we’ve been lucky again that we haven’t had financial problems like a lot of other places.
Now, part of that is down to good management . . . But part of it is down to luck. We’ve got a
service profile and income profile that puts us in a good position, so we’ve a good mix of general
hospital-type services and specialist services.
Board members believed a number of factors could stall the momentum that had been built up around
quality improvement. The difficult economic environment was cited as a key factor, particularly the
tensions associated with funding the ‘7-day week’ agenda. Hospital reconfiguration in the region was also
viewed as a threat to ensuring safe care. It was reported that Islay was in a unique position to lead the
necessary system changes across the local health economy, yet organisations did not always want to
engage with them. Islay had a reputation ‘for wanting to take everything’ and there was a feeling among
some board members that they needed to build better relationships with key stakeholders across the
region, otherwise they risked isolation. It was believed that being isolated within the local health economy
might have serious negative consequences for the organisation. For example, it was felt that if
neuroscience services were to be moved to another organisation this would precipitate serious financial
difficulties for the organisation.
Leadership activities
Successful board oversight of patient safety was often linked to the leadership style of the CEO and the
ND, and in particular to their efforts to invest in quality improvement programmes and embed these across
the organisation. The executive directors were described as an experienced team who worked well
together and who believed collectively in the strategic approach being taken.
Central to board strategy was the focus on consulting and engaging staff at all levels of the hierarchy in
key decisions. This was cited as key to them, being one of the organisations with the highest engagement
scores in the NHS for two consecutive years. Specific leadership styles that were frequently mentioned
related to ‘asking questions’, ‘getting the best out of that individual’ and obtaining ‘rich information from
that individual’. The CEO described that what made Islay different from other organisations was that the
board did not have a chief operating officer (COO). The rationale was that they wanted each executive
director to have a specific domain of responsibility for a division of the organisation. The role of the
executive was therefore cast as one of striving to encourage, advise, motivate and coach the management
staff within their particular divisions. This close contact with staff lower down the organisation meant that
the board’s vision became ‘something that everyone believed in’:
I firmly believe that if you continue to chase the dollar, you will be chasing the wrong thing. You need
to chase the quality and safety, and what brings quality and safety for me is deep staff engagement,
and that costs you not a penny.
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Although staff engagement was noted as a particular success, there was also recognition among some
board members that engagement policies could be variable. Despite achieving high NSS satisfaction scores,
recent qualitative research undertaken by the trust had highlighted significant variability across the
divisions in terms of staff feeling that they were a member of a team, that they could speak out if they
saw something untoward and that managers supported them. This breakdown in board communication
was illustrated by a poorly graded environmental health inspection which, it was reported, had exposed
the limitations of staff engagement in the organisation:
We’ve got a bit of a less robust connection . . . and that was brought into stark relief by the
experiences in the patient kitchen . . . I would say the engagement is more variable than it might
first appear.
The existence of ‘closed’ and ‘hard-to-reach’ areas of the organisation was challenging. For example,
engaging with staff working in one or two specific departments and in the operating theatres was raised
as an area where there was thought to be ‘room for improvement’ in terms of embedding the desired
behavioural and cultural changes and, in particular, inculcating new approaches to working among senior
consultant medical staff. The NEDs also noted that the board did not have the same visibility in the
community services that they ran as they had in the hospital and that they needed to think of different
ways of better engaging staff in care homes, intermediate care providers and the private sector. The CEO
also raised the challenge of developing better engagement with the public, as he felt the board had yet to
develop an effective way of gathering patient, family and carer views about the services the trust provided.
Board meetings and mechanisms
Quality and safety issues were described as being the core business of the board meetings at Islay, with
the first part of meetings given over to presentations about the progress of ongoing quality improvement
activities and typically ‘over one-third’ of board meetings being spent discussing and debating quality and
safety issues. A feature of board meetings at Islay was the participation of all divisional directors in the first
part of board meetings. The purpose of involving them was to create an opportunity for the board to
cascade messages down the organisation and to hold the divisional directors to account for the quality/
safety performance of their divisions.
Islay was unique among the case study sites in having a ‘patient story’ at the start of each board meeting.
The aim was to ‘set the tone’ for discussion and to focus the immediate attention of board members on
service quality and patient safety matters. The ND had ‘championed’ this approach, but there were
conflicting views about its usefulness, with the business director questioning the overly emotional
connections that could be engendered by such stories. Criticism was also made regarding the lack of time
available for the board members to discuss fully the implications of the patient’s story.
The fieldwork uncovered that, out of the almost 13 hours of board discussion observed across the
four meetings, a total of 160 minutes was spent discussing patient safety issues (just over 20% of the total
time). Compared with the other case study sites, there was less discussion about C. difficile infection issues
and attainment of external performance targets. Patient safety discussions tended to be connected to
wider quality improvement activities. The only patient safety-specific issues discussed at length were
those relating to issues around mortality coding in orthopaedics (just under 30 minutes) and the
environmental health inspection (50 minutes). The majority of time spent at the four board meetings
observed tended to be focused on broader strategic issues, such as hospital reconfiguration, developing
strategic partnerships and strengthening links with the community sector.
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Governor relations
A number of board members described their support for governors as an effective means for FTs to
engage their local community. It was also thought that governors provided ‘a voice of the people’, along
with providing important intelligence about the organisation in terms of ‘what people are feeling and
thinking’. NEDs talked about the additional education and training programmes they had developed for
governors to help them in their role. The board chairperson described developing a close relationship with
governors where he would feed back the outcomes of executive board meetings and give his ‘own honest
opinion’ of what was happening:
I meet with the council of governors personally and in private, and I go through the board papers with
them . . . I wouldn’t drop that meeting because they think it is so valuable to be able to ask tough
questions privately and for me to be able to give an honest and open and sometimes a personal
opinion about them. They get it unvarnished.
However, some board members suggested that the role of governors in the organisation was still not clear
and questioned the competencies and capabilities of governors to successfully fulfil their role. It was also
noted that the time needed to volunteer meant that governors were overwhelmingly of retirement age
and that there was less representation from younger social groups in the population.
Governors described being engaged with the governance of patient safety at a number of levels.
These included the Quality Subgroup, where governors were to able talk and challenge NEDs about the
day-to-day operational issues related to quality and safety. Governors also described generally good
relationships between the board and the council of governors. Governors felt that they were able hold the
board to account through a variety of channels, including involvement in the chairperson’s appraisal and
being able to actively challenge NEDs at the Quality Subgroup. The main issues of concern for governors
related to the ‘steep learning curve’ and the time needed to fulfil the role effectively. It was thought by
some that the ‘enforced’ election process and the potential removal of governors at the end of their 3-year
term resulted in a ‘loss of key talent and organisational memory’.
Fieldwork observation of governor meetings supported many of the issues raised in the interviews.
Governors rarely participated in discussions, which were dominated by the CEO and the chairperson.
The focus of the discussions was one of education about particular issues (in this case hospital
reconfiguration) in order to seek support from governors to continue the position the board was
currently taking.
Assessing organisational performance
The organisation had been a forerunner in developing a quality assurance framework that combined
national-level data regarding the HSMR and standardised health mortality indicators with additional local
data, such as the NAAS, and Quality Improvement projects using Statistical Process Control run charts.
Board members described triangulating these data with additional and softer intelligence obtained through
walkabouts, board briefings (project managers presenting reports), and the complaints panel. Walkabouts,
in particular, were highlighted as a good way to make the board visible and as an opportunity to engage
with frontline staff and to respond immediately to their concerns:
I think that regular attendance on the shop floor gives us a level of information and knowledge that
we otherwise wouldn’t get . . . and I think that that gets pulled back into the discussions that we have
at board level.
Although the current performance information and quality indicator dashboard was in large part
supported, comments were made, particularly by NEDs, calling for a greater narrative interpretation and
analysis of the bold statistics and graphs provided and for a greater allowance of time for the board to
‘think about the implications’ of what the information was ‘saying’. The chairperson made the point that,
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although disaggregation of the data was the ultimate goal, this information needed to be presented in an
accessible way:
People would probably like the graphs, but I couldn’t give two hoots about the graphs because words
mean more to me. So to tell me what that actually means. Is it good, bad or indifferent? Have we
gone up? Have we gone down? What is the trend?
. . . looking at these graphs are leaving us cold. We’ve been doing it for 3 years, we see eight data
points above or below, and then it drops down, great, what does that tell us?
Frustrations were raised by the ND about NEDs still struggling with interpreting run charts, despite the
board having used them since 2007. However, rather than more training, NEDs reported that they wanted
more time to develop relationships within the organisation and also between fellow NEDs.
Relationships with commissioners
Board members described good relations with commissioners that have continued during the transition
from the local PCT to the local Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG). The experience of the MD supported
the move to CCGs in facilitating greater clinical involvement in commissioning decisions, and it was seen
as an opportunity to have ‘mature’ discussions about the current economic environment. An example
of this was the recent collaboration around unscheduled care, which brought organisations across the
local health economy together in an attempt to save several million pounds. Alongside these positive
experiences, some board members reported that commissioners were ‘suspicious of their success’ and that
this led to ‘mistrust’ in negotiations. Frustrations were also expressed about commissioners being overly
focused on hospital oversight at the expense of the wider health economy, with community care settings
in particular described as ‘very loose’ in relation to patient safety:
I think there is a recognition across the health economy that we’re one of the ambitious organisations
who are at the top . . . but I think that also brings with it a level of unhelpful scrutiny and unhelpful,
what’s the word I’m looking for, mistrust. It can’t all be good. Trying to find a problem, if you like,
which is irritating, to say the least.
Interviews with commissioners suggested that they felt ‘very fortunate’ to have such a high-performing
trust. Islay’s strong emphasis on quality and safety meant that they tended to ‘shine out of the
information’ that was being presented. Islay was seen as ‘slick’, with their success being attributed in large
part to a very stable board and a very strong chief executive. Islay had been open and transparent in
sharing performance information. This was supplemented with regular meetings and conversations about
issues or incidents that were reported:
I get a lot of comparative data . . . compared to other organisations across the region, and there are a
range of indicators where it is performing better . . . the mortality rates are low, infection control rates
are much lower; so a range of indicators where it gives us a level of assurance compared to similar
organisations. It’s doing very well.
The only ongoing issue specific to Islay was where rival providers thought the organisation’s performance
was ‘too good to be true’. For example, it was reported that clinical quality managers in the health
economy could not believe that Islay had failed to report any grade III or IV pressure ulcers. The recent
‘absolutely excellent’ CQC inspection rating was cited as a case in point, as Islay had been inundated with
requests nationally for help but there were few requests from within the local health economy. To improve
relationships, the CCG was working with the MD and ND of Islay to try and encourage local general
practitioners (GPs) and its own medical consultants to collaborate around a quality improvement
programme. The goal was for both parties to use the same incident reporting system to encourage
dialogue and the sharing of information between primary and secondary care about incidents.
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Board members reported that the CQUIN mechanisms being used were not really impacting on service
delivery as much as expected. Interviews with commissioners raised similar issues for example, although
the CQUIN for dementia services was seen to have had an impact in terms of raising awareness, greater
local ownership was needed in order to maximise impact. CQUIN targets, it was thought, were in danger
of becoming ‘a bit of a tick box’ as a way of securing finance, but with little long-term service impact. As a
result, the CCG was trying to take a more collaborative approach in identifying areas where they wanted
to try and secure improvement. Recent examples of this were the agreement of two CQUINs around
developing 7-day working in surgery and acute medicine. There appeared to be a shared interest for both
parties for quality improvements in this area:
I do believe it needs to be done and in a collaborative way. It’s not good us as Commissioners saying,
‘we want you to improve by X in area Y’ if they haven’t got the appetite to do that.
Relating to regulation
The Monitor compliance framework was supported by board members in terms of ‘focusing the mind’ in
relation to key performance areas. The introduction of infection control targets exemplified this, with the
development of targets for MSRA and C. difficile infections seen as changing the way infection control was
governed. The CQC criteria were also reported as being helpful in supporting the board to identify
problems related to cleanliness and infection control:
You’ve got to take that as being a success. You know, there’s no other way of saying that . . . when
we started with MRSA, we were probably having 80 [cases] a year . . . [but] we haven’t had any this
year . . . So that, in part, has to be the fact that targets have been set.
The first thing I look at in the board pack is the infection control! And then I look at all the data,
you know. So I think we are incredibly mindful of that.
However, the point was made that the experience of Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust highlighted the
unintended consequences of focusing on performance indicators as an end in themselves. The recent case
of an environmental health breach was use to illustrate where those service areas (kitchens) not covered
by Monitor or CQC compliance frameworks often went unnoticed. On this basis, it was reported that
the board needed to be ‘brave’ in balancing the interests of Monitor and the wider interests of the
organisation and patients. The ND raised the point that central targets needed to be backed up with a
supportive local culture and that the leadership of the organisation needed to be focused on quality
improvement. The Islay board was therefore seen as good at combining a locally driven agenda on quality
alongside the national agenda and centrally set performance standards.
CQC inspections are getting more and more focused on the minutia of the documentation, and yet
you know you could have the entire documentation perfect, but the patients could be not being
treated kindly.
Skye
Skye is a district general hospital trust providing services across two sites. It was one of the early NHS trusts
to be awarded foundation status. Over the past 5 years the board has been characterised by continuous
change, with the arrival and departure of several CEOs, MDs and NDs. The trust has one of the highest
patient demands in the country and has been faced with a number of challenges related to bed capacity.
Organisational performance is currently a cause for concern, with the HSMR above average, high A&E
demand and increasing infection rates. Skye had struggled to successfully implement governance activities
to ensure safe care because of a continuous turnover of board members and the priority placed on finance
by successive board regimes.
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Strategic vision
Interviews with board members at Skye suggested that the continuous change of executive board
members in recent years had prevented the development of an effective strategy for patient safety. In
what was described as a ‘jigsaw puzzle of piecemeal activities’, bed capacity was cited as a case in point
where previous board decisions to remove beds were linked to a variety of problems facing the trust,
including poor A&E performance, poor C. difficile infection management rates, high pressure ulcer rates
and a demoralised workforce:
If there’d been someone in the executive with a longer term sort of organisational memory, they
might have put some connections together.
Points were also raised about previous board configurations that promoted cost control over quality
improvement. The dominant influence of the finance director was seen as a feature during this time,
described as ‘a 100% focus on short-term financial issues’. One example of finance seen as overriding
patient safety decisions related to the protracted attempt by the IPC committee to purchase a fogging
machine to improve deep cleaning. Vacancies, recruitment and pathway redesign were also issues where
finance would challenge progress being made.
Criticisms regarding the lack of strategy were also directed at the current board. The director of HR
described it as ‘a very functional board’, with no deeper discussions about the evolution of service delivery.
The style of the chairperson was also mentioned as a contributory factor, being described as ‘more
hands-on than strategic’. An example of this was the proposed ‘quality day’, which was a response to
pleas for more dedicated time for discussion. Although this initiative was supported, concerns were also
raised about the style of the chairperson, who was described as trying to ‘cram everything in’ and focus
on targets rather than developing more informal open discussions about strategy and moving forward:
I had originally thought oh good, because that means we’ll be able to stand back and look at our
organisational purpose . . . Actually what it’s turned out to be now is a list of things that just looks like
a long board day, so we’re going to talk about C. diff . . . it’s probably partly because the chair doesn’t
like blank spaces on agendas.
Despite this lack of strategic thinking, notable improvements were connected to the latest board
configuration. The appointment of a new director of finance and a new CEO were seen as improving
relations within the organisation and with commissioners. The dynamic was also improving in light of
the Francis Report, which was switching the board on to quality. The recent bed plan exemplified how the
clinical drivers outweighed the finance issue, as decisions were taken ‘before the financial answer had
been found’.
Leadership activities
The continuous turnover of board members at Skye had created a form of ‘staccato leadership’,
characterised by interruptions and hiatuses. The new CEO was a case in point: it took him time to find his
feet, and this ‘created gaps’, which meant the chairperson had ‘to do a bit more leading than might be
expected’. Despite this turbulence, the board was aware that they needed to set the tone in promoting a
culture of openness and transparency. Being visible was central to these activities, which were exemplified
by the chairperson holding regular meetings with large groups of senior nurses to talk to them about
the key issues of the moment. Executive and non-executive involvement in a variety of governance
committees, including the mortality review group and the ‘safer care’ group within the clinical governance
subcommittee, provided further examples of leadership activities.
It’s the visibility of the leadership I think is the key thing. And I mean they go on to wards to basically
look around and talk to staff and actually say, ‘I’m a non-executive director, do you want to raise
anything? What are the issues that you’re concerned about?’ So I think on an individual level, ours are
very good.
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Board leadership was also associated with challenge by creating an environment where certain behaviours
were not tolerated. This was particularly the case for NEDs, who were noted for their vocal challenge in
holding the executive to account. For example, the acting ND, new to the position, reflected on the
difficulties of responding to the challenge from NEDs. Being in an acting position, she noted, ‘made it a
hugely vulnerable and exposed place to be’ as the NEDs attacked her inexperience. NEDs very much believed
that challenging the executive was key to their role; however, the point was made that they struggled to hold
the MD to account because they lacked the necessary clinical knowledge. ‘Second-guessing clinicians’ was
an ongoing struggle; therefore, having greater clinical knowledge in the boardroom was seen as necessary.
The chairperson was particularly frustrated at holding individual clinicians to account, and described the
disproportionate amount of trust given to them as particularly unhelpful as the board sought to understand
and investigate any quality and safety issues. Things were changing, with the board now doing more work
via the clinical directors who could then provide a peer-to-peer approach to scrutinising clinical practice.
It surprised me when I first got involved in the health sector that pretty serious things can go wrong,
and accountability doesn’t seem to be as strong as it would be in other industries. A ‘never’ event
should be a ‘never’ event, and people who were involved it, I would take a much stronger line than it
appears the health, well the NHS certainly take at the moment.
Issues were also raised about the boards’ ability to engage staff. The board was improving the
engagement mechanisms with notable updates to appraisals as well as the introduction of weekly
briefings to promote communication; however, the point was raised by a NED that staff were feeling
‘underinformed’ about what was happening:
We don’t generally engage with staff too well. You can see from the survey results . . . [that] a theme
running through this is the performance appraisal. There were people who’d do it in groups, so the
ward manager would just do all the nurses together. I mean, absolutely dreadful, and that was if it
was done [at all].
Board meetings and mechanisms
Although some board members, notably the chairperson, described how meetings over recent years had
become more focused on quality and patient care, others were frustrated with the way the agenda was
covered, with the chairperson seen as being driven by action plans and timescales. The chairperson,
in turn, was aware of these frustrations; however, he believed that the right approach was being taken,
and described how a recent action plan related to mortality was being delivered:
I could understand the frustrations on some of my colleagues . . . I’m a bit more in the ‘doing’ rather
than the ‘talking’ camp here. You know, we can talk about things for forever and a day . . . but there
is a time when the talking has to stop and the doing has to start.
The observations of board meetings highlighted that out of almost 15 hours of discussion across four
board meetings, 4.5 hours of the discussion related directly to patient safety issues (30% of the total time).
Most of this time was spent on the mortality review across patient pathways (95 minutes) followed by
discussions about the breach of C. difficile infection rate performance targets and the resulting financial
penalty (80 minutes). Other issues included discussions regarding performance related to patient falls,
complaints and pressure ulcers, along with policy updates concerning patient safety, such as the CEO’s
summary of the Francis Inquiry (which in in one board meeting lasted for around 30 minutes).
Governor relations
Board members had mixed opinions about the role of governors. On the one hand, the board understood
the need to have governors holding NEDs to account and providing a voice for patients, the public and
staff. The trust secretary described how the board proactively worked with governors in holding quarterly
time-out sessions to brief them on any current issues, and NEDs suggested that they did feel that
governors were holding them to account through being involved in their performance appraisal, as well as
through governor observations of their performance in chairing different subcommittees.
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However, other board members pointed to limitations of the governor role in the (perceived as poor)
quality of their contribution to patient safety walk-rounds, productive wards and various other initiatives.
One senior executive suggested that governors did not properly hold the board to account, and the
quarterly time-out sessions were seen as a ‘bit of a hassle’. Despite well-meaning questions, the capability
of governors was seen as mixed and as often diluted by personal agendas, pet topics and minor issues:
We can give a 5-minute spiel about something and talk with intent, hopefully. And people think,
‘Oh, that’s okay,’ and then you get another quarter.
There are some who are not confident to speak up and we try and encourage them but they’re not
confident at all. There’s some who are very confident but actually kind of miss the point or
misunderstand their role.
Interviews with governors described how they supported the latest board efforts, particularly in helping the
chairperson and CEO to respond to patient safety issues. They were also impressed with the NEDs
describing their observation of subcommittees where (for example) infection control reports would ‘get
some hammer’. This was in contrast with the previous board, which was described as being ‘very
entrenched in the old way’, that had ‘not got a grip’ of patient safety. The current board also seemed far
more receptive to governors. This was evidenced by greater strategic involvement included drawing up
the annual report, sitting on the Clinical Governance Committee, getting access to ‘never event’
explanations, setting the agenda of meetings, going on walkabouts and providing an opportunity to raise
issues from a patient perspective.
Having spoken to other governors from other organisations, we’re better off here . . . We participate
to a greater extent than any of the others I know I’ve met. And we’re not just a talking shop. We
don’t just have governors’ meetings where we talk about things then go away and forget about them.
Despite this, there were still some issues with the current board. As a relatively inexperienced board, some
felt that they needed to develop better relationships with the organisation and be more open to staff
feedback about service improvements. Concerns were also raised about the quality reports that they
received having inaccurate information, particularly in relation to finance. Furthermore, issues were also
raised related to the governor role itself and the time needed to develop this properly. The first 3 years
following election were seen as a very steep learning curve and it was often only in the second term that
governors felt that they had real influence.
Observation of governor meetings found that the majority of discussions centred on governor education
about the latest policy developments and the provision of summary performance information. As with the
other sites, dialogue was mostly led by the CEO, who would summarise his report, providing a number of
updates regarding policy. There were also PowerPoint® (Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA, USA)
presentations by the CEO about the Francis Inquiry, along with the COO, who presented a business
intelligence report detailing the key performance indicators related to activity and infection control. The
result of this was that there were limited contributions from the other board members, apart from the
chairperson. The chairperson was, however, influential in encouraging governors to question the business
intelligence report. The question and answer sessions in response to this report did tend to be active and,
in one meeting, this led to a short but significant discussion that challenged the COO about poor
C. difficile infection management performance. Points were made about performance being ‘not good
enough’. At these times the MD and ND would enter the conversation, allaying concerns and suggesting
that things were being done to improve the situation.
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Assessing organisational performance
Board member interaction and analysis of performance information was, again, mixed. Some positive
aspects were raised, particularly by the trust secretary, about the quality dashboard and how the board
was ‘ahead of the game’ in some of the information it was collecting related to HR and the disaggregation
of the HSMR broken down on a monthly basis. However, the stronger opinion, particularly from NEDs
and the COO, described the current benchmarking as poor, with mistakes in the reports often being
found. More work was needed to improve the methodology, as the accuracy of the data was currently
being questioned.
I think the business intelligence report isn’t quality controlled brilliantly well. I’m fed up with spotting
reds that should be green . . . that needs to be tightened.
Patient safety performance was seen as worrying, with both the HSMR and the standardised health
mortality indicators being above average. One of the ways the board was looking to respond to these
trends was by paying particular attention to the way that different directorates input information into the
Corporate Risk Register. The CEO raised the point that there was currently some disconnect between
the information systems used by the directorates and that used by the board, with directorates lacking a
consistent structure, leading to people measuring things in different ways. This meant that when issues
escalated up to board levels, not all staff were receiving consistent messages. The trust secretary described
how directorates viewed the Corporate Risk Register as ticking the box rather than as an opportunity to
raise any issues they had with the data. In looking to resolve the disconnect between central support units
and board-level measurement systems, the MD and COO at the time of writing were undertaking a
pathway redesign that was looking to standardise performance measures across central support units,
which will then be reported to the executive team.
Alongside the review of quantitative data, board members described how they gathered soft intelligence
through the review of patient complaints, the carrying out of mock CQC assessments and walkabouts.
Board briefings provided opportunities for people to be invited or to offer a presentation to the board.
A recent example of this was bringing people in who were involved in an investigation of a recent serious
incident. Having a patient come to speak to the board was suggested, as well as having a commissioner
on the board providing the ‘client voice’. A note of caution was raised, however, that there was a danger
that board business could become diluted, with other people coming in and taking over the agenda: there
are certain things that have got to be done. Connected to this point the ND, with the support of the CEO,
was looking to introduce patient stories to board meetings as a way for the board to interact with more
qualitative material at board level. Despite her enthusiasm, fellow board members decided that it was not
appropriate. Reasons for opposition included:
It ends up with ‘Woe is me’ and we end up spending 30 minutes to three-quarters-of-an-hour on a
patient’s story and it didn’t actually make any difference to the patient, right? And the one thing that
concerned me through all this was: ‘Where is the learning? Where is the continuous improvement?
Where is the will to not make that mistake again? Where is the will to plug that hole and say, that will
not happen again?’.
The touchy-feely stuff . . . Yes. I’m a surgeon by trade, so I’m not good on touchy-feely.
In Skye, NEDs raised a number of personal challenges in relation to measuring performance. As it often
took up to 6 months to get a handle on the job, understanding and processing the volume of information
was an ongoing challenge. Walkabouts were mentioned as a good way for NEDs to triangulate the
information and yet they were also problematic for NEDs, as they were not necessarily prepared with
enough information about the area they were going into. Despite these concerns, other NEDs believed
that they were starting to tap into the organisational realities. A NED, who was female, stressed the need
for a greater female presence on the board, particularly when it came to connecting with female staff.
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In this sense, rather than further statistical training in this area, more attention should be dedicated to
developing relationships and managing situations:
Actually seeing with your own eyes is difficult. The difficulty I think, that it becomes a box-ticking
exercise, that you’re looking at a list which somebody’s prepared for you and you tick the boxes and
say yeah, it’s really fine.
Relationships with the commissioners
Relationships with commissioners were described as cordial and constructive in working through the
current pressures in the system. Despite this, there were calls for the board to have a closer relationship
with the CCGs, particularly in relation to what commissioners were doing in the community to help reduce
hospital demand. Having a commissioner as a NED on the board or attending regularly was tabled as an
option to facilitate further communication and interaction. The COO also called for commissioners to
spend more time in the hospital, particularly to see how A&E worked:
[we need to get] closer to these guys and we’ve got to, you know, have sometimes some difficult
conversations like, ‘Hey guys, you’re throwing everybody into A&E because you’re not really making
yourselves available to people, so come on, let’s play fair here’ . . . we need to have a chat about this
because this is not how we need to do things.
The arrival of the new CE improved communication, with regular meetings now taking place. Furthermore,
the board had recently witnessed a ‘very sensible approach’ by commissioners to support the investment of
a fogging machine to encourage the prevention and control of C. difficile infections. Such a ‘joined-up
approach’ was linked to the Francis Inquiry recommendations, to which commissioners were now looking
for a more transparent and collegiate relationship with provider organisations.
Interviews with commissioners revealed positive relations with Skye. Since Skye had become a FT,
commissioners commented on how progress had been made in terms of openness and communication
about patient safety issues. The relationship was now at a point where it felt more like a partnership. This
was exemplified by commissioners recently being invited to attend and contribute to their Clinical
Governors Standards Committee and attend their mortality review group:
If we turn the clock back 6 years, for example, we weren’t allowed to be in any of their groups. They
used to occasionally invite our medical director – our clinical governance leader was a GP – to the odd
one, but they basically didn’t invite us as a matter of course.
A key driver for this openness was the events at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, which had driven
a realisation that they needed to be open. Commissioners had witnessed the trust become more proactive
at handling, reflecting on and reporting serious incidents. Commissioners had been impressed with the
NED who was chairing the Clinical Governors’ Standards Committee in the way he challenged the
committee and called for a drive to improve standards. Commissioners had also seen the trust become
more open to collaboration in working together on patient pathways:
From our perspective, the fact that they then reported 4 months late, we have to take a good view of
that. We have to say, ‘Well okay, you should have picked it up at the time but are we going to flog
you for it when you’ve actually been open and said we’re reporting it now?’
Although it was reported that Skye had a positive baseline with high patient satisfaction, there were also
ongoing problems with several issues, such as the management of the emergency care pathway, clinical
rota covers and admissions at the weekend. This meant that the trust were in a high-risk category for
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quality and safety. This was likely to receive ongoing attention; however, commissioners had been working
with the trust to resolve these issues. In doing so, commissioners were pleased and supportive of the way
the trust were responding, particularly concerning urgent admissions:
We have to make sure we stick by the line with them, that they’ve done what we asked them to do,
and if we didn’t then I think that would be a bit of a breach of trust between the two organisations
because they’ve really tried their best on it.
Interviews with board members recognised that CQUIN payments did provide a lever by which
commissioners could encourage certain behaviours and practices within the trust. The use of CQUIN to
inform the stroke pathway was a good example of CQUIN being used as a carrot to encourage best
practice. The CEO also suggested that the CQUIN target for a needs assessment for dementia patients was
‘absolutely the right thing to do’ and was forming part of the board’s dementia strategy. That said, the
director of risk suggested that CQUIN was also presented as a double-edged sword: it was good to have
such payments, but it could provide a distraction from other activities. Further issues cited included the
point that any payments went into a trust ‘black hole’ rather than to the teams and departments who
were delivering. As such, it became all sanction and no reward, which led some staff to become apathetic.
For commissioners, CQUIN had provided an incentive for the trust to claim significant additional monies, as
well as being a driver for good practice. Falls was a case in point, with the commissioners incentivising
reductions in serious falls. The introduction of a falls risk assessment scheme was correlated to a reduction
in serious falls. CQUIN was also credited with reductions in pressure ulcers and with supporting Skye to
fund service changes and encourage further discussions with community services.
Relating to regulation
Board members suggested that the previous emphasis on finance and cost control were connected to the
fact that Monitor was financially driven in its focus, and that that skewed board behaviours towards the
‘financial baseline rather than worrying too much about quality’. Having targets attached to the regulatory
framework and financial costs attached to these did focus the mind and being held to account through
the Monitor compliance framework was a ‘reasonable way’ of doing so. However, the current compliance
framework continued to create dysfunctional consequences, as attention and energy moved from one
target to the next. VRE was mentioned as a case in point where the board invested energy to hit a
national standard which then slipped as the ‘searchlight goes onto something else like C. difficile’.
As the organisation was in breach of its C. difficile infection rate target, the financial penalties that
followed represented a key issue for the board. A number of frustrations were outlined, including the
lack of consultation regarding how the target was formulated and the relatively small margins of error
(a handful of cases can lead to multimillion pound fine). The lack of dialogue regarding the target
negotiation was having a demotivating effect and potentially turning people off infection prevention as
‘we’ve been set up to fail’. The trust was eventually able to negotiate the penalty with the CCGs, but the
maximum fine would have completely wiped out their surplus and put them into deficit.
Financial penalties had also driven safety improvements in response to changes in insurance premiums set
by the NHS Litigation Authority (LA). The money lost to litigation payments was a cause for concern, as the
premium was likely to increase based on the number of claims made over the past 12 months. Further
detailed analysis of litigation claims by the board was therefore needed:
We’ve been running on no claims, unprotected no claims discount, if you like, since the inception of
the NHS LA and now they’re moving to relating your premium to how many accidents you’ve had.
And again that will hopefully focus all boards, including ours, on understanding how that we can
prevent those accidents, if you want to call them that, and obviously the costs that arise for the system
for that.
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Changes to the local authority funding formula from weighted deprivation age were also highlighted as
problematic in reducing the amount of funding because of the high deprivation in the area. The local
health economy was expected to lose a large sum of its revenue as a result of these changes. Thus, the
external environment had a number of conflicting effects on the discussion of quality and safety by
the board.
Lewis
Lewis is a large NHS trust that delivers services across several sites. It offers one of highest number of
specialist services in the NHS, with a large consultant body, and is described as being at the ‘cutting edge’
of clinical care. Its long-standing reputation for high-quality clinical care is reflected in its consistently being
in the upper quartile of hospital performance and quality ratings. Board members at Lewis attributed their
success to the leadership of the CEO, who had shaped the strategy and culture of the organisation.
Strategic vision
Board members described how a culture of quality and safety was built into the vision and mission of the
organisation and how this was led by the CEO. As one of the longer-serving CEOs in the NHS, his style of
leadership was described as ‘one that reigned’ but also ‘one that people aligned to’. Other board members
spoke critically of his style being ‘abrupt and antagonistic’:
I think absolutely culture is determined right from the top . . . He sort of determines the strategy and
we run round after him doing the sums, improving the governance, you’ve got to work with
somebody a long time, haven’t you, to get that kind of confidence? So, I think we are a little bit
different here in how strategy’s determined in organisations where the chief exec’s been there for a
long time.
Alongside the CEO’s power and influence, the chairperson strongly believed that success was attributed to
‘sticking close’ to the annual plan by holding the organisation to account against the corporate goals that
had been set. Furthermore, both the chairperson and the CEO emphasised that success was linked to
developing and nurturing a culture of clinical leadership, as a well as a research-centred culture:
Compared to some places, we’ve actually got very high calibre senior staff . . . We’ve got a lot of
longstanding senior medical staff. We’ve also got the dimension of the academic and the medical
school and the students. That actually brings a little bit of a different flavour to things . . . The
academics . . . they have a fresh dimension and challenge because they’re not completely
service imbued.
Despite quality and safety being expressed as ‘everywhere’ in driving strategy, some of the board members
described how more work was required to better translate these messages across the organisation. The ND
reported a ‘power gradient’ with the board not as in-control as they perhaps thought they were. The MD
alluded to areas of the organisation that were ‘sweeping issues under the carpet’, while the trust secretary
suggested communication and translation of board objectives was a particular issue in the large TH within
the trust where the ‘old guard’ of senior medics still had ‘too much control’.
I think what we have become aware of, over the last year or 18 months, is that we’ve achieved a lot
of change in some parts of the organisation, and in a few areas, very little change . . . it’s probably not
fair to single them out, but other disciplines where the culture remains very much that of sweeping
things under the carpet, of not learning.
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The board had received lots of feedback about how the trust was a ‘good place to work’; however, an
emerging theme was apparent that people felt inhibited to speak up or ‘whistleblow’ when there were
problems in terms of quality and safety. The ‘listening events’ in response to the Francis Inquiry highlighted
(through anonymous voting) that one-third of staff did not feel confident about raising concerns for fear
of being disciplined. As in all NHS trusts a formal whistleblowing policy was in place, yet it was felt that
further work was needed develop a culture where staff felt comfortable about raising concerns.
Leadership activities
As with strategic vision, board leadership of patient safety was dominated by the CEO. His long tenure
meant that he was highly visible and had developed strong relationships across the organisation. His
‘organisational memory’ was seen as a key factor in driving organisational success. The ND and the MD
had also worked at the organisation for many years.
You’ve got that stability at a very senior level . . . I think there is a bit of a benefit there . . . these very
small trusts don’t have the critical mass, the financial stability, and therefore that then knocks on to
quality and being able to, sort of, flex your muscles a bit and challenge the system. Whereas, when
you’re big and you’ve got a bit of cash in the book, you can tend to, you know, be a little bit more
arrogant maybe, but just say, ‘No, we’re fixing that. We don’t need your help, but, you know,
we’ll call you in if needed’.
The CEO had a reputation for carrying out unannounced inspections, and the ND also exemplified this
‘leading by example’ style of leadership by doing a nightshift once a month. Of the CEO, the trust
secretary said:
It’s his nature, it’s his personality, he knows the guys scrubbing pans in the kitchens, he knows the
porters by name, he knows the cleaners who run the corridors around here by name and he takes a
personal interest in them. It’s not just a bit of grandstanding, he genuinely does. And he gets out on
the shop floor and I think that’s a big difference . . . pretty often, he informally pops up in peculiar
places, he’s quite often got his camera with him and people then get a sheaf of embarrassing
photographs slapped on their desks the next day, you know, ‘why is this corridor filled with all this
equipment?’ ‘Who left all these rubbish bags there?’ So, it sets the standard very high.
Board members described how they addressed patient safety by being actively involved in the governance
structures of the organisation. A NED described how chairing the clinical governance and standards
committee made it clear that the board takes patient safety very seriously. The complaints process was
seen as a good example. This was described as ‘very exec-led’ and ‘taken extremely seriously’, with the
CEO scrutinising every single complaint. Further scrutiny was also undertaken at the complaints panel,
which comprised governors, the director of quality and effectiveness, the ND and the MD.
Although some members of the board commented on how the CEO had created the right balance and
skill mix, the dominance of the CEO was also mentioned as a potentially inhibiting factor. The MD felt
that the chairperson could be stronger ‘in reining him at times’ in order to facilitate better discussion.
One NED also suggested that too much of the patient safety brief ‘fell on the laps’ of the ND and MD and
that these roles were already overstretched. The ND’s remit, in particular, was described as ‘colossal’.
Indeed, the MD herself suggested that further support here would be helpful.
Board meetings and mechanisms
Board meetings were described as being predominantly focused on quality and safety issues. A NED
described how the quality report containing MRSA and C. difficile infection rates and hospital mortality
statistics (and similar) tended to occupy about one-quarter of the whole meeting.
That said, both the ND and MD still thought that more discussion could be given to the quality and safety
papers rather than having protracted discussions about finance and business matters, which were thought
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to sometimes dominate the board agenda. The board agenda had been restructured, with a section now
dedicated at the start to discuss quality and clinical effectiveness. This view was questioned by the
chairperson, who was less in favour of the change, suggesting that it was leading to duplication with the
governors’ meeting agenda and that the first part of an executive board meeting was starting to resemble
a board of governors’ meeting. Others disagree:
I don’t think that there’s enough discussion at the board about the clinical issues and quality issues.
I think there’s far too much concentration on politics and buildings and arguments about the office
block and all this sort of stuff, which are important from the organisation’s point of view – there’s a
lot of money associated with them – but I think the board agenda is dominated by those issues.
Non-executive directors were confident that they challenged and held the executive to account in board
meetings. Despite NEDs’ confidence that they effectively challenged the board, in contrast, the ND’s
experience of meetings was that there was not enough challenge. In her view, meetings tended to be
dominated by the CEO. This was connected to views suggesting that the chairperson had a key role in
encouraging contributions from other board members:
I don’t think the challenge is there. And I think that’s because it’s so dominated by the chief executive.
Please don’t get me wrong – I’m not saying he’s not right or that he’s bad for the organisation. You
can see very well that he isn’t bad for the organisation. I just . . . I think the board would be healthier
if there was more challenge from the whole spectrum of board members rather than it being so
dominated by one person. And I think some of that comes down to his personality, some of it comes
down to relatively weak chairing.
The observation of board meetings found that out of just over 14 hours of discussion observed across the
four meetings, a total of 200 minutes were directly related to patient safety issues, around 24%. This time
was predominantly spent on discussions about C. difficile infections (about 70 minutes), and covered the
target being set and the financial penalty imposed if the target was breached. A wide range of shorter
discussions were directly linked to the Quality Report agenda item, containing performance indicators
(falls, sharps, needles) as well as clinical risk factors, such as clinical negligence, and environmental health.
The majority of these board meetings were based around monologues by the CEO, who provided a
commentary on the ‘matters arising’ that the board faced, particularly in relation to estates and
service reconfiguration.
Governor relations
Governors were emphasised as a key priority for the CEO and the chairperson. The CEO described how
they were given ‘top-level’ information with which to scrutinise the board and to enable them to ‘drill
down’ and ask critical questions. For the CEO, this had led to a number of challenging questions,
particularly in relation to high levels of patient falls and difficult staffing levels. In contrast, other board
members, particularly the finance director, supported the view that governors were not particularly
effective. He felt that governor meetings tended to be ‘easily distracted’ from the key issues and got
‘bogged down’ in personal interests and issue campaigns.
Interviews with governors revealed a great deal of support for the board, with particular praise for the trust
secretary, chairperson and chief executive. Governors interviewed were happy with the type and amount
of information they received. Governors were involved in a variety of subcommittees, including the
complaints panel. The lead governor described how she worked very closely with the chairperson and the
trust secretary. The majority of quality and safety issues were covered in the Quality of Patient Experience
working group.
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Ongoing issues were raised about improving the relationship with NEDs. They described how NEDs tended
to lack interest in governors, which was manifest in NEDs often not turning up to meetings and having
little direct contact. The difficulties of finding members of the public with the required competencies to be
a governor were also raised. It was reported that governors were often happier to do the softer things
(‘potter round and do patient food testing’), with the general public having little understanding as to the
complicated reality of the role.
The majority of discussion at board of governors’ meetings was built around governor education regarding
the latest policy developments alongside the provision of summary information about performance. There
were a variety of PowerPoint presentations covering issues about improving patient experience, workforce
development and infection control. The CEO was central to these discussions, with his report occupying a
significant part of the meeting agenda. Here, the CEO provided a summary of the key issues facing the
trust and sought to mobilise governor support. Governors made only a limited contribution to the
meetings, other than largely supporting the CEO and chairperson in their current negotiations. In relation
to C. difficile infection rates, they supported the CEO in his criticism of the financial penalty being imposed
for a breach of target. Some questions and challenges were raised regarding patient and staff experience.
For example, a governor consistently made the point in the meetings that the board needed to improve
hospital food by providing healthier options.
Assessing organisational performance
Board members expressed confidence and support in the ‘good reports and regular dashboards’ that were
provided. In addition to the mandated performance measures, board members described other ways in
which safety performance was measured. They had recently adopted the CAT, which was being adapted
to the needs of the local context and used to provide a monthly online survey covering a variety of clinical
quality assurance measures. The board also benchmarked their performance against other FTs.
Although the overall message was one of support for the board, concerns were raised about the amount
of information that board members had to read in advance of and during board meetings. Both the MD
and a NED suggested that more detailed ‘deep-dive’ analysis of particular issues was needed, as there
was a danger with ‘high-level reports’. Other concerns were raised about the danger of looking at serious
risks at the expense of more everyday ‘average’ issues.
The corporate governance committee spends quite a lot of time fretting about the Corporate Risk
Register. Are we looking at the right things? . . . What about the stuff in the middle ground? . . .
Something ticking away there that’s been running for months or even years, that might actually be
more of a concern . . . and I worry about some of those things from a governance perspective because
people tend not to keep their eye on those so much.
Walkabouts were cited as something the board regularly carried out, but again there were anxieties
expressed by a NED who held the view that they were ‘never quite sure of what’s going on’ therefore a
‘certain amount of wit’ was needed to understand the high-risk areas. The MD wanted the board to
build-in walkabouts as part of the board meeting in order to gain further soft intelligence. A NED also
supported the view that further work was needed with the organisation in relation to communication and
engagement with different members.
I, personally, feel that there should be more board-to-ward communication . . . some of them, I think,
don’t actually . . . They’re a bit frightened of it . . . I think some of them feel out of place. It’s a bit like
putting a barrister in an operating theatre – they’re fine in a courtroom, but you put them in an
operating theatre and it’s a different ball game.
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Relationships with commissioners
There was reported to be a problematic relationship between the trust and local commissioner. A NED, for
example, described how relations with the former PCTs were based around ‘tick-box exercises of patient
safety rather than looking at the bigger picture’. Relations had improved with the introduction of CCGs
and the board had quality meetings with CCGs, which were described as being positive and constructive.
Board members described having good professional relationships; however, there were some points of
contention in relation to capital investments within the local health economy. Here, local ‘rivalries and
egos’ created strained relationships, particularly regarding to the decision to build a new hospital.
Reflecting on their experiences, the interviews with commissioners suggested that the board was at times
too ‘aggressive in its ambitions’ for business expansion and in its attempts to seek control of the local
health economy. Despite these tensions, they recognised that there had been a lot of work within the trust
to promote quality and safety issues. From this standpoint, Lewis was described as an excellent trust
providing excellent care:
My opinion of the trust is they’re a trust that absolutely puts patients at the centre of everything it
does and wants to do the right thing, and if things go wrong, hands in the air and tells us it’s gone
wrong, this is what we’ll do to put it right.
In relation to the CQUIN, board members suggested that the financial incentive did make the trust
‘stop and think’ about quality issues. For example, the CQUIN for dementia had worked in driving
improvements. However, there was a fear that within the new commissioning arrangements there was a
danger that incentives such as the CQUIN would get less attention. In contrast, commissioners suggested
that the CQUIN had not driven quality improvement. Rather than acting as a financial incentive, the CQUIN
tended to be perceived as a sanction or penalty for trusts with ‘money being taken off them’. There was a
feeling that the CQUIN therefore needed to be redesigned if it was to deliver its intended outcomes.
Options proffered for improvement included redesigning the CQUIN so that they ‘joined up across the
pathway’ and for the CQUIN to apply across ‘hospital stay experience as well as in the community’.
They see it as their money, it’s extremely difficult to negotiate stretching targets and you know we are
sort of working on that and we certainly don’t give them all of the money up front.
Relating to regulation
For the CEO, Monitor was valued as being a ‘genuine independent regulator’ built on a ‘constructive
relationship of guidance and opinion’. Having the same relationship manager for 5 years had helped to
nurture informal dialogue on what was described as a need-to-know basis. In contrast, the MD suggested
that, because Monitor was primarily set up as a financial regulator, this largely framed the discussions.
Although the Monitor compliance targets had driven improvements, the point was raised that the
threat of the financial penalty per case of C. difficile infection over the target trajectory had negative
consequences for services delivery. Problems were also raised regarding the CQC. The CEO suggested that
it was up to the CQC to better communicate emerging issues. The MD also characterised the CQC as
‘very much a box-ticking apparatus’ that did not ask the right questions or ‘talk to people on the ground’.
Arran
Arran is a TH providing general and specialist services across multiple sites. Over the last 5 years the board
has been characterised by relative stability, with low levels of turnover of board members. The trust aims
to continue to build its global brand as a provider of specialist services and is undertaking large-scale
redevelopment in order to address excess demand for local A&E services. Organisational performance as
measured by the HSMR is higher than average, but the trust has faced some performance issues with
regard to levels of staff satisfaction and, more recently, infection control rates. Arran’s ambition is to be a
world leader in clinical excellence, and innovation appears to have distracted attention from the board
oversight of patient safety.
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Strategic vision
As a large specialist TH, Arran’s strategic vision was focused on supporting clinical excellence and securing
a drive for further funding for research and development. This was particularly the case in clinical areas,
where the trust was seen as being a leader in the field. There was a clear aspiration to further enhance the
‘global brand’ of the organisation.
In striving for clinical excellence, the fluidity that characterised the trust meant that board members often
associated more with a ‘vision’ of clinical excellence than a corporate plan. The board had not yet
translated this vision into operational plans, as one NED observed:
Some people want a very detailed strategy document written and [others are] of the view that so long
as we broadly know where we’re going, we don’t need it, because it changes so much; it’s hard to be
definitive about where we’re going, even though we think we want to know where we want to go.
So writing it down, it would be out of date as soon as you’d written it.
One board member explained that the reason for the lack of strategy by the board was in large part
connected to a preference for a ‘crisis management’ style of governance. The point was also raised that
safety and quality improvements tended to be patchy across the organisation or merely bolted on to local
initiatives at the division level rather than being seen as an organisation-wide approach:
We are much better when we’ve got a crisis, a burning platform to deal with rather than seeing a
problem and dealing with it in a structured, planned way. I’m overstating the distinction but I just
think that things tend to be quite operational, crisis driven rather than improvement focused.
Some board members expressed concerns that the drive for innovations to increase efficiency could
compromise service quality and patient safety. This view was further supported by the observation that the
trust had a ‘strong audit culture’ and was ‘strongly focused on research’ but less focused on continuous
quality improvement:
I do hear stories about people making perhaps not very well advised shortcuts because they thought
that they had to hit the budget overall . . . a more able manager will find a creative way of spending
what they need to deliver the service. Your less creative, innovative or less financially enabled person
will hide behind the fact of, ‘Oh I didn’t think I’d got the budget to do that’ but it’s not an
acceptable behaviour.
However, other board members disputed this view and suggested that the Quality and Safety Agenda was
given priority, with ‘the days of having finance at number one long gone’. Discussions about patient safety
were said to have had high visibility throughout the board and the Quality and Safety Committee. The
strong clinical presence running throughout the organisation also ensured that issues around finance did
not compromise quality and safety.
Leadership activities
Interviews with board members in Arran highlighted how the leadership associated with patient safety
contrasted with other organisations. In support of its strategic vision of clinical excellence, the governance
structures of the trust were led by medical professionals, with the trust having multiple medical directors each
operationally responsible for the financial, workforce and patient safety issues within their own directorate.
These MDs formed part of ‘clinical boards’, consisting of divisions that reported upwards to the executive
board through a range of feedback and audit systems. In addition, the trust had a medical directorate, which
provided forums for sharing quality and patient safety information across the various clinical boards:
It’s a clinically led organisation with nursing, doctor and AHP (allied health professional) feed-in to
specialty and division . . . If you believe that the right systems and processes will stop mal-alignment
and errors, we have a number of checks on that.
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Although board members generally expressed confidence in the medically led assurance mechanisms with
regard to patient safety, some concerns were expressed about the underlying culture around incident
reporting. This was acknowledged as ‘suboptimal’ and was connected to deeper staff concerns about the
reputational and career consequences of reporting in an environment perceived as being hierarchical and
where people could be ‘scapegoated’ for raising issues about poor quality and unsafe care:
We still have a way to go about developing a really positive reporting culture; for everyone to feel
that we’ve got a just reporting culture that’s flexible, that then acts effectively. So we still get ‘never
events’, we still get serious incidents.
It’s a matter of record that we have a less-than-fantastic record on bullying and harassment which
we’ve tried to address over the last 3 or 4 years, but it’s a fact.
In response to these issues and concerns, considerable effort was being made by the board to encourage a
more open and responsive organisational culture. The ‘Making a Difference Together’ initiative was set
to support staff in translating the values of kindness, teamwork, safety and improvement into their
working values and practice. This initiative was incorporated into all appraisals and consultant appointment
panels in an attempt to spread these values throughout the organisation:
Whereas before if you were a UK leading surgeon with some good R&D [research and development]
behind you and the support of the university I think you could have been pretty assured you’d get a
clinical place. Here, we’re starting to get to the place now where we’re saying, ‘Actually no. If you
don’t appreciate the importance of kindness, if you don’t appreciate the importance of working in
a team . . .’
Although this development was considered to be important and a priority, some concern was expressed
over the extent to which these cultural changes were embedded within the organisation. An issue of
significant ongoing tension was raised by a board member, which related to his perception of the
corporate culture of the trust. As an ambitious organisation which promoted the view that ‘we want to
be the best’, it was felt that this had been a distraction from the day-to-day business of providing ‘the best
things for patients’. It was also felt that more needed to be done to translate the ‘high-level vision’ into
something that could ‘change behaviour on the front line’:
My concern has been when we say we want to be the best at the same time as we’re taking a
defensive position on a safety issue or an access issue: I’m suspicious because it’s just who appears to
be the best rather than actually [who is] providing the best service.
An example of this was the introduction of the World Health Organization’s ‘Safe Surgical Checklist’.
Theatre teams were taken out for a half-day at a time as it became apparent that there were cultural
issues with staff feeling that they were unable to speak out openly if there were any issues about the
quality of care, as well as being unable to address problems associated with clinical teams not working
well together.
Board meetings and mechanisms
It was reported that over recent years there has been an increase in time spent on quality and safety at the
expense of finance. This was driven in large part by the arrival of new NEDs, many of whom had extensive
clinical experience. In addition to increased time devoted to patient safety, the manner in which these issues
were addressed was also changing, from previously ‘noting requirements and ensuring compliance’ to
attempting to understand such requirements and integrate them within organisational routines and practice:
I mean [patient safety has] certainly changed in terms of profile, as I’ve already indicated. I think it’s
changed in terms of not just ticking the box that we do it, if you see what I mean, but actually people
genuinely trying to assure themselves that it is done.
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Openness was identified by some members of Arran as an important feature of the organisation’s culture.
This was exemplified by the first part of board meetings being open to the public (before this was made
mandatory post Francis Inquiry). Board members described how this had facilitated honest exchanges
between executives and non-executives. This was particularly the case for the NEDs, who could ‘always
speak absolutely freely and without consequence’. NEDs did not ‘pull their punches’, which meant that the
executive was ‘held to account’:
What I would say is that [NEDs are] pretty well empowered here. They are seen and treated with a lot
of respect by the executive. We don’t always agree with everything they say, but when they say
‘jump!’ to quite a large extent we jump.
Although many NEDs were confident that they could challenge other board members in meetings, some
raised questions about their ability to challenge executives, especially in relation to the availability of
detailed information on quality. A NED described his experience over the past 6–12 months of watching
the increase in C. difficile infections. He had had to trust professionals that ‘the matter was in hand’, but
was anxious that he had not seen data to support this view and had not seen a consistent action plan
being formulated.
Overall, board relations were described as being good, with healthy challenge and debate alongside
‘friendly fun and banter’. Indeed, some board members welcomed the way that ‘challenge’ was starting to
increase. This was seen as a positive shift from the ‘incredibly stage-managed’ meetings of the past, as
‘executives and non-executives were increasingly looking to resolve ongoing organisational problems’:
I think we’re only starting to get to a place where execs can question one another, but I would say
that’s definitely an evolution. Previously, I’d have said that was almost unheard of, that would have
been seen as being disloyal and, not career threatening, but just not done. That’s – I would say that’s
definitely changed. So it’s better than it was but I’d say it’s got a way to go before you can
speak freely.
Observations of board meetings revealed that, of the almost 14 hours of discussions across the four
meetings, a total of just over 4 hours was directly related to issues of patient safety, representing almost
30% of board time. The largest amount of time spent on any single issue related to an environmental
health risk involving contamination at the kitchens (just under 1 hour) – an issue which was not part of the
trust strategy and, thus, was not included in proactive quality improvement work. Other notable issues
included safety in operating theatres (about 30 minutes), orthopaedic performance (30 minutes) and
patient falls (just over 10 minutes). Considerable additional time was devoted to more general discussions
about quality improvement, including ‘patient story’ narratives (30 minutes) and quality improvement
presentations related to specific service areas, such as community nursing (almost 1.5 hours).
Governor relations
Governors were viewed as ‘the eyes and ears’ of the trust. Governors were involved in the Quality and
Safety Committee, where they could hold board members and managers to account. Board members
described being impressed by their ‘penetrating questions’. Governors were also represented on the clinical
quality review group and had their own high-quality patient care group, which carried out focus groups
or interviews.
Governors and the board had a good relationship, with the board providing governors with information
and the governors providing the board with patient journeys. Although some suggested that governors
were ‘pretty good’ at holding the trust to account as a ‘critical friend’, it was also expressed that it would
be very difficult for governors to actually hold the board members and managers properly to account with
regard to the ‘bigger picture stuff’ as they lacked detailed information and knowledge about board issues.
As with other sites, issues were also raised about individual governors having their own ‘hobby-horses’
and interests rather than putting forward a more rounded view.
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Analysis of governor meetings found that the majority of time centred on governor education and the
provision of summary information regarding trust performance. These meetings tended to have three
central parts running throughout: a PowerPoint presentation about a particular topic (in this case a junior
doctors survey and service line reporting); the chairperson’s report, providing a summary of recent activities
and events (such as charity work, visits and any latest developments); and the CEO’s report, which provided
a summary of the latest performance ratings. The meetings were largely driven by the contributions from
the chairperson and the CEO. The NEDs did not contribute to any of the discussions. Overall, governor
contributions were limited to questions for further information regarding the presentations, further
clarification about particular trends related to hospital activity, providing updates about working group
activities and discussion and reflections directly related to patient experience. There was no discussion of
patient safety at the meetings outside of the CEO’s summary of progress regarding IPC.
Assessing organisational performance
Arran had developed information systems and an information pack that concentrated on safety as well as
the other key aspects of performance, which were broken down across divisions within each clinical board.
With access to detailed information from across all of the divisions, an executive described how her
exposure to board information illustrated that they were functioning well in relation to quality and safety:
. . . it gives us a pointer in terms of who we should be speaking to, and there’s some commentary in
there as well and I place a lot of reliance on this, as I think many other people do.
To complement the RAG ratings, board information was supplemented by ‘Care Thermometer’ clinical
data, which provided more fine-grained information at ward level. Although this was welcomed, some
concern was expressed that these disaggregated data were currently used in a largely reactive manner,
with the view that the board was a little slower than they should be at addressing particular issues:
For the most part, we look back at what has happened and try and learn from it and then try and
quickly apply, ‘Oh if that’s happened, what must we do looking forward’? If we were to aspire to the
absolute best practice, which we do, there’s something about tracking non-safety trends in an
intelligent way that you can now do with the level of data capture and using it to predict where the
might be a problem.
There was also some concern about an over-reliance on quantitative summaries. To balance this, board
members used a number of techniques for gathering soft intelligence, including unannounced visits,
ongoing review of all complaints and walkabouts:
The secret of it all is to talk to a lot of people because people will often tell you in conversation what
they wouldn’t tell you if they had to write a report about it or if it had to go through their line
management process, wherever that line management process may apply.
There was some support for the use of ‘patient stories’ to provide additional qualitative information and
soft intelligence on patient experience. However, this was not universally supported by board members
and consequently patient stories were not routinely used:
We’ve done [a patient story] once and the board were quite staggered at the story that was told. But
they were staggered and then they were sort of – ‘so what’? Well the ‘so what?’ is that we developed
the whole ‘Making a Difference’ campaign as a result of it. So the board are starting to see that this
is important. But I think they don’t want to be just hit with a sledgehammer every month and yet I
think there’s nothing wrong with that! [Laughs.]
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Relationships with commissioners
Arran relies heavily on specialist commissioning contracts. The majority of their income comes from
specialist commissioners, especially the Nationalist Specialist Group (NSG). Although, on the whole,
relations with commissioners were described as cordial, it was reported that the fragmentation in the
commissioning landscape made it difficult to have meaningful discussions. However, it was thought that
the NSG were helpful allies in promoting safety within the organisation:
We’re a much bigger client of National Specialist Group than most other hospitals. That will probably
be a good thing for safety because I think for the first time . . . the people on the other side of the
table really know what they’re talking about . . . The CCG are less likely to get hold of the
Safety Agenda.
In relation to patient safety, the Clinical Quality Review group within the trust provided an opportunity for
commissioners and the trust to meet and review matters related to quality and safety. Commissioners
would scrutinise their performance, looking at serious incidents, infection control and waiting times and
pressures ulcers, etc. Commissioners and the trust were currently in discussions about the financial
penalties regarding the breach of C. difficile infection rate targets.
Relating to regulation
Monitor was well regarded for ‘keeping the board on their toes’. One result of external performance
targets was that the board began to invest time and energy into developing their own performance
indicators. However, questions were raised about the regulatory frameworks and the targets established in
relation to C. difficile and MRSA infections. The board was in discussion with Monitor about the recent
breach in this area: it was thought that Monitor did not take into consideration the specialist, tertiary
nature of the trust and its policy of admitting patients from other hospitals that already had infections.
Concluding remarks
The case study findings highlight a variety of activities, practices, supporting tactics and relationships
associated with the effective board governance of patient safety. The findings suggest that different board
behaviours can be identified across different organisations and governance contexts. They also relate to
the various models of board governance outlined in Chapter 2.
The case studies provide links to agency theory through the ways in which boards established processes to
measure patient safety performance to ensure compliance and to hold staff accountable for their actions.
Agency theory thus appears particularly relevant in terms of understanding board governance at Arran,
in particular the way the board focused on the use of audit and performance measurement to support its
‘clinical board’ governance structure.
The case studies link to stewardship theory in the way that boards have sought to create a framework of
shared values, built on trust, within their organisations. The relationships developed between the board
and staff through initiatives such as such ‘walkabouts’ exemplified attempts by boards to improve their
relationships with the broader organisation. Stewardship theory was particularly relevant in terms of
understanding behaviour at Islay in relation to the board’s engagement of staff and patients in the
development of strategies for quality and safety.
The case studies also show evidence of practices that can be understood through stakeholder theory,
where boards have attempted to manage complex trade-offs between stakeholders, including staff,
patients and the public. The documented involvement and interaction with governors across the sites
represents an illustration of this, where boards recognised, to varying degrees, the need to engage
governors in the oversight of patient safety. Similar engagement and trade-offs were seen in the
relationships between several of the case study trusts and their commissioners.
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Finally, the case studies link to resource dependency theory in the way boards attempted to manage
internal and external relationships in order to leverage influence and resources. The relationship with
commissioners was an example of this in terms of the boards’ attempts to negotiate influence and
resources. The negotiation between Lewis and Monitor regarding the imposition of financial penalties for
a breach of targets represents a good example of this.
These data, therefore, provide specific insights into the challenges of enacting board governance, as well
as showing how the different theoretical ‘lenses’ discussed in Chapter 2 can provide complementary
insights into the complex processes at play. The next analysis (see Chapter 6) seeks to drill down into the
trusts by following key safety issues ‘from board to ward’. In this way we seek to extend our reach from
the activities and processes at executive level to the impacts and actions at mid-tier management and
frontline clinical services.
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Chapter 6 Case study analysis of tracer issues
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present a qualitative analysis of board activities in our case study sites,
associated with two tracer issues and informed by the theoretical framework of conformance and
performance, as developed by Garratt26 and explained in Chapter 2. In order to explore conformance, we
followed board involvement in the management of C. difficile infections; control of C. difficile infection is
a key requirement by the external regulator in IPC. To explore performance aspects of governance we
examined how each case study site dealt with a specific patient safety issue or incident, identified during
fieldwork, from ‘board to ward’.
We first provide a brief overview of the Garratt framework before exploring the findings from the case
study sites relating to conformance (the issue of C. difficile infection control) and then performance
(issues specific to each site).
Background to Garratt’s ‘learning board’ model
In exploring the effect of board directors, Garratt26 posits four tasks that require sufficient diversity within a
board for it to cope with the ongoing intellectual and operational challenges: policy formulation, strategic
thinking, supervising management and ensuring accountability (for more details, see Chapter 2). For
Garratt, an effective board is able to balance these four tasks simultaneously, combining external, internal,
long-term and short-term perspectives. Garratt compares an effective board to a brain which is engaged in
continuous learning, a ‘learning board’ being the centre of a learning organisation’s business brain.26
There are two sides to learning boards: board conformance, sometimes termed compliance, and board
performance. Conformance itself involves two aspects: ‘ensuring accountability’ through conformance to
regulation, audits and stakeholder rights, and ‘supervision of management’ through conformance to key
performance indicators, budgets, projects and organisational capability. Similarly, board performance also
involves two aspects: ‘policy formulation and foresight’ and ‘strategic thinking’ to drive the enterprise
forward by maintaining learning and developing its position in its energy niches to allow it to survive and
grow. Garratt suggests that these four board tasks (policy formulation, strategic thinking, supervision of
management and ensuring accountability) feed naturally into each other as interactive elements of an
annual cycle of the board’s learning. This structured way of thinking about board tasks was used to inform
the analysis of tracer issues.
Tracer issue 1: board attention to ‘conformance’
The following subsection presents findings from each of our case study sites in relation to board
conformance, analysing the board’s role and subsequent activities in relation to an IPC issue, specifically
C. difficile infections.
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Islay’s response to C. difficile infections
Islay was seen as high performing in terms of C. difficile infection containment. Interviews with IPC
committee members reflected pride in their achievements, and they expressed their support of board
members’ forward thinking in relation to infection control. The Quality Improvement Strategy was central
to progress, as it made infection control a key priority from the outset. The very first quality improvement
collaborative undertaken by the trust was related to C. difficile infection control, with results showing
significant reductions in the participating patient group.
The board provided financial support and encouragement to the infection control team; C. difficile
infection control was well resourced, with six HPV (human papillomavirus) fogging machines to hand, a
team of 24/7 domestics available to move patients at all times and side rooms also available. The IPC team
were also able to draw on a relatively advanced electronic patient record system to manage and track
patients with infections.
The team suggested that they had a slightly different dynamic to other trusts, as the MD was the director
of IPC and considered to be a ‘crucial driving force’, providing strong leadership and accountability in
relation to IPC performance. The MD supported the IPC team in situations where directorates were
underperforming, providing the necessary ‘clout’ that meant audits and reports were taken seriously.
A further example given was that of ‘antibiotic stewardship’, in which the MD was central to a ‘Green for
Go’ campaign concerned with changing compliance with the antibiotic guidelines from ‘red’ to ‘green’.
The ND was also important, keeping in regular contact with the IPC team and creating a direct reporting
link to the board.
The arrival of performance targets was cited as crucial in shaping board behaviour, as the financial cost for
breaching the C. difficile infection rate target raised its corporate profile. Building on these mandated
performance targets, IPC committee members described how the board seized the moment very early
to develop division-based targets to increase competition across the divisions, to reflect on progress and to
ensure that divisions were held accountable.
Ongoing issues in the governance of C. difficile infection rate management were identified. Although
targets had driven a number of improvements, there was now recognition that the C. difficile infection
rate targets needed to be revised – continuing reduction to a point of zero tolerance was not realistic and
difficult to communicate to staff groups. IPC committee members did, however, suggest that more could
be done in relation to preventing and controlling C. difficile infections, including improvements in the
translation and accessibility of antibiotic guidelines, availability of web-based guidelines and other IT
resources for the workforce, such as apps.
There was still work to be done regarding joined-up working with the community. Despite the availability
of a regional collaborative for all infection control leads to meet and discuss key issues, collaboration
between hospital and community infection control teams could be improved. The fact that community and
acute trusts had separate targets caused friction between teams. Maintaining the focus and resources for
C. difficile infection control was also presented as a challenge given the existence of ‘rival’ infections.
For example, a recent outbreak of CPE (carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae) infection in a
neighbouring hospital highlighted the likelihood of more pressure on resources such as side rooms used to
treat C. difficile-infected patients in the future.
Skye’s response to C. difficile infections
At the time of the fieldwork, C. difficile infections had gone up from being undertrajectory to a point
where acceptable levels had been breached. The cause of this trend related to continuing problems with
matching capacity with demand as bed occupancy levels were running at 90%. Such levels prevented the
opportunities to carry out deep cleaning, as wards were full and essential isolation facilities, such as side
rooms and en-suite rooms, were not available.
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Historically, members of the IPC committee suggested that board approaches to infection control had been
‘hit and miss’, with frustrations expressed about the time taken to make decisions, putting costs before
quality and a culture described as ‘ticking a box but missing the point’. The IPC team provided evidence
to show one of the effective ways to control C. difficile infection through good environmental
decontamination, but this had taken 3 years:
[D]eep cleans: we have been trying to get that in place for 3 or 4 years. It has gone to the finance
group, it’s essentially been said ‘Oh well, yes we support it’ but there’s no money, so essentially it
didn’t happen.
It was noted that responses had improved recently, with the latest board proactively looking to involve the
IPC committee and placing them at the forefront of the strategic plan. The team were now in regular
contact with the CEO, who had also recently decided that there should be an executive member taking
part in every root cause analysis. Despite this increase in engagement, questions were still raised about
the MD who, despite being a member of the IPC committee, never attended the meetings. This lack of
engagement was linked to wider problems with medical involvement in infection control. The COO also
tended not to attend IPC committee meetings. Embarrassingly, when the trust breached its target and was
asked to report to Monitor, key personnel were not able to explain what the issues were.
Although targets were supported in getting infection control funded and recognised, questions were
raised about unintended consequences and equity, as elsewhere. First, board focus on targets such as
C. difficile infection rates had the potential to distract from other important issues. Second, as the
organisation was already starting from a low baseline, continuous reduction in the C. difficile infection rate
target meant they were more likely to get penalised when compared with a trust starting from a much
higher threshold. The trust managed to negotiate a reasonable financial outcome with CCGs after they
breached the target. Indeed, there were positive (unintended) consequences in that the penalty enforced
further investment to reduce infections.
We’ve probably reached the stage where most organisations have probably reached the irreducible
minimum. And it’s no coincidence that rates have probably plateaued or, if anything, are slowly
creeping up.
Although policies and guidance were available, further education about antibiotic stewardship was
needed, as knowledge of microbiology among nursing and medical staff was described as poor. While
junior doctors were a problem in this regard, the introduction of consultant champions had improved
antibiotic prescribing. The trust also needed to find new ways to translate information. Information
technology was tabled as a solution. The trust had an electronic prescribing system which was good in
flagging up resistant antibiotics on patients but it needed to be improved to build in more ‘red flags’,
such as whether someone was C. difficile toxin negative. Developing an antibiotic website along with the
use of apps were ways in which the trust was making information more accessible.
The IPC team was collaborating with the local health economy to deliver training around C. difficile
infection control and antibiotic prescribing and was part of a clinical governance forum where old cases of
C. difficile and MRSA infections were discussed. However, more work needed to be done at CCG level to
fill the big gaps within nursing (residential) homes.
Lewis’s response to C. difficile infections
Interviews with IPC committee members revealed overwhelming support for the board in relation to its
oversight of C. difficile infections. All IPC members commented on how the CEO, ND and MD were
receptive to and supportive of organisational efforts related to IPC. Support at board level was
demonstrated by successful business cases, which funded the organisational response to C. difficile
infections. It was also demonstrated by CEO and MD attendance at serious infection review meetings
(SIRM), which gave further power to the infection control team by signalling the backing of the board.
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The CEO was particularly important here in terms of knowing the different roles at each level and
managing interactions between different parts of the organisation. The ND was also a member of the IPC
committee and its operational review group, and her involvement was welcomed:
I’m involved in preparing the report for the board on a monthly basis, so I know the questions that
they are asking on the basis of the information that we are providing. They do want to know what is
happening and what we are doing to try and change the current situation and improve our rates as
much as possible.
The introduction of infection control targets has driven interest in C. difficile infection and led to
investment, enthusiasm and support for infection control. As a result, questions and concerns raised by
the board tended to focus on the targets at the expense of wider factors affecting patient safety. Although
targets have undoubtedly raised awareness, IPC committee members suggested that a different strategy
was now required, as continuing reduction in C. difficile infections was considered to be no longer
achievable. They were also concerned about securing greater recognition of the fact that a tertiary,
specialist trust such as Lewis tended to receive the most complicated patients with existing problems
(i.e. C. difficile carried from elsewhere).
At the moment it’s all about C. difficile so people are prepared to throw money at it . . . but things
that are not quite so high profile and like E. coli maybe don’t get the same attention.
The board mind-set was changed to ‘we’ve got to meet these targets, we’ve got to reduce the
numbers . . . we don’t want Monitor on our back, we don’t want the Care Quality Commission on
our back and we certainly don’t want fines.
More work was needed to engage the workforce in IPC issues, particularly those related to C. difficile.
Although information dissemination via e-mail or the intranet was considered good, staff engagement was
acknowledged to be low for junior and senior clinical staff alike. This was particularly so in relation to
antimicrobial stewardship (getting clinical staff to prescribe the right antibiotics). Things were improving as
the IPC team were starting to apply more pressure to medical staff, but they required more support from
senior medical staff, including the MD. Compulsory attendance at patient reviews, particularly those
concerning C. difficile infection, was suggested as way to improve the situation. Further issues concerned
how best to educate junior medics and change the practices of senior medics to be consistent with new
guidance; initiatives included an induction package for junior medics, additional support from pharmacy
teams and ‘antibiotic champions’ in each directorate.
Concerns were also expressed about the epidemiology of C. difficile, with focus moving to community
settings and patient profiles. It was felt that more community involvement with C. difficile was required.
The trust formed part of a region-wide HCAI partnership that concentrated on C. difficile and MRSA, and
had a subgroup sharing best practice, experiences and lessons learned. Despite good relations, further
joined-up working between primary and secondary care was called for, as the approach to managing
C. difficile infections was to look at C. difficile carriage in the patient population. As it stood, the key issue
was a lack of clarity over who was responsible for infection control in primary and community settings such
as GP surgeries and care homes. A ‘great deal of work’ was needed in terms of education and awareness
at the interface between community and secondary care.
C. difficile is much more widespread in the greater community than we had thought and that carriage
of C. difficile by patients or carers or visitors is probably a much greater risk for transmission than
using an antibiotic.
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Arran’s response to C. difficile infections
The IPC team at Arran outlined an extensive infection control infrastructure supported by ‘infection control
link practitioners’ (mainly nurses) who were trained to act as ‘the eyes and ears on wards and within
departments’ for audit purposes and charged with embedding infection control training into practice.
One IPC nurse suggested that, although some of the education was relatively simple for some audiences
(e.g. educating those nurses in charge of cleaning wards), the challenges came when trying to engage the
wider clinician audience to changing particular practices. Recently the approach by the IPC team has
changed towards providing a more customised ‘tailor-made’ education programme for particular clinical
groups. This approach has gained a number of successes, including ‘transforming hand hygiene’ within
A&E by developing a series of must-do rules:
[Y]ou need to go into the silos and actually see, you know, who are the champions there, who are the
opinion leaders, how can we influence them to get them involved and then recruit them and try and
get them to join in.
In contrast to other sites, the IPC team described having a distant relationship with the board: although
the IPC committee had relatively good relationships with staff, the relationship with the board proved to
be challenging, particularly when attempting to escalate problems; one IPC described being told by the
CEO ‘to stop coming to him with bad news’. This opinion exemplified a reluctance to engage with
underlying systems and process problems within the organisation, with a preference for ‘good news’
headlines. Such a perspective was linked to wider issues with the incident reporting systems of the trust.
This included ‘a culture of bullying and intimidation’ prevalent throughout the organisation, which meant
that there was a tendency for middle managers to project the image of being ‘seen to be doing okay’
by achieving targets and making sure none of the issues was escalated up to board level:
In the lower ranks we have a joke about how only good news goes through and none of the bad; so
that you know you’ve got a problem on the ground but by the time it gets to the chief exec people
are all saying everything’s okay . . .
. . . if you do pick up on anything you will find that people will be too nervous to tell you about all the
intimidation that goes on because even when the CQC came in . . . it wasn’t said but the implication
was that nobody should really go over there and tell anybody about the bullying culture. It wasn’t
picked up here at all but it does exist.
Although the trust had historically made significant achievements in relation to C. difficile infection control,
recent trends suggested that occurrence of C. difficile infections was increasing, with a breach in the
performance target likely to happen. An IPC committee member explained that this increase was in large
part caused by the distorted picture that the board received in relation to C. difficile infection management
performance. The lack of systems to effectively govern C. difficile infections meant the response only
happened in times of crisis. Although the organisation did respond to infection control issues, it did so
reactively, once an external target had been breached.
. . . suddenly people become aware of it and say, ‘Why didn’t anybody tell us?’ I’m very cynical
about it.
. . . it’s not just me, it’s organisationally, they’re not a listening organisation, not to the staff that are
working inside them.
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Tracer issue 2: board attention to ‘performance’
The following subsection presents findings from our four case study sites in relation to board performance
aspects of governance, analysing board responses and subsequent actions in dealing with emerging
patient safety issues.
The Islay board’s development of the ‘staff stories’ initiative
Board members were looking to further develop staff engagement as part of the Quality Improvement
Strategy. To do so they carried out what was described as a series of ‘Berwick sessions’ to identify
staff concerns in relation to quality and safety. These Berwick sessions had two objectives: to raise staff
awareness of achievements currently being made and to enable staff to raise previously unidentified
concerns, thereby developing emerging themes.
Building on the idea of patient stories as a way of providing a voice to untapped intelligence about the
organisation, the board developed the idea of ‘staff stories’ about their past experiences of being a patient
within the organisation. The board requested volunteers to ‘have a cup of tea’ and speak to them about
their patient journey and to rate particular aspects of the service. The questions asked by the board built
on CQC inspection questions such as ‘Did you feel safe? Did you feel that your treatment was resourceful?
Was it effective? Was the outcome what you expected it to be?’ These questions were supplemented with
a self-reported visual analogue scale ranking experience in terms of safety, effectiveness, resourcefulness
and caring.
Feedback from participating staff identified positive and negative experiences of the initiative. One staff
member described the positive experience of being listened to:
[T]hey were quite transparent throughout the whole thing and admitted that, you know, if there were
any faults in the services they wanted to rectify them . . . it wasn’t about pointing blame towards
anyone, it was about learning from mistakes . . . and putting strategies in place to improve the services
that they offer.
However, this respondent also stated that it could have been further enhanced by having a clinical
perspective from someone involved in the patient journey under discussion to triangulate patient
experience with a frontline staff perspective and initiate a dialogue with the service under review.
Greater transparency of dissemination of feedback across departments would also have been welcomed,
as would evaluation of the extent to which lessons were being learned and applied.
if they’d had someone there as a representative from that service that might have kind of helped them
to understand things a little bit more . . . I came away in some ways feeling not bad but, you know, oh
I feel like I’ve just been really negative there about that part of the service . . . Whereas if the person
from the service had been there, then perhaps that might have been giving the board a bit of a better
understanding of how it operates and why they do things in a certain way.
The Skye board’s development of the ‘Bed Plan’
In a context of ever-rising demand for services, the trust was unable to match capacity and demand or
successfully manage patient flow. Faced with a bed crisis, the COO developed proposals to redesign bed
management. The key proposal was to close emergency admissions and open an additional rehabilitation
ward at one of the trust sites in an attempt to reduce the number of outliers and ward transfers,
improving efficiency and quality by having patients on the right wards with the staff skills.
Even on the heady days of summer we still seemed to have patients who weren’t in a bed belonging
to medicine. It wasn’t entirely correct . . . that seemed to give us a signal that there was
something amiss.
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. . . [the bed plan] gives us a better patient experience by . . . not moving anybody overnight and,
making sure people aren’t in acute beds who don’t need to be there.
Interviews with staff involved in the formulation and implementation of the bed plan indicated that the
proposals had improved the situation, reducing the number of outliers. Investment in additional bathrooms
and bays had also improved infection control, as it was now possible to isolate cases and provide decamp
facilities. Yet despite these successes interviewees were critical of the amount of time needed to make
these changes. The Bed Plan was described as ‘the outcome of a discussion many times over’, where
continuous changes at executive level led to protracted negotiations over the plan.
Managers and nurses identified limitations in the engagement processes associated with the plan:
consultation processes had largely failed to engage nurse and ward managers in the key admission areas
of A&E. Further, consultant physicians had each been nominated a number of beds spread across up to six
different parts of the trust; one manager described their anxiety with the possible implications for patient
care of making physicians ‘homeless’ as a result of the changes, and suggested a need for a dialogue with
the executive team.
It was further suggested that better links were needed between the board and the clinical support unit
management team, clinical directors, and senior nurses if engagement was to be improved. Suggestions to
enable this included staff invitations into boardroom decision-making processes and increased visibility of
board members on wards. The board needed to ‘get their faces known out there in clinical practice’.
If you went round an organisation and you asked most of the matrons, who are obviously heavily
involved and impacted by the Bed Plan . . . if you asked all of them for details there’d be a very
different range of answers and some people wouldn’t be able to answer. We all know the new ward
is opening . . . but when you go into the details of that and what that actually means and where
patients . . . it gets a little bit fuzzy, especially around how we’re going to staff those wards.
Despite these difficulties there was cause for optimism. Some interviewees noted that the board should be
given credit for the huge effort involved and also their increased openness, visibility and enhanced
communication via team briefings. The new CEO was perceived to be working in the right direction as the
forthcoming strategic plan built on a consultation process.
The Lewis board’s development of the ‘After Francis’ initiative
In response to the Francis Inquiry, the MD, the ND and the director of quality scrutinised all 290
recommendations of the Francis Inquiry and RAG rated the organisation against those recommendations.
For those areas deemed less than fully compliant, a series of working groups and listening events were set
up to explore issues related to communication and staff awareness of how to raise concerns. The 3000
staff who attended the listening events were asked to anonymously vote ‘Would you recommend this as a
place to look after your friends and family and if you had concerns would you know how to raise them
and what mechanisms are in place to do so?’ Although over 96% of attendees said they would
recommend the trust, the board wanted to know why 4% would not; to do so they invited staff to
express their concerns and make suggestions for improvements via an anonymous electronic survey.
The 960 responses were largely positive but a significant proportion (20%) stated they were not
confident to raise concerns: specifically, a consistent theme was the inability to raise concerns about
senior medical staff. Suggestions for improvement included helping staff build their own confidence to
be able to raise a concern, and reassurance that they would be listened to and taken seriously, and
that reported inappropriate behaviour would be challenged. Themes around communication, attitude,
hierarchy and the conduct of some groups of staff were raised.
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[W]hile the vast majority of our medical staff are fantastic, absolutely superb, would willingly go to any
of them for referral or care, but we have a small group who have been brought up in a particular style
and they manifest that, and other people think it’s OK to behave in that way.
Although the trust had a whistleblowing policy under which concerns could be managed confidentially,
areas of improvement were required in relation to reporting and ensuring feedback of action to those
raising issues. Strategies in response to these findings included the incorporation of a ‘core professional
and leadership behaviours’ dimension into all staff appraisals to ‘talk through with you how you feel your
role fits into that bigger trust vision and strategy’.
Although the introduction of the new appraisal system received good feedback from staff, some resistance
to staff appraisals has been made by doctors; some ‘difficult conversations’ led by the MD were needed
with a small cohort of clinicians who, although clinically competent, displayed disrespectful behaviour
which negatively impacted on staff morale and patient care.
The slight concern I have in this organisation is some of the badly behaved are very, very able and
competent clinicians – probably you would describe them as exceptional – and because of that their
behaviour has been tolerated and appears to be tolerated and they appear to be protected . . . That
person continues to be protected and I feel very uncomfortable with that, and I’m in a senior role and
I am aware of the difficult individual and feel completely unable to do anything about it. And I don’t
like that; I think that’s not good.
I don’t get the sense that consultants . . . see themselves as managers and leaders in the organisation.
They’re here to do a job . . . You know it’s a good job, it’s a technical job, it’s a challenging job, and
it’s a very skilled job. But it’s – the responsibility – I just don’t get the sense that there’s that kind of
commitment to the organisation and they’re here for life any more.
Francis Inquiry feedback and listening events also indicated poor communication between corporate teams
and ward-level staff in many parts of the organisation. In response, proposals for new means of
communication were developed, in order to standardise operating procedures. These included inviting all
staff groups to feedback events at specific places and times, consistent publication of information bulletins
and increases in the ‘presence’ of board members within staff information bulletins.
[W]e want to take that back a step, refresh the standard operating procedure around that to make it
much more ‘Right, that will come out on a Friday lunch-time’.
On reflection, further engagement of senior medical staff at the outset would have improved the initiative.
Because of time constraints, senior clinicians were not able to come away from their clinical commitments
to attend, and therefore a more proactive approach was required. Some staff members also suggested
increased involvement from the MD and NEDs was required:
I suppose I’m seeing much more from the nursing taking the lead, from quality and effectiveness
taking the lead – and instinctively I feel that you almost shouldn’t be able to see any light between
the medical and the nursing director on this.
The Arran board’s developments on junior doctors’ dissatisfaction
The board was made aware that the annual GMC national survey had indicated junior doctors’ concerns
about the possible negative consequences of reporting a colleague’s inappropriate practice. The survey
also identified that ‘undermining’ (a term for bullying) was indicated in a handful of the 40 specialties
within the trust. This was acknowledged as a potentially serious problem:
Junior doctors not feeling empowered, not feeling able to challenge their seniors – that’s a problem.
If that led to an occasion where a junior doctor had a concern about patient care or about safety and
they felt unable to say because of perceived repercussions that’s a serious issue.
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In moving forward the board was described as ‘significantly sighted’ on the junior doctors’ issue. This
translated into the chairperson and the governing body implementing an ongoing review of this issue with
the aim of developing long-term cultural change. The executive board was also reviewing junior doctors as
a standing item at the HR subcommittee, which had developed an action list of 10 things that needed
improvement. Agreement was also secured from the MDs that this was something that they would
support within their board. Progress would be reported on after a year. Although it was stated that the
action plan was getting stuck on administrative issues, progress was being made:
It’s been very trustee proactive at a trust-wide level but firefighting in individual departments.
Hopefully in the future we’ll move to a point where it will be very proactive on both fronts but at the
moment that’s pretty much how it is really.
Concluding remarks
The tracer issue analysis presented above shows the extent to which these hospitals could be characterised
as the ‘learning boards’ envisaged by Garratt. The case studies of board conformance highlight that boards
have been reasonably effective in ensuring ‘accountability’ through IPC committee members engaged in
regular audits and education initiatives related to the control and prevention of C. difficile infections.
The findings also point to limitations within these efforts in relation to ongoing challenges, such as
engagement of the medical workforce. IPC committee members also indicated the extent to which the
introduction of external performance targets had driven board behaviours, but again these findings
suggest limitations, with performance targets having reached a point where they were no longer relevant
to the organisation.
The case studies of board performance showcase how boards have looked to formulate policy and strategy
in relation to patient safety governance. The ‘After Francis’ initiative in Lewis represents a case in point, in
which the board have looked to respond to quality and safety issues and develop new approaches to
patient safety governance. Yet as with board conformance, notable gaps appear within these efforts as the
boards struggle to engage particular areas of the workforce. These findings also point to notable ‘blind
spots’ in board policy formulation, where particular areas of the workforce were not as engaged as they
could or should have been, subsequently leading to difficulties in policy implementation. Fears of raising
concerns or being seen as outspoken remain a significant problem in some areas.
Having drilled down in each of the trusts, we now move to a different framing for the final chapter in this
qualitative analysis: a dramaturgical view of board performance to explore the more symbolic aspects of
board practice(s).
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Chapter 7 Hospital boards: a dramaturgy
perspective
Introduction
This chapter draws on qualitative data from the overt non-participant observation in board meetings at the
same four NHS hospital FT boards explored in Chapters 4–6. It seeks to address explicitly the performative
aspects of trust boards (i.e. what board members say and do to discharge their accountabilities for patient
safety). Applying a dramaturgical framework and using the dimensions ‘scripting’, ‘setting’, ‘staging’ and
‘performance’, we found important differences between case study sites in the performative dimensions of
processing and interpretation of safety information. This was most clearly seen in the use of infection
control data. In this chapter we detail the board rituals and practices associated with these differences,
including the legitimation of current progress, the querying of data classification and the naming and
shaming of executives, and consider their implications for the governance of patient safety.
As explored briefly in Chapter 2, boards are most often considered instrumentally, whereby a ‘successful’
board is one able to take decisions on corporate strategy efficiently and effectively.19 However, attention
may also be given to symbolic approaches which understand boards in terms of the implicit social aspects
of board practice.37,104 From this perspective, boards undertake important organisational work outside of
the formal agenda in terms of conventions and ritual activity, in which participants construct narratives
about who they collectively are. It is in this regard that the concept of performativity may prove particularly
helpful, and the purpose of this chapter is to explore the application of performativity empirically. Below,
we introduce performativity and consider the breadth of its influence within the study of organisational
life, trace its foundations within the seminal work of Austin105 and Goffman106 and consider its empirical
application in the context of participatory governance.32 We then employ the framework of scripting,
setting, staging and performance developed by Hajer to the dynamics and processes of hospital executive
board meetings in relation to patient safety. We consider the insights such an approach can bring, and
their implications for the study of patient safety governance more widely.
The rise of ‘performativity’
From its inception within linguistic philosophy,105 the reach of performativity has grown in many different
ways. Early areas of influence include theoretical development in the emergence of order in complex
interactive systems,107 the framing, staging and (re)creation of social life106 and the ‘language games’
that structure performative utterances.108 Later applications include the performative constitution of
gendered identity through interactions,109,110 the continuous construction of society through ongoing
performance111,112 and the effects of economic theory on action.113 Organisationally, performativity has
informed analysis of the continuous change present in the enactment of organisational routines,114 the
enactment of technology within social settings,115,116 the role of storytelling in co-ordinating within and
between organisations117 and organisational change as active translation rather than passive diffusion.118
The foundations of performativity: Austin and Goffman
Austin105 coined the neologism performativity to describe those instances in which the utterance of a
phrase constitutes an action which changes reality rather than describes it; a simultaneous ‘saying’ and
‘doing’ with creative potential that, once the intention of the utterance is recognised, requires others to
act in accordance with its implications. Austin’s paradigmatic case is the phrase ‘I do’ when spoken within
the context of a marriage ceremony; a phrase with implications beyond indicating acceptance and
requiring the people exchanging the vows to act, and be acted on by others, as a married couple from
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that point forward. Austin additionally stipulates that performative utterances are meaningful actions that
are neither true nor false; rather, they create a social reality.
Although Austin provides a working definition of performativity, Goffman’s106 dramaturgy of social
interactions applies a theatrical metaphor to indirectly explore its operation, principally through framing.
For Goffman, the framing of the stage – the separation of front of stage, backstage and audience, and
the reciprocal acceptance of the roles of audience and players – shapes the performativity of utterances
onstage. In an extension of earlier work on the presentation of self,119 he applies this metaphor to the
operation of social life, in which performativities are made possible through framing. Frames are essentially
classification systems that actors use to order and make sense of diverse social phenomena, so that the
performative potential of an utterance depends upon the frames available to actors within specific settings.
The performativity of governance: Hajer
Applying Goffman’s work106,119 to the arena of public governance, Martin Hajer33 and others have
advocated the placing of a greater emphasis on the symbolic and performative dimensions of governance,
focusing attention on the setting(s) in which deliberation takes place and the norms expressed during
the process. Organisational life is conceived as a series of staged performances in which interactions of
scene and acts produce a particular staging of decision-making.33,34 Hajer33 operationalises Goffman’s
approach, outlining a dramaturgical governance framework for the analysis of the performative dimension
of board governance. Practice is explored through consideration of the setting(s) in which deliberation
takes place and the enactment of organisational frames, operationalised through a consideration of the
scripting, setting, staging and performance of board governance.
Scripting refers to the determination of actors involved in the decision-making forum and, by implication,
those who are excluded. Consistent with the generative potential of performativity, it considers the way in
which participatory practices construct participants as either active or passive, collaborators or protesters
and competent or incompetent. In contrast, setting concerns the physical environment in which interaction
takes place, additionally including artefacts (e.g. minutes of previous meetings, tabled reports) that
participants bring to the physical environment and which shape the performance. Deliberate attempts to
organise the interaction between participants is identified as staging. It is achieved by drawing on existing
symbols and the invention and use of new ones, together with conventions governing distinctions
between active players and passive audiences; what might be termed the unwritten rules of engagement.
The final category, performance, concerns the way in which interaction constructs new knowledge/
understandings/power relationships that shape future interactions and provide opportunities for change
over time.
Crucially, if Goffman is correct that reality is mediated through the application of frames to make sense of
the mass of available information, then it follows that all accounts of reality are shaped. The implication
then, in the context of patient safety governance, is that the examination of safety could be framed in
many ways with radically different consequences for action. For example, in presenting data that indicates
a breach of an infection control performance target, is this an instance of unreliable data requiring a
defence of organisational practice to an external regulator, a worrying event requiring detailed diagnostic
work to uncover systemic problems and institute quality improvement activity or an impossibly harsh target
imposed by regulators that needs to be robustly challenged?
Given the above framing, we exploited the opportunities presented by our observational data to examine
the dramaturgy of board performance(s).
HOSPITAL BOARDS: A DRAMATURGY PERSPECTIVE
NIHR Journals Library www.journalslibrary.nihr.ac.uk
74
Board overviews as a background to dramaturgy
In presenting findings we first outline the operation of the board at each site to retain the integrity of each
organisational setting. We then offer a comparative analysis of Hajer’s dramaturgical categories, scripting,
setting and staging, in sequence across sites, indicating the scope and scale of differences between sites in
board enactment of patient safety governance (these are summarised in Table 7). We then explore the
fourth of Hajer’s dramaturgical categories, ‘performance’, in relation to board deliberation of indicators
associated with infection control; a key component of the external performance management regime
within the English NHS at the time of the study.
TABLE 7 Summary of Hajer’s dramaturgical categories by case study site
Dramaturgical
category
Case study site
Arran Skye Lewis Islay
Scripting CEO shaped events
through ‘CEO report’
agenda item; low levels
of NED challenge;
opportunities to
challenge ‘managed’
Chairperson dominant;
NEDs forthright
challenges; adversarial
(agency) model with
execs lauded
or shamed
CEO a dominant
personality; much deferral
to his experience;
NEDs able to question;
‘embattled’ narrative of
CEO the main coda
NEDs’ robust yet
respectful challenge;
endemic, framed and
legitimated as ‘improving
patient experience’
Setting I:
physical
Large, airy meeting
room in trust
headquarters education
centre; non-adversarial
‘horse-shoe’
arrangement of tables
at the front of the
room, space for many
observers as required;
high-quality projection
facilities routinely used
Rotating venue,
typically cramped,
dated and poorly
equipped; no
consistent seating
arrangement;
‘audience’ very close
to board tables
Boardroom at main
site – imposingly
furnished (dark wood,
large tables); a place
‘where important
decisions are made’.
Separate table for those
invited to present to the
board – adversarial; calls
to mind the layout of
an ‘inquiry’
Rotating venue, always in
well-furnished, low-key
‘office’ environment.
Spacious, with room
for a wide range of
attendees to observe
as required
Setting II:
artefacts
Presentations modelled
on medical lectures;
routinely used to
summarise main points
of reports in board
papers and frame
discussion. Successfully
limited the scope for
alternative challenges
Detailed information
presented using
software tools; typically
‘dry’ delivery; used by
NEDs to facilitate
challenge
Not used other than in
‘special’ presentations by
external speakers – and
then not supported by
software or projection;
relied on orations from
presenters and challenges
made with reference to
supporting information in
board papers
Presentations routinely
used in clinical updates –
supported by
presentation software
and projection facilities
Staging Highly structured and
formal; CEO’s report
placed early in agenda
affording scope to
craft an over-arching
narrative which
reinforced the
self-image of the
organisation as a high
performer even where
there were difficulties
(e.g. infection control);
performance data
summarised to one
page of A4 and used to
identify ‘red’ areas for
development work –
assurance mode
Highly structured and
formal; chairperson
steered focus on
breach of targets in
summary indicators
to facilitate robust
challenge
CEO dominance of
‘matters arising’, placed
early in the agenda, set
the tone. Most of the
time spent on these
items; the ‘CEO show’
Highly structured, yet
‘permission to speak’.
Opens with a narrative
patient story ‘to
concentrate our minds’ –
patient experience a
guiding principle,
invoked routinely.
Performance data
reported within a ‘quality
improvement strategy’
section – improvement
mode
continued
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Arran: a world-class provider
Arran has a strong research culture and a global reputation for service innovation and development.
The board acts strategically and is externally oriented, seeking to secure compliance with central policy
directives while safeguarding and further developing its global reach and status as a pre-eminent provider
and academic research centre. In operation, board meetings are highly formal and structured to enable the
CEO to ‘steer’ interpretations of events. The executive team are experienced, with low turnover and a
strong medical presence. NEDs exhibit very low levels of challenge, even when performance difficulties are
under discussion; indeed, the dynamic of board meetings could be summarised as maintenance of the
narrative of ‘world class’ status while engaging with potential performance difficulties evident in summary
indicator data.
Skye: a local service under pressure
In marked contrast, Skye presents as a trust with high levels of turnover in the executive team in recent
years and overt recognition of many problems in service provision. This had led to a focus on internal
problems rather than the development of organisational strategy in relation to the wider external
environment. Board meetings were steered strongly by the chairperson, who dominated a newly
appointed CEO. Strong challenges from NEDs were common, and included expressions of disappointment
at poor service performance, as well as strong support for those executives considered to be performing
well. During the period of observation, one of the executives, who was considered to be performing
poorly, stepped down, to be replaced by a deputy who received similarly high levels of challenge. The
dynamic of the board could be summarised as routine non-executive challenge with limited long-term
strategic direction.
Lewis: an embattled regional powerhouse
Protective of its reputation as a regional ‘leading light’, board meetings were structured to ensure that
issues of strategic importance to the trust received due consideration and events were considered as they
unfolded over successive meetings. The image of the trust revealed through board operation is that of
a guardian of the interests of the locale and wider region, requiring continued political influence to
secure those interests. The trust has an experienced and longstanding executive team; indeed, the CEO
personifies the organisation, dominating board meetings and acting as a political antagonist to defend
local interests. During observation the majority of time was spent on a small number of financial and
estate issues and related legal disputes. NEDs were typically involved in clarifications related to their specific
areas of interest rather than challenges over strategy or performance. Overall, the board dynamic could be
characterised as one of defending its status as regional champion.
TABLE 7 Summary of Hajer’s dramaturgical categories by case study site (continued )
Dramaturgical
category
Case study site
Arran Skye Lewis Islay
Performing:
infection
control
Despite existence of
summary A4 ‘traffic
light’ indicators
showing breach on
infection control, CEO
used their report to
frame perceptions
(successful
reclassification with
commissioners and
Monitor) to remove the
breach. There was no
non-executive challenge
Chairperson adopts tone
of ‘disappointment’
at data presented on
C. difficile infection
target breach to
demand action by the
ND. No attempt to
‘explain away’ or
contextualise the breach
C. difficile infection
targets presented as
unobtainable by CEO;
legal challenge
threatened to
commissioners as part of
‘embattled’ narrative
Infection control target
(reported in QI strategy
section) is met, but
CEO warns against
complacency. Data are
disaggregated to
identify potential ‘hot
spots’ to further
drive performance
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Islay: faith in quality improvement methodologies
The overwhelming impression of this site is of one in which board structures and processes focus attention
on the reconfiguration of integrated care strategies through the lens of service quality improvement
defined as ‘patient experience’. Central to this approach was the consideration of performance issues
related to external regulatory requirements (e.g. infection control, reduction in incidence of pressure sores),
and these were directly linked to improvement work to support the strategic plan. Patient experience
was routinely invoked and normalised by the presentation of a patient experience narrative at the start of
each board meeting. NEDs were encouraged to question and the executive team actively sought their
contributions. This board could be characterised as drawing on a wide range of soft and hard intelligence,
seeking to maintain strategic focus while discharging external regulatory accountabilities.
A dramaturgy of board governance in patient safety
Scripting
Sites demonstrated distinctive variations with regard to scripting. Although often commenting on
information presented to the board, at Arran NEDs were limited in their challenges to executives;
collectively, the tone was one of ‘low challenge’ without overt conflict. This was achieved principally
through agenda shaping by the CEO, who used his ‘CEO report’ agenda item to reframe potential
performance issues.
In marked contrast, the chairperson and NEDs at Skye confidently challenged executives, particularly in
relation to poor performance in infection control and capacity/demand issues, challenging the CEO to
improve standards and the finance director to increase investment in capacity. There was clear
differentiation in the way that executives were seen and treated. The MD was widely seen as competent
and dependable, with NEDs formally acknowledging his pathway development work. In contrast, the ND
received tougher questioning and her hesitancy was drawn to attention. In this manner, executives
were either lauded or shamed, and such public shaming had a negative reputational impact within
subsequent board meetings.
At Lewis, board meetings could be summarised as ‘the CEO show’, characterised by political statements
defending organisational interests. There was much deferral to his experience, political influence and
judgement. Central to this performance was the crafting of a narrative of an embattled trust fighting for
local interests. Board meetings gave the impression of a trust under fire, enmeshed in structural, legal
and financial disputes. The CEO’s views were rarely challenged, in large part because the board supported
his position, but also because they accepted that his performance was part of the ritual, crafted with
humour, emotion and political point scoring. In this context, the chairperson had a supportive presence,
summarising issues as appropriate.
At Islay the board maintained a clear focus on strategy and service improvement, with positive roles for
each member. The CEO projected a calm manner, as a moderniser and believer in quality improvement
methodology, with a similarly oriented executive team. The CEO had heavily invested in board development
in relation to quality improvement and this training clearly informed board practice. Robust yet respectful
challenge was the norm among NEDs, framed and legitimated as ‘improving patient experience’. Board
dynamics were driven by this central narrative, which granted permission for depersonalised challenge.
Setting I: physical
Board meetings at Arran were held within the education centre at trust headquarters in a large room with
high-quality presentation facilities used in formal presentations by invited speakers to address specific
agenda items. The location reinforced a sense of ‘information transmission’ rather than deliberation: a
passive process. The room was large, bright and airy and could have accommodated up to 30 observers
with ease. The audience for the public board meeting typically consisted of five governors and/or members
of the public, ordered into rows of (sparsely populated) chairs facing presentation screens and set back
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from board members, who were themselves seated in a ‘horseshoe’ arrangement of three tables at the
front of the room; a non-adversarial framing consistent with a ‘common purpose’.
Meetings at Skye were held at different locations across the trust. With one exception, meeting rooms
were poor environments in which to facilitate discussion: cramped, hot and lacking air circulation. Because
of the cramped conditions, the audience (3–5 governors) tended to split into two groups at opposite sides
of the room, very close to the board table. The chairperson, CEO, trust secretary and trust minute-taker
always sat together, with other seats haphazardly assigned with no consistency across meetings.
Board meetings at Lewis were held at the boardroom at the main trust site, whose décor, original to the
building, consisted of dark-wood tables and chairs with red leather covers: an imposing environment
reflecting civic pride. The seating arrangement was stable across meetings. The chairperson, CEO and
observers sat together, the business development director and NEDs together on an adjacent table to the
ND and finance director, with some spaces for guest speakers and observers. The trust secretary, MD
and more NEDs sat at an adjacent table. One important feature was that those invited to present to the board
faced an experience akin to an inquiry or investigation; waiting in an anteroom for the appointed time on the
agenda, invited in when required and positioned on a table in front of the board to face questions.
Although the venue for Islay’s board meetings rotated, they were always held in well-furnished, low-key
‘office’ environments. Rooms were spacious and able to accommodate observers as required. Seating was
arranged around a large single table on an ad hoc basis. Attendees included members of the QI team
and clinical leads who attended to report updates regarding specific clinical reviews.
Setting II: artefacts
All sites provided board members with ‘board papers’, a briefing pack for information consisting of a
formal, standardised agenda and appended reports for each agenda item in sequence, ahead of the board
meeting. The format and contents was very similar across sites. Two frames of reference were identified
that underpinned these board papers: RAG ratings and ‘narrative’ executive summaries. Patient safety
performance information contained within the board papers was assigned red, amber or green (RAG)
ratings to document performance. Additional quantitative material would include line graphs, along with
run charts and bar charts to present performance. In addition, board papers presented information in the
form of an executive summary of the ‘key issues’ over the past month and the options for moving forward.
At some sites, notably Arran, special presentations were typically undertaken by medical staff in response
to specific issues highlighted within previous board meetings. The format of these presentations broadly
adhered to conventions associated with academic medical lectures: presenters using the electronic
facilities available to display detailed presentations, summarising the main points of associated reports
appended within the compendium of board papers and then responding to questions from the floor.
Presentations anticipated likely questions and were generally of a high standard. While affording non-executive
board members the opportunity to raise detailed questions, the presentation format provided the opportunity for
prior framing material to create the desired effect.
Although similar conventions operated at Skye, the presentations were generally more informal in tone
and lacked vibrancy. They typically afforded NEDs the opportunity to raise questions in relation to detail
rather than broader framing.
Staging
Very formal in operation, the ordering of the agenda at Arran was significant in affording the CEO scope
to craft an over-arching narrative that reinforced the perception of the organisation as a high performer.
A separate ‘performance report’ delivered by the director of strategy provided a high-level summary and
narrative overview of key performance indicator (KPI) data related to activity, efficiency, access, cancer,
infection, quality and safety, workforce, finance and the Monitor compliance framework. Performance data
were presented for the current month and year to date, disaggregated by subdivision (medicine, surgery
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and cancer and specialist) on a range of indicators for each of the performance areas listed above,
summarised on a single A4 page, with additional supporting data for each performance area on
subsequent pages. Presentation adopted a traffic-light system in which performance against each indicator
is colour coded: green for ‘good’, amber for ‘attention’ and red for ‘breach’. This summary of performance
acts as a strong visual cue of actual and potential performance shortfalls, drawing the eye to patterned
clusters of ‘red’ and ‘amber’ on the page. Consequently, board attention was often drawn to, and time
was spent on, those performance indicators with ‘red’ and/or ‘amber’ status. Executive behaviour at
the board seemed strongly influenced by the need to publicly demonstrate performance against standards
as indicated by the performance indicators (‘conformance’), and account for any observed shortfall.
The structure (KPIs) and form (‘traffic-light’ RAG indication of performance against targets) of reporting
used to inform the board potentially facilitates the discharge of public governance in the form of assurance
(‘conformance’). Although such a system could be used by non-executives in a bullish manner to
vociferously challenge executives on performance shortfalls, this was not done at any of the observed
board meetings. Rather, the CEO drew attention to shortfalls in his CEO report, recontextualising the
figures and outlining ongoing work to diagnose and/or address shortfall. Non-executives seemed generally
supportive of these reassurances.
The CEO’s report was wide-ranging, provided opportunities for clarification and discussion and,
consequently, took a considerable amount of time. The CEO used this composite section, delivered very
early in the board meeting, to consider multiple items related to trust activity/performance and its
implications, in the light of external policy directives and/or the strategic opportunities they provided.
Examples include Dr Foster performance rankings, Monitor KPI governance ratings, CQC visit outcomes
and implications for the trust of the Francis Report into patient safety. This section was not delivered as a
monologue – rather, the CEO outlined his perspective and invited others (typically executive members, also
notably the chairperson) to comment in the light of this analysis and/or to clarify issues. Although there
was opportunity for NEDs to ask questions during proceedings, contributions invited by the CEO came
from executive board members, with minimal NED input.
In contrast to the close executive control exhibited above, at Skye the staging was typified by the
chairperson’s dominance of the agenda. The chairperson exercised his non-executive role in challenging
the executive and largely supporting the views of other non-executives. His steering of the agenda, and of
contributions from other non-execs, focused principally on the breach of targets (particularly C. difficile
infections) and issues related to coding and validity of information provided, with very limited external
horizon scanning or evidence of facilitating strategic thinking. The chairperson was active throughout,
but particularly in relation to quality and patient safety, as evinced in steering challenge to the ND about
infection control and the failure to achieve the C. difficile infection target. There was a sense (picked up by
an audience member in an aside to the researchers) that he dominated the meeting; by controlling the
staging and encouraging the NED performance the chairperson prevented other narratives from unfolding.
Staging at Lewis was shaped by an extensive ‘matters arising’ section, placed immediately after the
opening item of ‘apologies’. This was by far the longest section and invariably consisted of the following
issues considered most important: a major capital investment project, ‘safe and sustainable’; paediatric
cardiac surgery; any Qualified Provider procurements; an Academic Health Science Network and
commissioner penalties in relation to C. difficile infections.
Board meetings at Islay were strategically focused and tightly structured around the agenda. The tone of
each meeting was set by an opening ‘patient story’ narrative, introduced by the chairperson as ‘something
to focus our minds’. These narratives, collected by the improvement team and presented in the patient’s
own words, concerned issues such as the fears, anxieties and negative experiences following diagnosis,
processes of care and treatment outcomes. They were emotive and used by the chairperson to legitimate
challenge and concern with service improvement, and this language of ‘patient experience’ was available
to, and used by, board members to depersonalise challenging questions. The strategic focus on service
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improvement was also supported by the structure of the agenda, which considered ‘service improvement’
to be a standing agenda item placed immediately after the ‘patient story’ opening, and led by members of
the quality improvement team presenting data and updating progress on strategically important projects,
such as intensive care, community services, falls and infections. The incorporation of indicators for
infections into this section is important, as it ties external regulatory requirements to internal strategy in an
agenda item specifically oriented to service improvement.
Performance(s): board governance of infection control
Board meetings at Arran were dominated by the CEO and typified by a need to present trust performance
in a favourable light, consistent with a ‘world-class’ reputation. This dominance was not exercised through
explicit force of personality, but principally through careful structuring of the agenda and the use of
framing in the ‘CEO report’ agenda item to shape perceptions of, and thus actions in relation to, items
which appeared later in the agenda.
As outlined above, the CEO’s report often drew attention to shortfalls in performance. Notable examples in
relation to patient safety included failure to achieve reduction in C. difficile infection targets for three
quarters in succession and a potential breach of A&E waiting time target in quarter 4 (and thus for the
whole year). Although both of these topics could have elicited vociferous challenges from NEDs, no such
challenges were made. Rather, in relation to the former, the CEO announced that he had successfully
argued with commissioners for a waiver of penalties for 10 cases, and once this had been agreed he argued
with the relevant external regulatory body for reclassification as ‘green’ (healthy) under their governance
performance indicator, which had been flagged as amber, placing the trust under external scrutiny. This
was presented by the CEO as evidence of oversensitivity to borderline non-compliance. His analysis drew
support for an internal review of antibiotic prescribing habits (supported by comments from a NED and one
of the MDs). In the case of the A&E issue, the seriousness of the potential breach was minimised by
reference to the ubiquity of such problems nationally (‘everyone faces such difficulties’), addressed with
reference to current plans to expand A&E provision (‘we are already dealing with this’) and attention
focused on the role of limited out-of-hours cover by GPs in increasing demand on A&E services
(‘the problem lies elsewhere’).
In both instances, the CEO’s report identified poor performance against indicators that could have been
addressed within the latter ‘performance’ report section as ‘breaches’ and subtly interpreted the data in a
misleading way. That these analyses were convincing is clear from the positive reception they received
and that fact that neither of these issues were referred to in the latter presentation of the ‘performance’
report or picked up by NEDs for further exploration. Given the important work involved in framing these
issues in such a way that possible poor performance is acknowledged, while simultaneously offering
reassurance that ‘all is well’, the CEO report was typically one of the longer, and on one occasion the
longest, agenda item(s), at 46 minutes out of a total of 110 (42% of the total time).
At Skye, board performances were typified by high levels of NED activity. In relation to breach of a
C. difficile infection target, the chairperson adopted a tone of disappointment at failure to reach the
target, presenting it as a serious issue that needed to be tackled and required explanation by the ND and
active discussion by NEDs. Although there is some acceptance that there are widespread difficulties in
meeting the target, there is no serious attempt by the chairperson or any executive to reframe the target
breach. The ND (and later the acting ND) is held responsible. A ‘red’ trajectory against A&E performance
led to NED involvement in discussions concerning historical failures of the board. NEDs also challenged
finance report data showing an operating surplus despite underperformance of general medicine and
lower than anticipated emergency admissions; a downwards trajectory from amber to red in summary
performance data was also used by NEDs to challenge performance.
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At Lewis, the CEO’s dominance and use of humour, emotion and politics is exemplified in discussions of a
breach of infection control targets. Discussion was dominated by the financial penalties associated with
breach of the target, particularly regarding how the trust would pay the financial penalty if its target
were breached. As it stood, the trust faced a fine of over £1M per case in breach of the target. Disputes
with commissioners ensued and legal proceedings developed. The issue of discussion centred on
‘proportionality’ and perceived unfair treatment in comparison with their regional neighbours, whose
targets were considered far easier to reach. Mediation was the next step, with the trust taking the
commissioners to court. The CEO suggested they had no choice and he was forced to make a stand.
Although board consideration of infection control at Islay was also framed in relation to external targets,
the service improvement orientation of the board was very evident. The MD presented data showing that
the trust was meeting its target – although it was close to the limit. This was warmly welcomed by a
NED, who praised the effort, and then quickly considered the interventions required to ensure continuous
compliance, prompting a discussion of the educational interventions being made to embed infection
control in staff behaviour, including associating high-risk cases with reinforcement of requirements to
junior doctors.
Reading across the cases then, we see very different emphases and approaches to the performative
aspects of governance. These are summarised in Table 6, and further discussed below.
Discussion
Obtaining, processing and interpreting performance information are acknowledged as important aspects
of boards’ oversight role.120 Although there is some empirical support for the assertion that those hospital
boards which prioritise the collection and analysis of performance, data tend to have improved quality
outcomes.64 We draw attention to the importance of processing and interpreting this information and
to the performativities at play: the social practices involved in realising the potential of patient safety
performance indicators121 and, perhaps even more importantly, how ‘warning signals’ provided by such
information systems may be muted, deflected or even silenced.
Although the same level of performance indicator data relating to infection control was available in all of
our case study sites, differences in use were significant and related to the practices legitimated within each
setting. At Skye, board activities were underpinned by agency theories of governance,19 in which the
interests of board members were framed in adversarial terms and identified the primary responsibilities
of NEDs as seeking assurance of conformance to standards. Consequently, infection control data were
used to ‘name and shame’ executives by a dominant non-executive cadre led by a strong chairperson.
In contrast, board activities at Lewis were informed by stewardship theories of governance,19,122 in which
board members’ interests were framed as compatible and built on a shared set of values related to
regional position and protection of the locale. Thus, infection control data indicating similar levels of
underperformance to that at Skye was framed by the CEO as an ‘unattainable target’ and a threat of legal
challenge was issued to commissioners. To similar effect, at Arran the CEO drew on resource dependence
models of governance,24 in which board members seek to manage internal and external relationships to
leverage influence. Board members’ shared values in relation to the position of the trust as a world-leading
organisation were mobilised by the CEO to forestall challenge to his interpretation of the meaning of
infection control rates; not through force of personality so much as through use of the agenda structure of
the ‘CEO report’ to reframe the breach of target as ‘a data difficulty’ and by exerting influence over local
commissioners to secure a reclassification to reduce the number of ‘cases’ below the regulatory threshold
then discussing the reclassification with the regulatory agency. The early placement of the CEO report
provides an opportunity for reframing poor performance against indicators and minimising the challenge
related to it, even though the traffic-light reporting makes it plain to see. This is chilling in the light of the
reaction to concerns about mortality indicators in the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust case, in
which (seemingly) efforts were made to reinterpret poor performance against mortality indicators.4
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04040 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 4
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
81
It is important to state here that we do not claim privileged status for our own analysis; that our
perspective somehow reflects a single underlying objective ‘truth’ to which we had special access and
that remained unavailable to the board members observed. We do not claim that the performance indicator
data presented at these board meetings showed deficiencies in patient safety that were inappropriately
interpreted away. Indeed, the very value of a performative approach is that it seeks to trace the way in
which words both ‘say’ and ‘do’; to consider those meaningful actions that are neither true nor false but
that create a social reality that is then acted upon by others. Our analysis shows the use of data to create a
social reality in relation to infection control rates, which guided future actions. The value of performative
analysis is also evident in relation to board activity at Islay, in which the chairperson nevertheless used data
showing compliance with infection control targets as an opportunity to consider how to improve practice.
Our findings have important implications for the governance of patient safety. The very different
performances observed in relation to infection control data evident in our case study sites has implications
for the nature of advice and training made available to boards. Crucially, while the availability of
information may be a necessary precursor for improvement, it is clear from the data presented above that
it is not in itself sufficient. A set of behaviours/practices that use such information to support cycles of
improvement activity is also required. This draws attention to additional lines of inquiry that explore the
relational or trust-based dynamics associated with board governance. For example, when there is a
common set of strong values, NED challenge runs the risk of being framed as disloyalty. In these cases
and scenarios it is important for boards to reflect critically on existing relationships and ensure that they
create conditions for openness and transparency.
Concluding remarks
It is acknowledged that studies of statistical associations between organisational structures and patient
safety outcomes are not able to explore the dynamic and messy lived reality of board governance practices
related to patient safety.17 Our analysis of such practices at four hospital boards indicates the importance
of local processes of organising in relation to governance of patient safety. Although the availability of
summaries of quality indicators to board members is undoubtedly important, so equally is the operation of
processes of organising that make it possible for local actors to use such information to make interventions
to hold executives to account with regard to patient safety processes and outcomes. In this regard, our
findings indicate the challenges faced by board members in terms of the artefacts at their disposal and
the limitations of the scripts and stages associated with board practices. Encouragingly, in drawing
attention to practices associated with the enactment of safety and quality they also indicate possibilities
and opportunities for enhanced deliberation of information with which to improve the corporate
governance of safety and quality, and we encourage the additional applications of performativity-based
approaches in order to further develop our understanding of patient safety governance enacted by boards.
This chapter concludes our analysis and presentation of the qualitative data, and we move next to a
consideration of the quantitative data, exploring any relationships between boards and wider
organisational performance.
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Chapter 8 National survey of NHS boards
Introduction
This chapter presents the key findings drawn from the two national surveys of NHS boards (see Chapter 2,
Methods). These survey data have been linked to nationally available routine data to begin to explore
some of the analytic questions set out in Chapter 1.
The findings are presented here in three main parts. First, a descriptive account of NHS boards which
also examines differences between hospitals of different types, specifically FTs versus non-FTs and THs
versus non-THs. Given the different governance arrangements for FTs and the greater scale and complexity
of TH activities, it seemed worthwhile to make this exploration, but we had no specific prior hypotheses
that we were testing. Within this descriptive account of NHS boards we examine two key areas: (1) board
size, structure and composition, including clinical representation on the board, and (2) board engagement
with patient safety issues, including the use of diverse sources of hard and soft information.
Second, we present an analysis of the Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire (or BSAQ) that
revalidates the data structure of the BSAQ instrument alongside a descriptive account of aggregate trust
board responses in the six dimensions that make up the BSAQ.
Finally, we present an analytic account that explores correlations between various descriptive variables of
boards (including BSAQ) and numerous routinely available quality and safety parameters aggregated to
organisation level.
The nature of NHS boards
Board size and composition
Given the range and diversity of roles required of NHS trust boards, it follows that they need to be of
sufficient size and diversity. The smallest board in our sample had eight members and, in general, boards
were tightly clustered in size with between 10 and 15 members. Around 42% of boards had 10–12
members and around 51% had 13–15 members, with the largest board counting only 17 members.
We found no significant difference in board size between trusts of different types (FT/non-FT; TH/non-TH).
In our study, around 62% of boards had three or fewer serving board members with clinical backgrounds.
For about two-thirds of the trusts (63%), board members with a clinical background constituted < 30% of
the board. We found no significant differences between FT/non-FT and TH/non-TH trusts in the distribution
of board members with clinical backgrounds. Our findings chime with recent work that focused on NEDs,
which found that only half of trusts (52%) had any NED with health-care leadership experience, with the
overwhelming majority of NEDs (86%) being drawn from a commercial, financial or managerial
background (non-clinical).
Board engagement with patient safety
In this study, boards appear to give considerable time to safety and quality issues. Only one-fifth of trust
boards (21%) reported that ≤ 30% of their time was spent discussing safety and quality issues, but only
one-quarter (26%) reported that > 60% of their board time was spent on these issues.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04040 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 4
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
83
Board practices around patient safety
A very high proportion of the trusts in our survey reported the kinds of desirable characteristics and
board-related processes that research says may be associated with higher performance (Box 2). On only
two of these questions (safety measures in the CEO’s performance review, and formal training for
board members on quality and safety) did affirmation fall at or below 90%. There was a small (but still
non-significant) difference between FT/non-FT boards with respect to board members receiving formal
training in relation to patient safety, with 90% of FT boards versus 83% of non-FT boards reportedly
receiving training. Other differences between trusts of different types on the raft of measures in Box 2
were minimal. These generally high (or very high) ‘desirable responses’ by trusts may represent
considerable board attention being paid to quality and safety, especially in the light of scandals such as
that of Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, and/or they may reflect a growing awareness of the
importance of signalling that such issues are being taken seriously. These uniformly high affirmative
response rates made correlational analysis of any relationships between board responses in these areas and
organisational outcomes inappropriate.
Board use of information on patient safety
In our national survey we found that hospital boards were using a wide range of hard performance
metrics and soft intelligence to monitor their organisation with regard to patient safety. Quantitative data,
including a range of clinical outcomes measures, infection rates and process measures, such as medication
errors and readmission rates, were reportedly used at every board meeting across most hospital trusts
(> 80%). It is noteworthy, however, that fewer trusts reported routine reporting of patient safety surveys
(81%) and implementation of patient safety alerts (79%). A much smaller proportion of trusts (57%)
routinely report morbidity rates at every board meeting. There was no appreciable difference between
FT/non-FT boards and TH/non-TH boards on most reporting of explicit performance metrics except for
‘formal morbidity reporting’, for which 52% of non-FTs compared with 60% of FTs routinely presented
these at board meetings.
BOX 2 Prevalence of desirable characteristics of boards in the English NHS
Does the board have a formal subcommittee that discusses patient safety issues? (Yes: 100%.)
Are there procedures for proactively responding to the reporting of staff concerns about patient safety?
(Yes: 100%.)
Has the board set explicit measurable goals for improving performance in relation to patient safety? (Yes: 98%.)
Does the board have formal procedures for reporting inappropriate behaviours in relation to patient safety on a
regular basis? (Yes: 98%.)
Have strategic goals and objectives related to patient safety been distributed to staff groups within the last
12 months? (Yes: 99%.)
Are patient safety measures included in the CEO performance review? (Yes: 90%.)
Have board members received formal training in relation to patient safety? (Yes: 87%.)
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There were some (generally small) differences between FT and non-FT boards, and also between TH and
non-TH trusts, in their use of softer intelligence, but these differences were not marked and nor were they
consistent. For example, the difference between FTs and non-FTs in their use of patients’ stories was 8%
(80% vs. 88%); the same difference seen in their use of board members engaging with clinicians (91% vs.
83%), but with the direction of difference reversed.
In general, then, despite a very high level of desirable characteristics being reported (see Box 2), there
remained considerable variation in the use of diverse sources of hard and soft information. Explicit metrics
(such as morbidity rates), in particular, were used only intermittently in a considerable number of trusts.
The application of the Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire in
English boards
The BSAQ instrument123 was developed to assess board performance in non-profit organisations in the
USA in six areas (Box 3). Since its development, it has undergone extensive analysis of reliability, validity,
and sensitivity.43,44 It has also been used to assess board effectiveness in non-profit US hospitals45 and in
one small study of UK NHS trusts.29 As this was the first major study using BSAQ in the UK context, we
first tested the data structure of the instrument in that setting.
Testing the structure of the Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire
The BSAQ online survey was conducted over two periods: between 21 May and 20 August 2012 (phase 1)
and between 30 January and 5 April 2013 (phase 2). A total of 334 responses were received from
165 executive and 169 non-executive board members representing 95 NHS trusts (of the 144 that were
sent the BSAQ questionnaire). Of these 95 trusts, 51 are FTs. Board composition by foundation status is
shown in Table 8.
Table 8 shows that non-FTs had a slightly higher response rate and a slightly smaller board size, but a
higher proportion of clinicians on the board. However, differences were not found to be
statistically significant.
The 65 questions on the BSAQ are scored by respondents on a 4-point Likert scale as one of strongly
disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree. Each of the questions corresponds to one of the six dimensions
of board performance.
BOX 3 The six BSAQ dimensions of board competencies
1. Contextual dimension. The board understands and takes into account the culture, values and norms of the
organisation it governs.
2. Educational dimension. The board takes the necessary steps to ensure that all board members are well
informed about the organisation and the professions working there, as well as about the board’s own roles,
responsibilities and performance.
3. Interpersonal dimension. The board nurtures the development of board members as a group, attends to the
board’s collective welfare and fosters a sense of cohesiveness.
4. Analytical dimension. The board recognises complexities and subtleties in the issues it faces and draws upon
multiple perspectives to dissect complex problems and to synthesise appropriate responses.
5. Political dimension. The board accepts as one of its primary responsibilities the need to develop and
maintain healthy relationships among key stakeholders.
6. Strategic dimension. The board helps envisage and shape institutional direction and helps to ensure a
strategic approach to the organisation’s future.
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Factor analysis
We perform factor analysis at the respondent level to explore underlying factors that characterise board
performance in each of the six dimensions. We find that there is a single underlying factor for each
dimension that can be expressed as a BSAQ score. This continuous score summarises the inter-relationships
among the ordinal 4-point scale questions in the dimension. A total BSAQ score is also derived and is used
to explore whether or not there are associations between board performance and patient safety measures.
Specifically, our analysis comprises the following steps:
1. We carry out ordinal factor analysis on each of the six dimensions of board performance individually.
Based on the extracted factors, for each respondent we construct six scores, one for each dimension.
2. We apply factor analysis on the factor scores representing the six BSAQ dimensions to construct a total
BSAQ score.
3. We explore correlations between the constructed BSAQ scores and a number of patient safety measures.
4. We estimate multivariate models regressing patient safety measures and measures of hospital ability
to handle errors, near-misses and incidents on the total BSAQ score and a number of
hospital-level characteristics.
Purpose of factor analysis
Each BSAQ dimension consists of a number of questions (items). Factor analysis assumes that the variance
in a given item can be explained by one or more common underlying factors and by variance that is
unique to the item. The amount of variation in the item that is caused by the common factors is known as
communality. Our purpose is to establish whether or not each of the pre-determined BSAQ dimensions is
unidimensional. The process, known as factor extraction, is iterative. First, the squared multiple correlation
for each item (a measure of how much variance an item shares with the other items) is initially placed
on the diagonal of the correlation matrix to approximate communalities (how much the items share with
the factors). Then factors are extracted successively, with the first factor accounting for the maximum
amount of common variance. The second factor is extracted from the residual correlation matrix after
factoring out the influence of the first factor, and the process continues until some criteria are met.
Revealing the latent factors
In factor analysis, eigenvalues represent the amount of common variance among all items that is explained
by a particular factor. The larger the eigenvalue, the more total common variance in the items that is
explained by the factor. Table 9 presents six sets of eigenvalues obtained from factor analysis performed in
each of the six BSAQ dimensions. In the first dimension, the contextual dimension, there are six negative
eigenvalues, which are not acceptable in factor analysis and, therefore, only factors 1–6 are further
examined for this dimension. Similarly, in the other dimensions, only the positive factors are examined.
TABLE 8 Board composition by foundation status
Board composition
Non-FT (n= 42) FT (n= 51)
Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum
Respondents 3.62 1 8 3.57 1 13
Board size 12.57 8 17 13.10 10 16
Proportion of respondents 0.30 0.06 0.88 0.27 0.06 0.87
Clinicians 3.50 2 7 3.37 2 8
Proportion of clinicians 28.27 0.13 0.64 25.79 0.14 0.53
Executives 1.74 0 4 1.80 0 9
Proportion of executives 0.14 0 0.40 0.13 0 0.60
Independent sample t-tests found no statistically significant differences for all variables by foundation status.
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The amount of common variation explained by the first factor is 3.30, significantly larger than the variance
explained by the other factors. One of the criteria for determining the end of the extraction process is to
select only those factors for which the eigenvalues are > 1 (Kaiser–Guttman criterion). In all six dimensions,
only the first factor meets this condition. Although the criterion is criticised as being inappropriate for
factor analysis, two other commonly used criteria confirm the existence of a single factor within each
dimension. Unlike principal component analysis, the eigenvalues in factor analysis do not sum up to 1;
therefore, values > 1 do not necessarily imply that the factor accounts for more than its share of the
total variance in the items.124 The percentage of variance extracted by the first factor exceeds 85% in all
six dimensions (much higher than commonly used thresholds in social sciences).
Scree plots125 identified in all cases show distinct breaks between the slope of the larger eigenvalue (which
corresponds to the first factor) and the trailing off of the other eigenvalues, suggesting the use of one
factor. Figure 2 shows the scree plot for the contextual scale as an example.
The results of finding a single factor for each of the six BSAQ dimensions supports the validity of the BSAQ
dimensions and is also found in previous studies.29,42,44,45
Contribution of items in the common factor
Each of the dimensions in BSAQ has a number of questions that load onto that dimension; for example,
there are 12 questions/items in the contextual domain, but only eight questions/items in the political
domain. The factor loadings presented in Table 10 indicate the extent to which each of the items correlate
with the underlying factor. The square of an item’s loading represents the item’s communality. For
instance, 26% of the common variance that item 1 shares with the other 11 items within the contextual
domain can be explained by the common factor. In all six dimensions, items load reasonably strongly,
exceeding the commonly used threshold of 0.3 for communality,124 with only few exceptions.
Scores
We generate a score on the common factor for all respondents. We do this for all six dimensions,
following two approaches.
TABLE 9 Eigenvalues from factor analysis (all six BSAQ dimensions)
Item
BSAQ dimension
Contextual Educational Interpersonal Analytical Political Strategic
1 3.30 2.99 2.37 2.72 2.47 4.58
2 0.58 0.59 0.45 0.30 0.22 0.53
3 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.10 0.26
4 0.11 0.20 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.11
5 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03 –0.03 0.06
6 0.02 0.00 –0.05 –0.04 –0.04 0.02
7 –0.02 –0.03 –0.09 –0.08 –0.13 –0.06
8 –0.13 –0.11 –0.13 –0.14 –0.19 –0.08
9 –0.15 –0.17 –0.17 –0.19 –0.11
10 –0.17 –0.20 –0.19 –0.23 –0.23
11 –0.26 –0.27 –0.22 –0.24
12 –0.33 –0.31 –0.27
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FIGURE 2 Scree plot for the 12 items of the contextual scale.
TABLE 10 Item loadings on the common factor for the six BSAQ dimensions: factor analysis
Item
BSAQ dimension (loading/loading2)
Contextual Educational Interpersonal Analytical Political Strategic
1 0.51 0.26 0.53 0.28 0.48 0.23 0.56 0.31 0.48 0.23 0.69 0.48
2 0.65 0.42 0.58 0.34 0.18 0.03 0.54 0.29 0.50 0.25 0.56 0.31
3 0.58 0.34 0.54 0.29 0.55 0.31 0.56 0.31 0.47 0.22 0.60 0.36
4 0.43 0.19 0.45 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.63 0.40 0.69 0.47 0.77 0.59
5 0.52 0.28 0.33 0.11 0.58 0.34 0.40 0.16 0.60 0.35 0.48 0.23
6 0.57 0.33 0.38 0.15 0.39 0.15 0.37 0.14 0.66 0.43 0.56 0.32
7 0.56 0.32 0.59 0.35 0.47 0.22 0.68 0.47 0.60 0.36 0.66 0.43
8 0.55 0.30 0.51 0.26 0.52 0.27 0.37 0.13 0.39 0.16 0.66 0.43
9 0.58 0.33 0.62 0.39 0.55 0.30 0.53 0.28 0.48 0.23
10 0.43 0.19 0.38 0.14 0.41 0.17 0.47 0.22 0.60 0.36
11 0.26 0.07 0.35 0.13 0.43 0.19 0.69 0.48
12 0.54 0.29 0.60 0.36 0.61 0.37
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The more sophisticated approach is to estimate factor scores. In the context of BSAQ, an estimated factor
score is a linear composite of the optimally weighted individual responses on the items that comprise a
particular dimension. In common factor analysis, there is no unique solution to estimate factor scores.126
We apply the following method, which is implemented in SAS version 9.2 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC,
USA), to calculate factor scores.
1. All of the individual’s responses on the items are standardised to form a new k × 1 vector, where k is
the number of items.
2. The PROC FACTOR procedure in SAS coupled with the SCORE option produces a k ×1 vector of factor
score coefficients following a multiple regression approach. These coefficients are the weights to be
used in step 3.
3. The standardised individual’s scores on the items are weighted by the generated factor score
coefficients and summed across all items to produce the individual’s factor score. This is a standardised
score with a mean of zero and a variance equal to the squared multiple correlation between the
estimated factor scores and the true factor values (which are not known).
The second approach is to create factor-based scales. This less sophisticated method does not use weights
but has the advantage of allowing use of only the items that load satisfactorily on a factor. Because all
items in BSAQ dimensions load reasonably well, this is not relevant for our analysis.
Construction of factor-based scales is done as follows. A respondent’s score on the factor-based scale is
the sum of the individual’s (unstandardised) responses to the items. Because all the items are measured on
a 4-point Likert scale, the possible range for the 12 items in the contextual dimension is 12–48, for the
10 items in the analytical dimension it is 10–40, and so forth. Table 11 shows that factor-based scales do
not differ by foundation or teaching status. We will not use further factor-based scales, as they do not
take into account item loadings.
TABLE 11 Factor-based scales by foundation and teaching status
Variable
Foundation Teaching
No (n= 42) Yes (n= 51) Difference No (n= 66) Yes (n= 27) Difference
Contextual 36.13 36.91 –0.77 36.32 37.13 –0.81
Educational 36.49 37.18 –0.69 36.87 36.87 0.00
Interpersonal 32.05 32.53 –0.47 32.00 33.08 –1.08
Analytical 29.81 30.14 –0.33 29.99 29.99 0.00
Political 24.65 25.02 –0.36 24.84 24.88 –0.04
Strategic 36.50 37.11 –0.62 36.78 36.96 –0.18
BSAQ 195.63 198.87 –3.24 196.80 198.91 –2.11
None of the differences is statistically significant.
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Total Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire score
To develop a composite BSAQ score for all 65 items we performed factor analysis on the factor scores
representing the six BSAQ dimensions. One single factor emerges and Table 12 shows the factor loadings.
All dimensions load very strongly on the common underlying factor. About 67% of the common variance
that the contextual dimension shares with the other five BSAQ dimensions is explained by the
common factor.
Ordinal factor analysis
Factor analysis applied to ordinal data is criticised for using Pearson’s correlations and therefore relying on
the assumption that the variables are continuous and follow a multivariate normal distribution. A more
suitable approach might be to perform factor analysis on the matrix of polychoric correlations, which can
be thought of as correlations between unobserved continuous variables that represent crudely the ordinal
variables. We present the results of ordinal factor analysis in Tables 13 and 14. One common factor
emerges and the differences in loadings compared with conventional factor analysis are small.
TABLE 12 Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire dimension loadings on the common factor
Variable Loading Loading2
Contextual 0.82 0.67
Educational 0.72 0.52
Interpersonal 0.79 0.62
Analytical 0.82 0.68
Political 0.76 0.58
Strategic 0.81 0.66
TABLE 13 Eigenvalues from ordinal factor analysis (all six BSAQ dimensions)
Item
BSAQ dimension
Contextual Educational Interpersonal Analytical Political Strategic
1 4.38 3.91 3.09 3.66 3.31 5.88
2 0.71 0.75 0.54 0.35 0.28 0.64
3 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.11 0.33
4 0.12 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.07 0.13
5 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.06 –0.02 0.08
6 0.02 –0.01 –0.07 –0.05 –0.04 0.02
7 –0.02 –0.04 –0.12 –0.10 –0.18 –0.09
8 –0.15 –0.14 –0.16 –0.17 –0.22 –0.10
9 –0.19 –0.21 –0.21 –0.24 –0.13
10 –0.21 –0.24 –0.24 –0.31 –0.27
11 –0.31 –0.33 –0.28 –0.28
12 –0.42 –0.40 –0.33
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Conclusion regarding the data structure of the Board Self-Assessment
Questionnaire score
Overall, then, this analysis supports and replicates the original six-factor structure of the BSAQ and
provides reasonable grounds for using the dimensions described with English NHS boards.
Using the Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire to describe and
analyse English NHS trust boards
The BSAQ data gathered as part of this study generally showed high or very high levels of agreement with
desirable statements of practice in each of the six previously identified dimensions. Aggregate levels of
agreement within each dimension ranged from 73% (on the interpersonal dimension) to 85% (on the
political dimension). Differences between aggregate levels of agreement for FT/non-FT were generally small:
across the six dimensions these difference between trust types ranged from 0% to 4%. For THs/non-THs
the differences ranged from 1% to 5%. Nonetheless, there was some consistency in these data, with
non-FT boards generally scoring slightly higher than FT boards across all six dimensions except ‘strategic’,
and teaching boards generally scoring slightly higher than non-teaching boards across all six dimensions
except ‘educational’. However, none of these differences was statistically significant.
Relating Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire scores to patient safety
parameters from routine data sets
After constructing the factor scores representing the six BSAQ dimensions and the total BSAQ score, we
explored whether or not these are correlated with patient safety measures. We found no strong correlations
between any of the six BSAQ dimensions or the total BSAQ score and the various patient safety measures.
TABLE 14 Item loadings on the common factor for the six BSAQ dimensions: ordinal factor analysis
Item
BSAQ dimension (loading/loading2)
Contextual Educational Interpersonal Analytical Political Strategic
1 0.55 0.31 0.59 0.35 0.56 0.32 0.66 0.44 0.57 0.32 0.77 0.59
2 0.74 0.55 0.65 0.42 0.26 0.07 0.60 0.36 0.60 0.36 0.66 0.44
3 0.65 0.42 0.60 0.36 0.62 0.39 0.67 0.44 0.52 0.27 0.68 0.46
4 0.55 0.31 0.51 0.26 0.45 0.20 0.72 0.53 0.80 0.63 0.83 0.69
5 0.61 0.38 0.38 0.14 0.68 0.47 0.50 0.25 0.68 0.46 0.54 0.30
6 0.66 0.43 0.42 0.18 0.43 0.19 0.42 0.17 0.74 0.55 0.65 0.42
7 0.65 0.42 0.72 0.51 0.53 0.28 0.78 0.60 0.67 0.45 0.72 0.52
8 0.61 0.37 0.56 0.32 0.65 0.42 0.46 0.21 0.50 0.25 0.77 0.59
9 0.67 0.45 0.69 0.48 0.60 0.36 0.62 0.38 0.56 0.32
10 0.51 0.26 0.48 0.23 0.45 0.20 0.53 0.28 0.69 0.48
11 0.28 0.08 0.43 0.19 0.46 0.21 0.80 0.63
12 0.63 0.40 0.68 0.46 0.67 0.45
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Regressions
We estimate multivariate and hierarchical models regressing patient safety measures (see Appendix 7
for a full description of the patient safety measures) and measures of hospital ability to handle errors,
near-misses and incidents (taken from the NSS for 2012) based on the total BSAQ score. We control for
a number of hospital-level characteristics.
The dependent variables are listed in Table 15 (patient safety measures) and Table 16 (measures of
provider ability to handle errors).
We also explored the option of examining patient safety indicators published on the NHS Choices website
(www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/patient-safety/Pages/patient-safety-indicators.aspx). These cover
measures of safe staffing, infection control and cleanliness, open and honest reporting, patients assessed
for risk of blood clots, NHS Safety Thermometer data on pressure ulcers and falls with harm, NHS England
patient safety reporting, CQC national safety standards and the percentage of staff who would
recommend the hospital, also taken from the NSS.
We did not, however, incorporate these data into the analyses with the BSAQ, as the BSAQ data are
reported at trust level and the patient safety data are reported at provider site level. There is a large
number of missing data and large variation within trusts across sites in the ratings, making it difficult to
aggregate up to trust level.
TABLE 15 Patient safety-related measures
Patient safety metrics Mean Minimum Maximum
Relative risks
HSMR Hospital Standardised Mortality Risk (spells with a primary diagnosis
of any of 56 common condition specialty groups)
99.1 67.1 120.3
HSMR2 Hospital Standardised Mortality Risk (spells with any
primary diagnosis)
98.8 66.9 116.4
VLRM Very Low Risk Mortality (spells with a primary diagnosis associated
with a low mortality diagnosis group – consistently below 0.5%)
95.3 37.3 181.3
ASM After Surgery Mortality (deaths following surgery
with complications)
98.7 37.7 192.9
HSMR_E Hospital Standardised Mortality Risk for weekend emergency
admissions (in-hospital deaths following weekend
emergency admissions)
97.3 68.9 117.9
HSMR_EW Hospital Standardised Mortality Risk for weekday emergency
admissions (in-hospital deaths following weekday
emergency admissions)
104.5 61.5 131.0
READM Twenty-eight-day readmissions 99.7 6.6 83.6
Rates
MRSA [MRSA/(total number of spells)]*10,000 0.7 0.0 2.8
MSSA [MSSA/(total number of spells)]*10,000 1.8 0.5 6.2
Cdiff [Cdiff/(total number of spells)]*10,000 4.2 1.4 13.6
Ecoli [Ecoli/(total number of spells)]*10,000 24.0 14.8 64.4
PSI Rate of organisational patient safety incidents 6.9 2.0 17.6
Count
Never
events
Total number of never events 1.7 0.0 9.0
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Measures of hospital ability to handle errors, near-misses and incidents are defined as proportions of NHS
staff respondents who responded agree or strongly agree to the following nine statements and questions:
1. My organisation treats staff who are involved in an error, near-miss or incident fairly.
2. My organisation encourages us to report errors, near-misses or incidents.
3. My organisation blames or punishes people who are involved in errors, near-misses or incidents.
4. When errors, near-misses or incidents are reported, my organisation takes action to ensure that they do
not happen again.
5. Would you feel safe raising your concern?
6. Would you be confident that your organisation would address your concern?
7. My organisation treats reports of errors, near-misses or incidents confidentially.
8. We are informed about errors, near-misses and incidents that happen in this organisation.
9. We are given feedback about changes made in response to reported errors, near-misses and incidents.
The set of explanatory variables in the regressions includes the total BSAQ score, FT status and three
dummy variables indicating hospital size (small, medium and large). The reference category is acute TH.
Regression results are presented in Tables 17a–e for the patient safety measures and Tables 18a–c for the
provider measures of effective management of errors.
Results are not significant for the total BSAQ score in any of the patient safety measure regressions. For a
few of the patient safety measures size is significant, suggesting differences in patient safety outcomes
between small, medium and large trusts and acute teaching trusts (the reference category).
Two of the variables show a positive and significant association between total BSAQ score (better board
governance) and the proportion of staff feeling safe to raise concerns about errors, near-misses and
incidents and also feeling confident that their organisation would address their concern. We ran further
regressions on the factor scores representing the six BSAQ dimensions for these two variables to explore
which aspects are correlated with staff’s ability to raise concerns over patient safety.
Tables 19a and 19b show results for the six BSAQ dimensions against staff feeling ‘safe’ to raise concerns
about errors, near-misses, and incidents, whereas Tables 20a and 20b show the regressions for the six
BSAQ dimensions against staff feeling ‘confident’ that their organisation would address their concern.
TABLE 16 Measures of hospital ability to handle errors and near-misses
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Treat fair 47.88 5.68 33.77 59.70
Report 86.16 3.16 75.83 91.46
Blame 13.18 3.02 7.47 20.39
Action 61.96 5.82 46.08 74.08
Safe 71.79 3.94 62.22 78.97
Confident 55.23 5.67 40.91 67.76
Confidential 63.22 4.97 51.33 70.79
Inform 42.51 6.65 28.54 63.97
Feedback 42.10 6.17 29.81 61.25
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TABLE 17b Regressions for patient safety measures
ASM HSMR_E HSMR_EW
Intercept 101.64*** (8.14) 89.92*** (2.88) 95.97*** (3.64)
BSAQ score –3.84 (3.90) –1.48 (1.38) –1.23 (1.74)
Foundation –0.30 (5.84) 3.46* (2.07) 4.34 (2.61)
Respondents/board 6.14 (14.59) –6.18 (5.16) –9.27 (6.52)
Small –5.96 (8.90) 9.08*** (3.15) 11.54*** (3.98)
Medium –9.31 (8.07) 6.54** (2.85) 7.85** (3.61)
Large –1.32 (8.57) 11.88*** (3.03) 14.13*** (3.83)
R2 0.03 0.19 0.18
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 17c Regressions for patient safety measures
MRSA_rate MSSA_rate Cdiff_rate
Intercept 0.82*** (0.15) 2.16*** (0.25) 4.87*** (0.52)
BSAQ score 0.03 (0.07) 0.07 (0.12) 0.43* (0.25)
Foundation –0.08 (0.10) –0.02 (0.18) 0.01 (0.37)
Respondents/board 0.02 (0.26) 0.59 (0.46) –0.09 (0.93)
Small 0.27 (0.16) –0.52* (0.28) –0.19 (0.57)
Medium –0.16 (0.14) –0.68*** (0.25) –1.32** (0.52)
Large –0.21 (0.15) –0.61** (0.27) –0.33 (0.55)
R2 0.14 0.11 0.14
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 17a Regressions for patient safety measures
HSMR HSMR2 VLRM
Intercept 91.41*** (2.96) 91.65*** (3.01) 100.05*** (9.27)
BSAQ score –1.43 (1.42) –1.50 (1.44) –0.20 (4.44)
Foundation 3.63** (2.12) 4.45** (2.16) 0.13 (6.65)
Respondents/board –6.96 (5.30) –7.67 (5.39) –12.75 (16.60)
Small 9.72*** (3.23) 8.78*** (3.29) –5.55 (10.13)
Medium 6.88** (2.93) 5.73* (2.98) –1.78 (9.18)
Large 12.42*** (3.11) 11.65*** (3.16) 2.00 (9.75)
R2 0.20 0.19 0.014
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 17d Regressions for patient safety measures
ecoli_rate Never events Org_PSI_rate
Intercept 21.03*** (2.00) 2.82*** (0.50) 5.91*** (0.68)
BSAQ score 0.08 (0.96) –0.02 (0.24) –0.01 (0.33)
Foundation –0.54 (1.44) –0.01 (0.36) –0.02 (0.49)
Respondents/board 6.41* (3.59) –2.06** (0.89) 3.44*** (1.22)
Small 3.38 (2.19) –1.20** (0.55) 0.91 (0.74)
Medium 1.66 (1.98) –0.38 (0.49) 0.08 (0.67)
Large 0.93 (2.11) –0.67 (0.52) –0.60 (0.72)
R2 0.07 0.06 0.12
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 17e Regressions for patient safety measures
Day case/inpatient READM
Intercept 5.10*** (0.53) 97.15*** (1.95)
BSAQ score –0.02 (0.25) –0.41 (0.93)
Foundation –0.33 (0.38) –1.87 (1.40)
Respondents/board –0.97 (0.95) 4.93 (3.49)
Small –0.30 (0.58) 2.78 (2.13)
Medium 0.11 (0.52) 1.86 (1.93)
Large –0.38 (0.56) 3.87* (2.05)
R2 5.10*** (0.53) 0.11
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 18a Regressions for provider measures
Treat fair Report Blame
Intercept 49.03*** (1.67) 84.97*** (0.93) 13.72*** (0.85)
BSAQ score 1.19 (0.80) 0.64 (0.45) –0.55 (0.41)
Foundation 0.68 (1.20) 1.10 (0.67) –0.26 (0.61)
Respondents/board 1.17 (2.98) 2.22 (1.67) 0.24 (1.53)
Small –2.37 (1.82) 0.33 (1.02) –1.08 (0.93)
Medium –0.96 (1.65) 0.22 (0.92) –0.09 (0.84)
Large –4.22** (1.75) –1.55 (0.98) –0.13 (0.90)
R2 0.11 0.14 0.005
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 18b Regressions for provider measures
Action Safe Confident
Intercept 60.66*** (1.66) 71.64*** (1.14) 51.74*** (1.59)
BSAQ score 0.95 (0.79) 1.26** (0.55) 1.41* (0.76)
Foundation 2.53** (1.19) 0.50 (0.82) 3.14*** (1.14)
Respondents/board 3.76 (2.97) –0.23 (2.04) 5.14* (2.84)
Small –1.72 (1.81) 0.29 (1.25) 0.27 (1.73)
Medium –0.99 (1.64) 0.14 (1.13) 0.44 (1.57)
Large –3.04* (1.74) –0.60 (1.20) –1.62 (1.67)
R2 0.13 0.08 0.18
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 18c Regressions for provider measures
Confidential Inform Feedback
Intercept 63.48*** (1.42) 43.59*** (1.92) 42.96*** (1.80)
BSAQ score 0.74 (0.68) 0.34 (0.92) 0.97 (0.86)
Foundation 1.17** (1.02) 3.10** (1.38) 2.29* (1.29)
Respondents/board 1.23 (2.54) 1.25 (3.44) 0.91 (3.23)
Small –1.93 (1.55) –3.98* (2.10) –3.25 (1.97)
Medium –0.65 (1.41) –3.64* (1.90) –1.77 (1.79)
Large –2.92* (1.49) –4.57** (2.02) –4.03** (1.90)
R2 0.10 0.13 0.12
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 19a Results for BSAQ dimensions against staff feeling safe
Contextual Educational Interpersonal
Intercept 71.41*** (1.13) 71.65*** (1.17) 71.47*** (1.16)
BSAQ score 1.52*** (0.57) 0.68 (0.60) 0.94 (0.58)
Foundation 0.48 (0.81) 0.63 (0.84) 0.61 (0.83)
Respondents/board 0.37 (2.02) 0.02 (2.09) 0.04 (2.07)
Small 0.22 (1.23) 0.26 (1.28) 0.32 (1.27)
Medium 0.13 (1.12) –0.24 (1.14) 0.12 (1.16)
Large –0.54 (1.19) –0.85 (1.22) –0.61 (1.22)
R2 0.10 0.04 0.05
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
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TABLE 19b Results for BSAQ dimensions against staff feeling safe
Analytical Political Strategic
Intercept 71.67*** (1.15) 71.78*** (1.15) 71.72*** (1.16)
BSAQ score 1.32** (0.63) 1.42** (0.66) 0.98* (0.55)
Foundation 0.57 (0.82) 0.48 (0.82) 0.63 (0.82)
Respondents/board –0.23 (2.06) –0.50 (2.07) –0.39 (2.09)
Small 0.19 (1.25) 0.24 (1.25) 0.25 (1.26)
Medium 0.07 (1.13) 0.25 (1.15) –0.09 (1.14)
Large –0.64 (1.21) –0.78 (1.20) –0.63 (1.22)
R2 0.07 0.07 0.06
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 20a Results for BSAQ dimensions against staff feeling confident
Contextual Educational Interpersonal
Intercept 51.45*** (1.56) 51.59*** (1.62) 51.53*** (1.60)
BSAQ score 2.03** (0.79) –0.22 (0.83) 1.23 (0.80)
Foundation 3.07*** (1.12) 3.45*** (1.16) 3.23*** (1.14)
Respondents/board 5.85** (2.79) 5.59* (2.89) 5.41* (2.85)
Small 0.19 (1.70) 0.08 (1.77) 0.33 (1.75)
Medium 0.51 (1.54) 0.03 (1.59) 0.49 (1.59)
Large –1.49 (1.64) –1.86* (1.70) –1.59* (1.68)
R2 0.21 0.15 0.18
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
TABLE 20b Results for BSAQ dimensions against staff feeling confident
Analytical Political Strategic
Intercept 51.75*** (1.60) 51.83*** (1.61) 51.90*** (1.59)
BSAQ score 1.36 (0.87) 1.18 (0.92) 1.53** (0.76)
Foundation 3.23*** (1.14) 3.20*** (1.15) 3.24*** (1.13)
Respondents/board 5.17* (2.86) 5.02* (2.89) 4.71 (2.85)
Small 0.15 (1.74) 0.18 (1.75) 0.26 (1.73)
Medium 0.34 (1.58) 0.43 (1.60) 0.25 (1.55)
Large –1.67* (1.68) –1.83* (1.68) –1.56* (1.67)
R2 0.18 0.17 0.19
*, p< 0.05; **, p< 0.01; ***, p< 0.001.
Note
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Results are positive and significant for staff feeling ‘safe’ in the contextual, analytical, political and strategic
domains, though the effect is strongest in the contextual dimension, which focuses on the board taking
cognisance of the organisation’s values and norms; for example, it may support a more open and
transparent culture around whistleblowing, thereby enabling staff to feel safe to raise concerns.
Results are positive and significant for staff feeling ‘confident’ in the contextual and strategic dimensions,
suggesting that a focus on the organisational values and institutional direction gives staff a sense of
security and assurance that patient safety concerns will be dealt with.
Concluding remarks
As in previous research,29,42,44,45 this analysis has shown the validity of the six BSAQ dimensions. The study
improves on previous analyses by doing a factor analysis applied to ordinal data, calculating both factor
scores and factor-based scales and developing a composite BSAQ score from the factor scores. This allows
us to obtain an appropriate measure of the underlying latent variable board governance. We test for
simple correlations between this composite BSAQ score and various measures of patient safety. Like
previous research,29 we found no association between board governance and various measures of patient
safety. We ran multivariate regression models, taking account of provider type and size, but again found
no association between board governance and any measures of patient safety.
We also ran multivariate regressions and found a positive association between board governance on two
measures of staff feeling confident about raising concerns about errors, near-misses and incidents and also
feeling confident that their organisation would address their concern. This suggests that there is some
association between board governance and staff’s ability to address issues around patient safety, but that
board governance does not directly affect patient safety outcomes.
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Chapter 9 Conclusions and research implications
Introduction
Hospital trust boards in the English NHS have statutory responsibility for upholding the quality and safety of
care delivered by their organisation. However, recent high-profile reports on serious failings in the quality
of hospital care in the NHS, most notably the standards of care at Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust, raise serious
concerns over the ability of trust boards to discharge these duties effectively. Despite a plethora of guidance
available to NHS boards on effective governance, both in general terms (e.g. structure and role) and with
specific reference to safer care,76,127 significant gaps remain in our understanding of what board governance
looks like and the organisational processes through which safer care is accomplished and sustained.
Against this background we wanted to strengthen the theoretical and empirical evidence base that underpins
board governance of safe care in the English NHS. In this final chapter we draw together the main findings
of the study and look forward at the emerging research agenda in this area. Appendix 9 sets out the current
and planned publications arising from this study.
A reminder of the ambitions of this study
Prior to this study, most of the research on hospital board governance originated from the USA, was
theoretically underdeveloped, focused on the more generic concept of service quality rather than patient
safety and was almost entirely of a quantitative nature. In the design of this study we attempted to address
the limitations of previous research and, in so doing, generate new knowledge and evidence to support
improved board oversight of safer care. Through reviewing extant literature and theory and through fresh
empirical study, involving national surveys across hospital trusts in the English NHS and in-depth qualitative
case studies, we have sought to:
1. identify the types of governance activities undertaken by hospital trust boards in the English NHS with
regard to ensuring safe care in its organisation
2. explore the role of boards versus boards of governors in FTs with regard to the oversight of patient
safety in its organisation
3. assess the association between particular hospital trust board oversight activities and patient safety
processes and clinical outcomes
4. identify the facilitators and barriers to developing effective hospital trust board governance of safe care
5. assess the impact of external commissioning arrangements and incentives on hospital trust board
oversight of patient safety.
In the rest of this chapter we summarise the main findings of the research relating to each of these
research objectives and then, subsequently, we identify the research issues arising from the study.
The chapter rounds off with a discussion of some of the study limitations and a note of projected
project outputs.
Drawing together the empirical work and conclusions from
the findings
This section takes each of the research objectives in turn and integrates findings from across all parts of
the study.
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Research objective 1: to identify the types of governance activities
undertaken by hospital trust boards in the English NHS with regard to
ensuring safe care in its organisation
NHS hospital boards as corporate entities have a fundamental strategic role in developing the strategy,
systems and cultures for its organisations. These approaches can be ‘hard’, for example the setting and
monitoring of polices, standards and procedures, or ‘soft’, for example nurturing appropriate values
and beliefs. We uncovered a range of instrumental and symbolic/performative behaviours and activities
undertaken by boards in relation to fulfilling its oversight duties with regard to safeguarding care.
In instrumental terms, a ‘successful’ board is one able to take decisions on corporate strategy efficiently
and effectively.19 In the national survey, a very high proportion of trust boards reported the kinds of
desirable characteristics and board-related processes that research says may be associated with higher
performance, with all having quality subcommittees and proactive procedures in place to address patient
safety concerns and almost all having explicit objectives related to improving patient safety. However,
given the current focus on patient safety in the NHS, it was surprising that only 87% of trusts reported
that board members had actually received any received training in patient safety issues. This, alongside the
in-depth case study work, indicates that some members of hospital boards may be struggling to fulfil
their roles and responsibilities concerning safety. In this regard it is notable that, in the USA, a number
of states have introduced initiatives and legislation around board training, particularly in the form of
accreditation, and mandatory induction and orientation programmes for board members.76 This may also
be an area that requires greater attention in the UK.
In the case studies we found that, although each organisation had developed its own unique style of
board governance and approaches to safeguarding care, all sought to provide strategic assurance by:
l establishing organisational structures and processes for reporting safety-related information throughout
the organisation and to the board
l setting the tone for the whole organisation by making patient safety a strategic priority
l developing and nurturing an ‘open and fair culture’ within the trust which encouraged the reporting of
patient safety-related incidents
l using high-level information to ensure that the trust is complying with safe practices and standards and
meeting externally led targets.
However, the degree to which these aspirations were fully met was moot, with persistent reports (away
from the board) about the risks and challenges of communicating bad news or of challenging senior
management perspectives and actions.
The four case studies exhibited features associated with the range of instrumental theories and models of
board governance outlined in Chapter 2. However, it was also clear that the boards adopted different
models at different times and in relation to particular aspects of board governance. Governance activities,
then, were seen to be contingent on a variety of internal factors, such as board dynamics, and on external
factors, such as the regulatory environment and commissioning relationships. The case studies (see
Chapters 4–7) show evidence of board governance approaches related to:
l agency theory, in the way that boards sought to measure its patient safety performance to ensure
compliance and to hold staff accountable for their actions
l stewardship theory, in the way that boards attempted to implement a framework of shared values built
on trust–based relationships
l stakeholder theory, in the way that boards have attempted to manage complex trade-offs between
stakeholders, including staff, patients and the public
l resource dependency theory, in the way that boards attempted to manage internal and external
relationships to leverage influence and resources.
CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
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In our four case studies, three of the sites operationalised the governance of patient safety largely in terms
of assurance and performance data were used retrospectively to alert the board of poor performance.
However, such an approach may encourage under-reporting of patient safety matters and does not
provide guidance on how best to address past performance deficiencies. In only one case of our four study
sites did the board seek to mitigate the potential for such dysfunctional organisational consequences,
through a strategic focus on quality improvement (in this case, even to the extent of structuring the board
agenda around strategic quality improvement).
Our analysis of the performative and symbolic aspects of board activities highlights the role and differences
in local and ritualistic processes of organising in relation to the governance of patient safety. Although
each case study identified different performativities at play in different situations, it was clear that the
setting(s) in which board decisions and deliberation take place, and the local enactment of organisational
frames (operationalised through different approaches to the scripting, setting, staging and performance of
board activity), have an important bearing on how organisations approach the oversight of patient safety.
These findings highlight the challenges faced by board members in terms of the artefacts that they have
available and the key role of scripting and staging, especially when decisions in these areas often pass
unchallenged, unremarked or even unnoticed. A better understanding of these issues may feed into
revised training and induction processes for board members.
The amount of time boards devote to discussing patient safety-related issues has been identified as a key
issue related to performance in this area.57 In our study we found that most boards do allocate a
considerable amount of time to discussing patient safety- and quality-related issues. The NSS obtained
responses which indicate that only one-fifth of trust boards reported that ≤ 30% of their time was spent
discussing safety and quality issues. In the case studies we found similar evidence, with only one study site
allocating < 30% of their board time to debating quality/safety matters. However, we also identified
(through the case study sites) that boards used this time rather differently. For example, for some a wide
range of performance data were made available to directors and attention tended to be concentrated
closely on those showing shortfalls. Such approaches tended to be quality assurance oriented, with less
discussion of proactive quality improvement. In other sites, the emphasis was more on the use of
quantitative data to support quality improvement rather than secure conformance against externally
set standards.
A key issue in the study was the type and amount of information that board members used to help
exercise scrutiny over safety issues. In the national survey we found that hospital boards were using a wide
range of hard performance metrics and soft intelligence to monitor their organisation with regard to
patient safety, including a range of clinical outcomes measures, infection rates and process measures, such
as medication errors and readmission rates.
It is noteworthy, however, that fewer trusts reported routine reporting of patient safety surveys and the
implementation of patient safety alerts, and a much smaller proportion of trusts routinely report morbidity
rates at every board meeting. Softer intelligence, used organisationally and reported at all board meetings,
was also more variably reported, with discussions with clinicians and executive walkabouts being most
often reported, alongside use of patient stories. However, in only about two-thirds of trusts did board
members shadow clinicians and report back to the board. These findings indicate some scope for
broadening and enriching board activities with regard to understanding and assessing patient safety.
In the case studies we also identified a range of information and performance data reported to the board,
and surfaced some of the key issues and challenges in their use by board members. For example, where
RAG indicator reporting systems were used, concerns were expressed about the validity and reliability of
the judgements so presented. In contrast, board members who focused on quality assurance data
expressed greater confidence in the validity and reliability of these data. One way out of the apparent
tension between assurance and improvement seemed to lie in attempts to combine the requirements of
external assurance with ongoing quality improvement through the development of national- and local-level
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data sets and qualitative information from reports by clinical service areas. Despite these efforts, we heard
reports of the need for further training of NEDs to understand and interpret standard quantitative data sets
and for further disaggregation of data at ward level.
Understanding of these tensions is augmented by our parallel view of board activities as performative and
symbolic. This analysis highlighted the important role of setting, scripting and staging in the use and
interpretation of information and performance data by the board. For example, although the availability of
summaries of quality indicators to board members was a key issue, so equally were the local processes of
organising in each board that made it possible for non-executive board members to use such information
to hold executives to account. The setting and staging could be seen as working in support of such
questioning or (more often) working against any breaking out from set scripting patterns. Thus, the
dramaturgical arrangements of boards require greater attention if they are truly to become fora for
effective debate, challenge and the instigation of action.
Key actions
l All board members should undertake training and education in relation to approaches to sustaining
and improving health-care quality and patient safety. This should be undertaken as part of induction
and orientation programmes for new members, with knowledge and skills in this area regularly
updated through continuing professional development programmes.
l There appears to be a particular need for training and education of board members in relation to
understanding and interpreting the quantitative data sets and performance indicators used to report
patient safety issues at board level.
l Boards should regularly review the (hard and soft) information that they use to assess and assure
patient safety in their organisation. This includes learning from organisations that have used a range of
approaches, such as board members shadowing clinicians and use of patient stories to inform board
members about patient safety in their organisation.
l Efforts should be made to encourage and support senior clinicians to engage and contribute towards
board oversight activities with regard to patient safety.
Research objective 2: to explore the role of boards versus board of
governors in foundation trusts with regards to the oversight of patient
safety in its organisation
A strong theme from across study sites was that, although the board of governors are generally perceived
as well-meaning, they were also considered to be largely ineffective in helping to promote and deliver
safer care for their organisations. Boards of governors seemed to serve a useful educative and community
linkage role, but with limited challenge or holding of executives to account. Meetings frequently resembled
seminars for information sharing, rather than a formal board meeting where key organisational strategies
were debated and discussed. Thus, while governors typically reported good relations with the executive
board, there was often a lack of awareness and understanding of respective roles. Although some sites did
report engagement of governors in quality assurance work in relation to, for example, NED appraisal and
committee work, there were also frustrations at what was seen as only limited active engagement from
NEDs. In summary, therefore, governor meetings appeared to play little active and positive role in the
governance and safeguarding of care across the organisations we studied. This is, of course, not to say
that boards of governors may not fulfil other important functions beyond the safety and quality remit of
this study.
Key action
l More information, encouragement, support and advice should be provided to boards of governors of
FTs to enable them to play a more active role in patient safety activities and to hold board members to
account for its oversight of patient safety within the trust.
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Research objective 3: to assess the association between particular hospital
trust board oversight activities and patient safety processes and
clinical outcomes
The national surveys were designed to explore any relationship(s) between board structures, board
activities, board competencies (as measured by the BSAQ) and a range of patient safety process and
outcome variables. The headline finding is that we did not find any statistically significant relationship
between these board attributes and (self-reported) processes and any patient safety outcome measures.
However, we did find a significant relationship between two dimensions of the BSAQ and two specific and
related NSS organisational ‘process’ measures: staff feeling safe to raise concerns about errors, near-misses
and incidents and staff feeling confident that their organisation would address their concerns if raised.
In particular, the correlational results are positive and significant for staff ‘feeling safe’ in the contextual,
analytical, political and strategic domains of the BSAQ, although the effect is strongest in the
contextual dimension. This context dimension explores how the board takes cognisance of the organisation’s
values and norms, and positive orientations here may support a more open and transparent culture around
whistleblowing, thus enabling staff to feel safe to raise quality concerns.
Results were also positive and significant for staff ‘feeling confident’ about the contextual and strategic
BSAQ dimensions, suggesting that a focus on the organisational values and institutional direction give staff
a sense of security and assurance that patient safety concerns will be dealt with.
These findings then suggest some association between board governance and staff ability to address issues
around patient safety, but also suggest that board governance may not directly affect patient safety
outcomes. To be surer of this last point, however, we would need more complex longitudinal data than
were available for this cross-sectional study.
This null finding of the effect of boards on outcomes is at odds with previous empirical work in the USA,
which did find an association between board activity and quality outcomes.17 This difference may be
explained in part by a number of factors, not least the focus on different measures of outcome in the US
studies and the different economic and political environment in which boards operate in the USA. It may
also be the case that there is a lagged effect between current board practice/competencies and patient
safety outcomes, which our study would not have picked up as it was cross-sectional rather than
longitudinal in design.
The finding linking board orientations to staff attitudes from our large-scale quantitative work are further
substantiated when we look at the qualitative findings, especially those that were gleaned from the
following of ‘tracer conditions’ from board to ward (see Chapter 6). Here there were persistent worries
that calling out quality or safety problems or challenging senior management were unlikely to be welcome
actions. Thus, providing an environment safe for challenge remains difficult and may yet be one key area
in which boards could have an impact.
The results linking board competencies and organisational policies, associated with the creation of more
open cultures and the assurance that patient safety concerns will be dealt with appropriately, are
important given the current focus on whistleblowing in the NHS and, in particular, the recently announced
independent review into whistleblowing to be chaired by Sir Robert Francis QC, Freedom to Speak Up.
Indeed, the terms of reference for the review state that ‘it will consider, in the light of recent policy
measures in response to the Public Inquiry into Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, what further
action is necessary to protect those individual NHS workers who speak out and in doing so make a
significant contribution to the open culture that is needed to ensure safe care for patients.’ Later in this
chapter, and building on our findings, we outline possible future research into board governance and
whistleblowing to explore these issues further.
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Key action
l Boards should review its structures and systems and develop appropriate ‘open cultures’ that
encourage staff at all levels to report and act on problems and issues around patient safety. Those staff
reporting concerns over poor standards of care through formal channels or whistleblowing to external
agencies should be supported and protected from potential bullying and intimidation by managers
and others in the organisation.
Research objective 4: to identify the facilitators and barriers to developing
effective hospital trust board governance of safe care
Organisational strategies, structures and cultures can potentially serve to enable or attenuate attempts to
improve board governance; however, there has previously been little research into this important area of
patient safety. In the case studies we explored these dimensions and identified a range of possible
organisational facilitators and enablers to effective board governance of safe care. For example, a key
facilitator at one of our study sites appeared to have been the development and implementation of a clear
corporate strategy and operational plan focused on enhancing the quality and safety of care in the
organisation. This plan had been further codified into bespoke performance measures, which were then
incorporated in an organisation-wide quality dashboard for board review. Thus, objectives were clearly
identified against the plan, which ensured continuous focus, supported by board dynamics characterised as
‘supportive challenge’ (where the open discussion of problematic issues was not interpreted as disloyalty).
At other sites, the stability of board membership over time was considered to be an important facilitator
of patient safety governance, and the detailed knowledge of, and connection with, clinical staff by the
CEO was thought to be crucial. Strong and committed clinical leadership was also considered to be an
important facilitating factor in supporting board governance, even when there were persistent concerns
over the so-called bullying of junior professionals by senior clinicians (which were, unsurprisingly, seen as
being important barriers to effective governance).
We identified a range of other organisational barriers to effective board governance of safe care across the
case study sites. Problems and disputes over the validity and reliability of summary performance indicator
data and apparent difficulties in communication between clinical units and the board, for example, led to
a sense of confusion over the meaning and the correct interpretation of performance indicator data
received and reviewed by the board. In addition, problems were seen to arise because of a perceived lack
of engagement among senior medical staff in many parts of the organisation, resulting in impaired
communication between corporate teams and ward level.
Research objective 5: to assess the impact of external commissioning
arrangements and incentives on hospital trust board oversight of
patient safety
Hospital trusts operate within a broader system of incentive and constraints, which necessarily help to
shape and influence approaches to board oversight of safe care. In terms of the commissioning
environment, there is currently a policy focus on the role of CCGs as a means of improving quality and
patient safety through the design of contracting and payment systems, as well as through establishing
collaborative relationships with providers. Across the case studies we found that contracting issues
appeared to play only a relatively minor role in incentivising quality and safety improvement. Building
strong and trustworthy relationships between commissioners and providers was often viewed as a better
way of stimulating positive change than focusing on incentives and sanctions. Relationships with
commissioners across all four of our study sites were seen as largely positive, notwithstanding a few local
difficulties (e.g. around plans for expansion and competition with other providers).
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External financial incentives also have the potential to influence board oversight strategies. The CQUIN
payment framework makes a proportion of providers’ income conditional on locally agreed goals
concerning quality (covering dimensions of safety, effectiveness and experience). During the period of the
research the incentive was 0.5% of contract value. The aim of the CQUIN is to support a cultural shift by
embedding quality improvement and innovation within commissioner-provider discussions. The CQUIN
appear to have had a mixed impact across the case study sites and were generally perceived to be a
low-powered incentive for quality and safety improvement, as well as possibly inducing a range of
unintended and dysfunctional consequences. For example, the CQUIN was perceived by some to be too
unwieldy in operation to act as effective incentives and were negatively perceived as ‘taking money off’
rather than incentivising improvement activity. Reactions were not uniform, however, with the CQUIN
being perceived as having a (albeit limited) positive impact in some areas but being a distraction in others.
Although compliance frameworks were generally welcomed for their effect of focusing attention on
aspects of patient safety, concerns were raised in relation to their negative unintended consequences,
notably ‘tunnel vision’ (a reduced attention and focus on important areas of health-care quality and patient
safety that were not covered under the CQUIN framework, e.g. environmental health). The CQUIN
penalties also proved difficult to apply in practice, with formal sanctions becoming a subject of negotiation
between provider and commissioner. Therefore, external financial incentives in the form of the CQUIN
appeared to have had little positive impact on board governance and safeguarding care in the case study
organisations, and may even have proved an unwelcome distraction.
Key action
l External commissioning arrangements and financial incentives such as the CQUIN should be evaluated
and reviewed regularly to ensure that they are levering and contributing to quality and safety
improvement in NHS organisations and are not inadvertently introducing or perpetuating unintended
and dysfunctional consequences for organisations, staff and patients.
Research agenda
This report provides evidence of the importance of board governance in the delivery of high-quality and
safe care. Yet, because of the complexity of board governance and the influencing factors on patient
safety in modern health systems, there is still much to unravel about these key facets of health-care
organisation and delivery in the NHS. Therefore, we suggest that there remains a challenging
governance- and management-focused research agenda around safer care. Specific methodological issues
and substantive areas that warrant further and more sustained investigation might be considered in the
following areas:
Research design
As with all research, a rigourous study design enhances the power and credibility of the findings and
future research in this area would benefit from a number of features:
l Any studies should be mixed-method and multidisciplinary in design, drawing on a range of
quantitative and qualitative methods, including detailed ethnographic approaches.
l As the phenomena under investigation are essentially dynamic (governance, performance and change),
longitudinal study will offer important additional insights over cross-sectional designs. Although we
achieved excellent response rates, the national surveys of board structure, activity and competency
(the BSAQ), which were linked to patient safety-related process and outcomes, used a cross-sectional
rather than a longitudinal research design. This means that we can only infer associations rather than
estimate causality between the variables. Longitudinal research using repeated cross-sectional data
would help to unravel any causal relationships.
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l It is plausible that existing board activity and competencies may take time to impact on patient safety
outcomes; therefore, there may be a lagged effect. However, in our study the board-level variables
were linked with relatively contemporaneous patient safety variables and so may have failed to pick up
any lagged associations. Future research might therefore explore such lagged effects, using patient
safety data in the form of a time series.
l In our study we have shown how both instrumental and symbolic theoretical approaches can yield
important insights into board behaviour and provide better opportunities for theoretical transference
and generalisability to other contexts. Future research will need also need sound conceptual
underpinnings rather than relying on empiricism alone.
Research on board governance, whistleblowing, employee silence and voice
Our finding that board governance/competencies appear to be linked to staff feeling safe to raise concerns
about patient safety issues, and also their confidence that their organisation would address their concerns,
is worthy of further and more sustained exploration, particularly in the context of the current focus on
improving whistleblowing policies in the NHS. Whistleblowing (the disclosure, either to a person in
authority or in public, of information concerning unsafe, unethical or illegal practices) is central to current
debates about addressing poor standards of care in the NHS. Since the 1998 Public Interest Disclosure Act,
all NHS trusts have been required to have policy and procedures in place for dealing with whistleblowing.
This is now enshrined in the NHS Constitution, which mandates ‘an expectation that NHS staff will raise
concerns about safety, malpractice or wrong-doing . . . as early as possible’.128 Yet a recent House of
Commons Public Accounts Select Committee report on patient safety concluded that ‘the NHS remains
largely unsupportive of whistleblowing, with many staff fearful of going outside official channels to bring
unsafe care to light’.129 Indeed, the Francis Inquiry noted that there had been a number of whistleblowing
policies in place at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust that had ‘the clear objective to empower
employees to raise concerns and to ensure that those concerns, where valid, were acted upon’.4 However,
the Inquiry heard that, despite the existence of such policies, no adequate support was given to staff who
attempted to raise concerns, with witnesses describing ‘an endemic culture of bullying’, with graphic
examples of victimisation of those who did raise concerns.4 Francis concluded that the culture at the trust
militated against health professionals openly raising concerns for two key reasons: they considered that
such concerns would not be acted on effectively, or they feared negative repercussions from colleagues
and/or victimisation by management. Yet despite these serious concerns about the effectiveness of current
whistleblowing polices, we still lack a firm evidence base to guide change.
To help address this gap in knowledge, the government announced an independent inquiry into
whistleblowing – Freedom to Speak Up – chaired by Sir Robert Francis QC.130 The review invited NHS staff
to share their experiences of speaking up, as well as ideas for removing the obstacles and creating the
right environment for an open and honest reporting culture. The review report calls for all NHS health-care
organisations and regulators to adhere to its principles and take actions to develop a safety culture, with
calls for the Secretary of State for Health to review the progress at least annually. Within such a context,
it will be interesting to see how boards respond to these developments and seek to nurture the cultures of
safety and learning advocated by Francis.
Research on the role of systematic group bias in board decision-making
Recent research has highlighted the negative impact of systematic cognitive biases on the quality of clinical
decision-making when individuals act alone. Croskerry, in the field of emergency medicine, for example,
has documented many such systematic biases and has identified a range of possible remedial strategies.131
Common cognitive biases that have been shown to afflict individual decision-making in clinical contexts
include confirmation bias (where individuals mainly seek out information sources that are likely to confirm,
rather than challenge, their existing opinion), hindsight bias (whereby the knowledge of the outcomes of
previous decisions erroneously influence the predictability associated with a particular new decision) and
the ‘fundamental attribution’ bias that arises from relying on decision problems that are seen as
representative of all similar problems.
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Boards make many decisions in which such individual biases may be a factor, but they also collectively
make decisions that may be open to different biasing processes.132 Group decisions, too, can be imperfect
and result in organisational and clinical errors, which may harm patients.133
Group decisions typically comprise three sequential stages: orientation (problem definition), evaluation
(discussion of decision alternatives) and control (deciding which alternative is selected). Furthermore, each
stage may be subject to systematic bias resulting from social influences and group dynamics.134 However,
group-decision-making bias is a hitherto unexplored aspect of board oversight of safe care and it would be
useful to undertake empirical research to explore the scope, range and impact of systematic group
decision-making bias in board settings on patient safety processes and outcomes. Such work might also
explore the potential for ‘de-biasing strategies’ to improve decision-making in this area. Possible systematic
biases in group decision-making worthy of exploring include:
l Groupthink. Highly cohesive groups with strongly connected members may inhibit the expression
of (true) opinion; in such cases group harmony and unanimity may be privileged over effective
decision-making. Clearly, this militates against the delivery of high-quality and safe care, where board
members should feel comfortable in expressing dissenting views and be willing to speak openly about
concerns they may have regarding the quality of care.
l Group polarisation. Groups sometimes make more extreme (compound) decisions than the initial
position of its (individual) members. Extreme decisions are those in which the group makes either a
more risky or more conservative decision rather than take a more balanced appraisal or ‘middle of the
road’ approach. For example, a hospital board may decide to commit significant resources, incurring
high opportunity and sunk costs, to implement a new policy. Conversely, the group may decide not to
commit resources to alternative courses of action because of the uncertainty involved. The term ‘risky
shift’ is used to describe situations in which a group exhibits more risk-taking behaviour than the initial
average risk-seeking tendencies of individual members. ‘Cautious shift’ refers to situations when group
action becomes more risk averse than the initial risk tendencies of the individual members. In both
cases, the average response of individual group members becomes more extreme when they are part
of the group, which may have a negative impact on patient safety in some situations and contexts.
Research on board governance assessment measurement tools
There is a real need for more and better-tested bespoke instruments and tools for assessing and informing
hospital board governance and competencies. In the study we used an adaptation of a US measure
(the BSAQ), but there is a need for further development in the UK context. As the key characteristics of
desirable board governance emerge from further sustained research, we will then be in a better position
to build better instruments. Given the dynamic nature and complexity of board governance in health-care
contexts, the building, testing and refining of a variety of board tools and instruments will be an
ongoing task.
Research on board reach into organisational cultures and practices
As our work on the ‘tracer issues’ (see Chapter 6) demonstrates, a crucial challenge lies in understanding
how different levels of organisational hierarchy articulate together. Activity within boards consists largely
of discourse-creating dialogue that needs translation into actions at various levels within the hospital.
Understanding how the dialogue and discourse creation at one level informs and influences the cultures
and practices at another is key, as is identifying and elucidating the key conduits through which these
layers are linked. Only detailed ethnographic work, particularly in well-functioning organisations, is likely to
shed much light on these complexes processes.
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Study limitations
As with all research projects, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the study. The first limitation
relates to the generalisability of the findings beyond the four case study sites. Although the case study sites
were sampled purposefully to include organisations with both an upwards and downwards trajectory in
relation to a basket of measures of patient safety performance, as well as being dispersed nationally, we
cannot state categorically that our findings are necessarily generalisable to all acute trusts in England.
Our intention has been to develop generalisable theories, which may or may not relate to particular trusts,
depending on context. The time period over which the case studies were carried out was relatively short
and more longitudinal work may have uncovered additional or even, possibly, contradictory findings.
Nevertheless, we are reasonably confident that our study has uncovered some important aspects of board
governance that are transferable to hospital trusts more generally. This view is strengthened by the
results of our quantitative survey data, which reinforced many aspects of the case study findings. It was
particularly noteworthy that the only significant correlation of the BSAQ data with organisation variables
came in the area of staff ‘safety’ and ‘confidence’ in reporting quality failings, a theme also seen in the
case work.
A second limitation is that our national surveys represent a snapshot of a particular time (March 2012–
April 2013) and, although we obtained excellent response rates from board members (particularly for the
board activity survey linked to the Dr Foster questionnaire), some of the responses may have been those that
were viewed as ‘socially desirable’ by board members and, therefore, may not represent respondents’ true
perception of the situation nor reflect the growing awareness of the importance of signalling that such issues
are being taken seriously. The fact that the study was cross-sectional rather than longitudinal in design also
means that we could only state that there may be associations between the variables rather than causal
linkages. The structured questionnaires will also have failed to pick up many of the complex and qualitative
aspects of board behaviour, which defy simple codification but which we did attempt to explore in the
qualitative case studies.
A third limitation of this work may be seen in the only limited reach that we were able to obtain into
broader hospital working (including at the care ‘coal face’). Although our use of ‘tracer issues’ did extend
our view of the impact and influence of board debates and actions to deeper levels of the organisation
hierarchy, we still lack the necessary comprehensive picture of how high-level debate and discourse shapes
lower-level debates, discourse and, most importantly, practical actions.
Concluding remarks
Our research is the first large-scale mixed-methods study of hospital board activity and behaviour related to
the oversight of patient safety in the English NHS. As such, we believe that it has much to contribute to an
understanding of boards, their influence and their operation. We have set out the key findings in this
report and believe that these should influence the design of future governance arrangements, as well as
the training and support of boards. Notwithstanding the contributions to understanding made by this
research, we also believe that research in this area is in its infancy and would more than justify additional
investment along the lines described in a preceding section. Without effective governance from ‘board
to ward’ it seems unlikely that the goals as laid out in the latest enquiry into NHS failings4 can be met in
the context of tight financial settlements for the NHS in the foreseeable future.
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Appendix 1 Effective board governance of safe
care scoping study
Stakeholder interview sample
We interviewed 10 people from the following organisations:
l Health Foundation: an independent charity working to improve the quality of health care in the
UK (n= 1).
l NHS Confederation: a membership body for organisations that commission and provide NHS services,
aiming to bring together, and speak on behalf of, the whole of the NHS (n= 1).
l Department of Health: contribution from representatives involved in patient safety policy
development (n= 2)
l NHS Litigation Authority: a not-for-profit part of the NHS that manages negligence and other claims
against the NHS in England (n= 1).
l Monitor: an executive non-departmental public body of the Department of Health that particularly
oversees and regulates FTs (n= 1).
l Care Quality Commission: an executive body of the Department of Health that regulates, inspects and
reviews all adult social care services in England (n= 1).
l National Patient Safety Agency: responsible for identifying and reducing risks to patients receiving NHS
care and leading on national initiatives to improve patient safety. In June 2012, the Agency became
part of the NHS Commissioning Board Special Health Authority (n= 1).
l Witness and seminar contributors to the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust Inquiry (n= 2).
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Appendix 2 Case study invitation letter
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
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Appendix 3 Participant information sheet
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Appendix 4 Coding frameworks used in the case
study analysis
Example of coding framework: board-level interviews
For the interviews with board members, our analysis built on a literature review (see Millar et al.17) that
highlighted a number of issues for boards in relation to the governance of patient safety. These would
form the central codes for the analysis (deductive); however, our analysis was also open to a variety of
emerging themes that occurred during the course of the fieldwork (inductive). The response to the
Francis Inquiry findings was an example of a code that emerged from the interview data.
Coding framework
Tree node Nodes Node explanation
‘Measurement’: instances where board
members described the accumulation,
interpretation and analysis of
performance information
Soft intelligence The qualitative dimensions of performance
measurement, such as patient stories
Hard intelligence The quantitative dimensions of performance
measurement, such as RAG ratings
Dashboards Board perspectives regarding the use and
effectiveness of current dashboards
Training and development Board perspectives on the extent to which
they needed further training and
development in relation to performance
measurement
‘Leadership’: instances where board
members described examples and practices
related to executive directors as leaders
Strategy Board perspectives on the ability to develop
an effective strategy regarding quality
and safety
Priorities Board perspectives on the possible competing
demands placed on them in terms of where
their priorities lie
Behaviours Board perspectives on the behaviours they
believed were expected of them in terms of
key board activities, e.g. walkabouts
‘Internal oversight’: instances where board
members reflected on the organisational
structures and processes for patient safety,
as well as the informal relationships
and dynamics between boards and
professional groups
Processes Board perspectives on the governance
processes within the hospital, including
reflections on subcommittees
Relationships Board perspectives on their relationships
with staff
Dynamics Board perspectives on the dynamics of the
current board
Meetings Board perspectives on their reflections on the
board meeting
Governors Board perspectives on their relationships with
governors in the oversight of patient safety
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Tree node Nodes Node explanation
‘External oversight’: instances where board
members reflected on their accountability in
relation to national targets and
regulatory bodies
Targets Board perspectives on the nature and impact
of delivering performance targets
Regulation Board perspectives on their relationship with
regulatory bodies
Policy Board perspectives on government policy in
relation to boards and patient safety
Commissioning Board perspective regarding their
relationships with commissioners
*Additional free node for the Francis Inquiry Francis A free node was created for board
perspectives regarding the Francis Inquiry
Excerpt from transcript: Code of Internal Oversight and
Dynamics (anonymised)
≤ Internals\\Medical Director≥ – § 5 references coded (12.69% Coverage)
Reference 1 – 3.86% Coverage
I think things have moved on. I think the board . . . Boards are interesting because they . . . This board,
the board in this organisation, has three doctors? . . . when I was made director, I had a limited clinical
practice. So those people understand all of these aspects of practice. The rest of the board have no
more knowledge of it than any layperson coming into hospital for a procedure. I, personally, feel that
there should be more board to ward communication. Some of the board members do make time to
do walkabouts and that kind of thing – many of them to it quite assiduously . . . does it pretty
regularly. Others of them find it very difficult to do that because of external commitments and time
constraints. And some of them, I think, don’t actually . . . They’re a bit frightened of it. The way we set
it up, I or one of the senior nursing staff . . . would go with them, so they wouldn’t be sent to a ward
. . . They’d go with somebody who knew the organisation and knew what questions should be asked
and so on. But I think some of them feel out of place. It’s a bit like putting a barrister in an operating
theatre – they‘re fine in a courtroom, but you put them in an operating theatre and it’s a different ball
game. And it’s the same thing – if I had to go and give evidence in a court of law, the barrister’s very
comfortable, but I’m pretty uncomfortable. So it’s the same thing when the board members go into
clinical environments.
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Example of NVivo node summary table
Node summary example for case study site
Source type
Number of
sources
Number of coding
references
Number of
words coded
Number of
paragraphs coded Duration coded
Node
Nickname: Nodes\\External
Nickname: Nodes\\External\commissioning
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 11 11 13,289 407
Nickname: Nodes\\External\regulation
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 5 5 11,384 359
Nickname: Nodes\\External\targets
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 8 12 13,818 414
Nickname: Nodes\\Francis
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 12 13 15,238 496
Nickname: Nodes\\internal
Nickname: Nodes\\internal\governors
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 6 7 12,595 442
Nickname: Nodes\\internal\processes
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 8 13 14,804 424
Nickname: Nodes\\internal\relationships
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 10 13 16,061 456
Nickname: Nodes\\internal\structures
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 9 9 12,716 401
Nickname: Nodes\\leadership
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Node summary example for case study site
Source type
Number of
sources
Number of coding
references
Number of
words coded
Number of
paragraphs coded Duration coded
Nickname: Nodes\\leadership\dynamics
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 11 32 20,192 648
Nickname: Nodes\\leadership\impact
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 12 26 12,377 301
Nickname: Nodes\\leadership\priorities
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 12 23 18,847 573
Nickname: Nodes\\leadership\strategy
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 9 12 16,465 462
Nickname: Nodes\\measurement
Nickname: Nodes\\measurement\dashboards
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 8 11 14,509 475
Nickname: Nodes\\measurement\hard
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 4 4 11,333 336
Nickname: Nodes\\measurement\soft
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 9 14 13,677 420
Nickname: Nodes\\measurement\training
Classification:
Aggregated: No
Document 6 7 12,032 381
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Appendix 5 The national survey board
activity questions
l How many board members are there in your organisation?
l Over the course of the last year, what percentage of board meeting time has been devoted specifically
to discussing patient safety issues?
l Over the past year, have board members received formal training in relation to patient safety?
¢ What training and development programmes have been attended?
l Have the board set explicit measurable goals for improving performance in relation to patient safety?
¢ Please specify these measurable goals?
l Have strategic goals and objectives related to patient safety been distributed to staff groups within the
last 12 months?
¢ Which staff groups have received these goals and objectives:
¢ ambulance
¢ allied health professionals
¢ doctors
¢ Health Informatics
¢ management
¢ nursing
¢ Healthcare Science
¢ wider health-care team
¢ other (please specify).
l Does the board have formal procedures for reporting inappropriate behaviours in relation to patient
safety on a regular basis?
¢ IF YES, what are these procedures?
l Are there procedures for proactively responding to the reporting of staff concerns about patient safety?
¢ IF YES, what are these procedures?
l Which of the following informal sources of information related to patient safety are reported at all
board meetings? Please indicate all that apply:
¢ executive walkarounds
¢ patient stories
¢ board members shadowed clinicians to better understand patient safety issues
¢ board members engaged clinicians to better understand patient safety issues
¢ other (please specify).
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l Which of the following quantitative data sources related to patient safety are reported at all
board meetings?
¢ infection rates
¢ mortality rates
¢ morbidity rates
¢ readmission rates
¢ incident rates and levels of harm
¢ patient safety surveys
¢ formal complaints processes
¢ medication errors
¢ CQC Quality and Risk Profiles (QRPs)
¢ staff safety (injuries and/or sickness)
¢ implementation of safety alerts
¢ formal written reports about safety performance
¢ other (please specify).
l How many members of the board have clinical backgrounds?
l Does the board have a formal subcommittee that discusses patient safety issues?
¢ IF YES, how many times a year does this subcommittee meet?
l Are patient safety measures included in the chief executive officer’s performance review?
¢ IF YES, please provide details.
l Does the board use any national reporting measures of patient safety?
¢ IF YES, please provide details.
l We are interested in the relative importance of a number of activities within your organisation.
Please rank the following in order of importance to the board:
¢ financial performance
¢ clinical effectiveness
¢ patient safety
¢ patient experience
¢ achieving waiting time targets
¢ staff satisfaction.
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Appendix 6 The Board Self-Assessment
Questionnaire
Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire
Question items arranged by board performance dimensions or competencies (contextual, educational,
interpersonal, analytical, political and strategic).
Items in italics are reverse scored.
Competency 1: understands context (contextual)
6. Induction programmes for new board members, particularly non-executives, specifically include a
segment about both the NHS and the organisation’s history and traditions.
12. In discussing key issues, it is not unusual for someone on the board to talk about what this
organisation stands for and how that is related to the matter at hand.
13. Values are seldom discussed explicitly at our board meetings.
30. This board has made a key decision that I believe to be inconsistent with the mission of
this organisation.
37. I have been present in board meetings where discussions of the history and mission of the organisation
were key factors in reaching a conclusion on a problem.
39. It is apparent from the comments of some of our board members that they do not understand the
mission of the organisation very well.
42. There have been occasions where the board itself has acted in ways inconsistent with the
organisation’s deepest values.
45. New members are provided with a detailed explanation of this organisation’s mission when they join
this board.
50. This board reviews the organisation’s mission at periodic intervals.
56. One of the reasons I joined this board was that I believe strongly in the values of this organisation.
59. Former members of this board have participated in special events designed to convey to new members
the organisation’s history and values.
63. This board understands the norms of the professions working in this organisation.
Competency 2: builds learning (educational)
2. I have participated in board discussions about what we should do differently as a result of a mistake the
board made.
10. At least once every 2 years, our board has a retreat or special session to examine our performance,
how well we are doing as a board.
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17. This board periodically sets aside time to learn more about important issues facing NHS Trusts.
18. I can recall an occasion when the board acknowledged its responsibility for an ill-advised decision.
21. Most people on this board tend to rely on observation and informal discussions to learn about their
role and responsibilities.
24. When a new member joins this board, we make sure that someone serves as a mentor to help this
person learn the ropes.
26. I have participated in board discussions about the effectiveness of our performance.
29. I have participated in discussions with new board members about the roles and responsibilities of a
board member.
34. I have participated in board discussions about what we can learn from a mistake we have made
38. I have never received feedback on my performance as a member of this board.
46. This board does not allocate organisational funds for the purpose of board education
and development.
51. This board has conducted an explicit examination of its roles and responsibilities.
Competency 3: nurtures group (interpersonal)
3. I have had conversations with other members of this board regarding common interests we share
outside this organisation
15. Differences of opinion in board decisions are more often settled by vote than by more discussion.
20. This board is as attentive to how it reaches conclusions as it is to what is decided.
27. At our board meetings, there is at least as much dialogue among non-executive members as there is
between non-executive members and executive members.
31. The leadership of this board typically goes out of its way to make sure that all members have the same
information on important issues.
32. This board has adopted some explicit goals for itself, distinct from goals it has for the
total organisation.
43. This board relies on the natural emergence of leaders, rather than trying explicitly to cultivate future
leaders for the board.
52. I am able to speak my mind on key issues without fear that I will be ostracised by some members of
this board.
57. This board does not recognise special events in the lives of its members.
60. This board provides biographical information that helps members get to know one another better.
64. This board meets socially as a group.
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Competency 4: recognises complexity (analytical)
1. This board takes regular steps to keep itself informed about important trends in the local health
economy, and in the wider national healthcare environment, that might affect the organisation.
4. I have been in board meetings where it seemed that the subtleties of the issues we dealt with escaped
the awareness of a number of the members.
5. Our board explicitly examines the ‘downside’ or possible pitfalls of any important decisions it is about
to make.
11. Many of the issues that this board deals with seem to be separate tasks, unrelated to one another.
22. I find it easy to identify the key issues that this board faces.
23. When faced with an important issue, the board often ‘brainstorms’ and tries to generate a whole list
of creative approaches or solutions to the problem.
28. When issues come before our board, they are seldom framed in a way that enables members to see
the connections between the matter at hand and the organisation’s overall strategy.
47. Recommendations from the executive directors are usually accepted with little questioning in
board meetings.
53. This board tries to avoid issues that are ambiguous and complicated.
61. This board seeks information and advice from leaders of other similar organisations.
Competency 5: respects process (political)
9. This board communicates its decisions to all those who are affected by them.
14. If our board thinks that an important internal or external stakeholder or stakeholder group is likely to
disagree with an action we are considering, we will make sure we learn how they feel before we actually
make the decision.
19. This board has formed ad hoc committees or task forces that include staff as well as board members.
25. I have been in board meetings where explicit attention was given to the concerns of the
local community.
33. The board periodically requests information on the morale of the professional staff.
41. Before reaching a decision on important issues, this board usually requests input from persons likely to
be affected by the decision.
48. At times this board has appeared unaware of the impact its decisions will have within our
local community.
54. The executive directors rarely report to the board on the concerns of patients.
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Competency 6: shapes direction (strategic)
7. This board is more involved in trying to put out fires than in preparing for the future.
8. The board sets clear organisational priorities for the year ahead.
16. This board delays action until an issue becomes urgent or critical.
35. Our board meetings tend to focus more on current concerns than on preparing for the future.
36. At least once a year, this board asks that the chief executive articulate his/her vision for the
organisation’s future and strategies to realise that vision.
40. This board has on occasion evaded responsibility for some important issue facing the organisation.
44. This board often discusses where the organisation should be headed five or more years into the future.
49. Within the past year, this board has reviewed the organisation’s strategies for attaining its
long-term goals.
55. I have been in board meetings where the discussion focused on identifying or overcoming the
organisation’s weakness.
58. The board discusses events and trends in the larger environment that may present specific
opportunities for this organisation.
62. This board makes explicit use of the long range priorities of this organisation in dealing with
current issues.
65. More than half of this board’s time is spent in discussions of issues of importance to the organisation’s
long-range future.
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Appendix 7 Patient safety measures
Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio
Metric
The ratio of the observed number of in-hospital deaths with a HSMR diagnosis to the expected number of
deaths, multiplied by 100, at trust level.
Denominator
Spells with a primary dominant diagnosis of any of the 56 clinical classifications software groups that
comprise the HSMR basket.
Observed
Denominator superspells with method of discharge as death (DISMETH= 4,5).
Deaths are assigned to every provider within the superspell.
Expected
Expected number of in-hospitals deaths derived from logistic regression, adjusting for factors to indirectly
standardise for differences in case mix.
Data sources
Secondary user service – commissioning data sets (SUS–CDS) for the financial year 2012/13 (April 2012 to
March 2013).
Statistical methods
l Logistic regression is used to calculate the expected number of in-hospitals deaths. To indirectly
standardise for differences in patient case mix, the model is adjusted for the following factors:
¢ sex
¢ age on admission (in 5-year bands up to 90+ years)
¢ interactions between age on admission (in 5-year bands up to 90+ years) and Charlson
Comorbidity Score
¢ admission method (non-elective or elective)
¢ socioeconomic deprivation quintile of the area of residence of the patient (based on the
Carstairs Index)
¢ diagnosis/procedure subgroup
¢ comorbidities (based on Charlson score)
¢ number of previous emergency admissions
¢ year of discharge (financial year)
¢ palliative care (if any episode in the spell has the treatment function code 315 or contains
International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Edition (ICD-10) (code Z515 in any of the
diagnoses fields)
¢ month of admission
¢ source of admission.
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l Relative risk: the ratio is calculated by dividing the actual number of deaths by the expected number
and multiplying the figure by 100. It is expressed as a relative risk, where a risk rating of 100 represents
the national average. If the trust has a HSMR of 100, the number of patients who died was exactly as it
would be expected taking into account the standardisation factors. A HSMR above 100 means more
patients died than would be expected; one below 100 means that fewer than expected died.
l Control limits: control limits tell us the range of values that is consistent with random or chance
variation. Data points falling within the control limits are consistent with random or chance variation
and are said to display ‘common-cause variation’; for data points falling outside the control limits,
chance is an unlikely explanation and hence they are said to display ‘special-cause variation’ – that is,
where the trust’s rate diverges significantly from the national rate.
Data points falling above the upper 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly ‘higher than
expected’, data points falling below the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly
‘lower than expected’, data points falling between the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit and the upper
99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be ‘within expected range’.
Notes
Superspell, a group of spells linked by transfer.
The HSMR basket of CCS groups accounts for approximately 80% of all in-hospital deaths in England.
See ‘HSMR Toolkit’ for full methodological detail.
Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio (100)
Metric
The ratio of the observed number of in-hospital deaths to the expected number of deaths for all diagnosis
groups, multiplied by 100, at trust level.
Denominator
Spells with any primary dominant diagnosis, linked into superspells.
Observed
Denominator superspells with method of discharge as death (DISMETH= 4,5).
Deaths are assigned to every provider within the superspell.
Expected
Expected number of in-hospitals deaths derived from logistic regression, adjusting for factors to indirectly
standardise for differences in case mix.
Data sources
SUS–CDS for the financial year 2012/13 (April 2012–March 2013).
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Statistical methods
l Logistic regression is used to calculate the expected number of in-hospitals deaths. To indirectly
standardise for differences in patient case mix, the model is adjusted for the following factors:
¢ sex
¢ age on admission (in 5-year bands up to 90+ years)
¢ interactions between age on admission (in 5-year bands up to 90+ years) and Charlson
Comorbidity Score
¢ admission method (non-elective or elective)
¢ socioeconomic deprivation quintile of the area of residence of the patient (based on the
Carstairs Index)
¢ diagnosis/procedure subgroup
¢ comorbidities (based on Charlson score)
¢ number of previous emergency admissions
¢ year of discharge (financial year)
¢ palliative care (if any episode in the spell has the treatment function code 315 or contains ICD-10
code Z515 in any of the diagnoses fields)
¢ month of admission
¢ source of admission.
l Relative risk: the ratio is calculated by dividing the actual number of deaths by the expected number
and multiplying the figure by 100. It is expressed as a relative risk, where a risk rating of 100 represents
the national average. If the trust has a HSMR of 100, the number of patients who died was exactly as it
would be expected taking into account the standardisation factors. A HSMR above 100 means more
patients died than would be expected; one below 100 means that fewer than expected died.
l Control limits: control limits tell us the range of values that is consistent with random or chance
variation. Data points falling within the control limits are consistent with random or chance variation
and are said to display ‘common-cause variation’; for data points falling outside the control limits,
chance is an unlikely explanation and hence they are said to display ‘special-cause variation’ – that is,
where the trust’s rate diverges significantly from the national rate.
Data points falling above the upper 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly ‘higher than
expected’, data points falling below the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly
‘lower than expected’, data points falling between the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit and the upper
99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be ‘within expected range’.
Note
Superspell, a group of spells linked by transfer.
Deaths in low risk diagnosis groups
Metric
Deaths per 1000 spells for conditions normally associated with a very low rate of mortality.
Denominator
Spells with a primary diagnosis associated with a low mortality diagnosis group where the mortality rate
has been shown to be consistently below 0.5%.
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Exclusions:
l Spells with a diagnosis code for trauma, immunocompromised state or cancer in any diagnosis field.
l Admission age under 19 (ages 18 and under).
l Spells with an ICD-10 code R296 (‘Tendency to fall, not elsewhere classified’) in any position.
Numerator
Denominator spells with method of discharge as death.
DISMETH:
4. Died.
Data sources
SUS–CDS (April 2012–March 2013).
Statistical methods
l To interpret the performance of a trust on a crude rate indicator, the data point is compared against
the national crude rate.
l Control limits: control limits tell us the range of values that are consistent with random or chance
variation. Data points falling within the control limits are consistent with random or chance variation
and are said to display ‘common-cause variation’; for data points falling outside the control limits,
chance is an unlikely explanation and hence they are said to display ‘special-cause variation’ – that is,
where the trust’s rate diverges significantly from the national rate.
Data points falling above the upper 99.8% binomial control limit are said to be significantly ‘higher than
expected’, data points falling below the lower 99.8% binomial control limit are said to be significantly
‘lower than expected’, data points falling between the lower 99.8% binomial control limit and the upper
99.8% binomial control limit are said to be ‘within expected range’.
Deaths after surgery
Metric
The ratio of the observed number of deaths following surgery with complications of care to the expected
number, multiplied by 100.
Denominator
Elective surgical spells, defined by a surgical HRG and an OPCS code for an operating room procedure in
any procedure field, for which a diagnosis code indicating potential complications of care is present in any
secondary field; and emergency surgical spells, defined by a surgical HRG and an OPCS code for an
operating room procedure where the principal operating room procedure took place within 2 days of
admission, for which a diagnosis code indicating potential complications of care is present in any
secondary field.
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Inclusions
Elective admission
ADMIMETH:
11. Elective: from waiting list.
12. Elective: booked.
13. Elective: planned.
Emergency admission where the principal operating room procedure took place within
2 days of admission
ADMIMETH:
21. Emergency: via Accident and Emergency (A&E) services, including the casualty department of
the provider.
22. Emergency: via general practitioner (GP).
23. Emergency: via Bed Bureau, including the Central Bureau.
24. Emergency: via consultant outpatient clinic.
28. Emergency: other means, including patients who arrive via the A&E department of another
healthcare provider.
Discharge age > 18 years and < 90 years.
Exclusions
Spells where the patient has an immediately subsequent spell in another acute trust or
where the spell is the final spell of the superspell and the discharge destination indicates
an external transfer
DISDEST:
49. NHS other hospital provider – high security psychiatric accommodation.
50. NHS other hospital provider – medium secure unit (from 1999–2000).
51. NHS other hospital provider – ward for general patients or the younger physically disabled.
52. NHS other hospital provider – ward for maternity patients or neonates.
53. NHS other hospital provider – ward for patients who are mentally ill or have learning disabilities.
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When the record is an emergency admission, the following Office of Population and
Census Survey codes and Health Resource Groups 3.5 codes do not qualify for the
denominator of this metric:
OPCS codes:
K49. Transluminal balloon angioplasty of coronary artery.
K50. Other therapeutic transluminal operations on coronary artery.
K75. Percutaneous transluminal balloon angioplasty and insertion of stent into coronary artery HRG
3.5 codes.
E15. Percutaneous Coronary Intervention.
Observed
Denominator spells with method of discharge as death.
DISMETH:
4. Died.
Expected
Expected number of deaths is derived from logistic regression, adjusting for factors to indirectly standardise
for differences in case-mix.
Data sources
SUS – CDS (April 2012 – March 2013).
Statistical methods
l Logistic regression: expected number of deaths is derived from logistic regression, adjusting for factors
to indirectly standardise for differences in case-mix. Adjustments are made for:
¢ sex
¢ age on admission (in 5-year bands up to 90+ years)
¢ admission method (non-elective or elective)
¢ socioeconomic deprivation quintile of the area of residence of the patient (based on the
Carstairs Index)
¢ comorbidities (categorised Charlson Comorbidity Score).
l Relative risk: the ratio is calculated by dividing the actual number of deaths by the expected number
and multiplying the figure by 100. It is expressed as a relative risk, where a risk rating of 100 represents
the national average. If the trust has a relative risk of 100, the number of patients who died is
exactly as it would be expected taking into account the standardisation factors. A relative risk above
100 means more patients died than would be expected; one below 100 means that fewer than
expected died.
l Control limits: control limits tell us the range of values that are consistent with random or chance
variation. Data points falling within the control limits are consistent with random or chance variation
and are said to display ‘common-cause variation’; for data points falling outside the control limits,
chance is an unlikely explanation and hence they are said to display ‘special-cause variation’ – that is,
where the trust’s rate diverges significantly from the national rate.
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Data points falling above the upper 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly ‘higher than
expected’, data points falling below the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly
‘lower than expected’, data points falling between the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit and the upper
99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be ‘within expected range’.
Notes
For emergency admissions, the principal operating room procedure date may occur within the first
two episodes of the spell, to capture all procedures that took place within two days of the admission date.
Based on Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Patient Safety Indicators. Translated by the Dr Foster
Unit at Imperial College in collaboration with the Care Quality Commission (formerly the
Healthcare Commission).
Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio for emergency
admissions (weekend)
Metric
The ratio of the observed number of in-hospital deaths following weekend emergency admissions with a
HSMR diagnosis to the expected number of deaths, multiplied by 100, at trust level.
Denominator
Emergency spells with a primary dominant diagnosis of any of the 56 CCS groups that comprise the HSMR
basket and an emergency admission on Saturday or Sunday, linked into superspells.
Emergency admissions are defined using the following ADMIMETH codes:
21 Emergency: via A&E services, including the casualty department of the provider.
22 Emergency: via GP.
23 Emergency: via Bed Bureau, including the Central Bureau.
24 Emergency: via consultant outpatient clinic.
28 Emergency: other means, including patients who arrive via the A&E department of another
healthcare provider.
Observed
Denominator superspells with method of discharge as death (DISMETH= 4,5).
Deaths are assigned to every provider within the superspell.
Expected
The expected number of in-hospital deaths derived from logistic regression, adjusting for factors to
indirectly standardise for differences in case mix.
Data sources
SUS–CDS for the financial year 2012/13.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04040 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 4
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
143
Statistical methods
l Logistic regression: expected number of in-hospitals deaths derived from logistic regression, adjusting
for factors to indirectly standardise for differences in case mix. Adjustments are made for:
¢ sex
¢ age on admission (in 5-year bands up to 90+ years)
¢ interactions between age on admission (in 5-year bands up to 90+ years) and Charlson
Comorbidity Score
¢ admission method (non-elective or elective)
¢ socioeconomic deprivation quintile of the area of residence of the patient (based on the
Carstairs Index)
¢ diagnosis/procedure subgroup
¢ comorbidities (based on Charlson Comorbidity Score)
¢ number of previous emergency admissions
¢ year of discharge (financial year)
¢ palliative care (if any episode in the spell has the treatment function code 315 or contains ICD-10
code Z515 in any of the diagnoses fields)
¢ month of admission
¢ source of admission.
l Relative risk: the ratio is calculated by dividing the actual number of deaths by the expected number
and multiplying the figure by 100. It is expressed as a relative risk, where a risk rating of 100 represents
the national average. If the trust has a HSMR of 100, the number of patients who died was exactly as
would be expected taking into account the standardisation factors. A HSMR above 100 means
more patients died than would be expected; one below 100 means that fewer than expected died.
l Control limits: control limits tell us the range of values that are consistent with random or chance
variation. Data points falling within the control limits are consistent with random or chance variation
and are said to display ‘common-cause variation’; for data points falling outside the control limits,
chance is an unlikely explanation and hence they are said to display ‘special-cause variation’ – that is,
where the trust’s rate diverges significantly from the national rate.
Data points falling above the upper 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly ‘higher than
expected’, data points falling below the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly
‘lower than expected’, data points falling between the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit and the upper
99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be ‘within expected range’.
Notes
The HSMR basket of CCS groups accounts for approximately 80% of all in-hospital deaths in England.
See ‘HSMR Toolkit’ for full methodological detail.
Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio for emergency
admissions (weekday)
Metric
The ratio of the observed number of in-hospital deaths following weekday emergency admissions with a
HSMR diagnosis to the expected number of deaths, multiplied by 100, at trust level.
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Denominator
Emergency spells with a primary dominant diagnosis of any of the 56 CCS groups that comprise the HSMR
basket and an emergency admission on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday or Friday, linked
into superspells.
Emergency admissions are defined using the following ADMIMETH codes:
21 Emergency: via A&E services, including the casualty department of the provider.
22 Emergency: via GP.
23 Emergency: via Bed Bureau, including the Central Bureau.
24 Emergency: via consultant outpatient clinic.
28 Emergency: other means, including patients who arrive via the A&E department of another
healthcare provider.
Observed
Denominator superspells with method of discharge as death (DISMETH= 4,5).
Deaths are assigned to every provider within the superspell.
Expected
The expected number of in-hospital deaths derived from logistic regression, adjusting for factors to
indirectly standardise for differences in case mix.
Data source
SUS–CDS for the financial year 2012/13.
Statistical methods
l Logistic regression is used to calculate the expected number of in-hospitals deaths. To indirectly
standardise for differences in patient case-mix, the model is adjusted for the following factors:
¢ sex
¢ age on admission (in 5-year bands up to 90+ years)
¢ interactions between age on admission (in 5-year bands up to 90+ years) and Charlson
Comorbidity Score
¢ admission method (non-elective or elective)
¢ socioeconomic deprivation quintile of the area of residence of the patient (based on the
Carstairs Index)
¢ diagnosis/procedure subgroup
¢ comorbidities (based on Charlson Comorbidity Score)
¢ number of previous emergency admissions
¢ year of discharge (financial year)
¢ palliative care (if any episode in the spell has the treatment function code 315 or contains ICD-10
code Z515 in any of the diagnoses fields)
¢ month of admission
¢ source of admission.
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l Relative risk: the ratio is calculated by dividing the actual number of deaths by the expected number
and multiplying the figure by 100. It is expressed as a relative risk, where a risk rating of 100 represents
the national average. If the trust has a HSMR of 100, the number of patients who died was exactly as
would be expected taking into account the standardisation factors. A HSMR above 100 means more
patients died than would be expected; one below 100 means that fewer than expected died.
l Control limits: control limits tell us the range of values which are consistent with random or chance
variation. Data points falling within the control limits are consistent with random or chance variation
and are said to display ‘common-cause variation’; for data points falling outside the control limits,
chance is an unlikely explanation and hence they are said to display ‘special-cause variation’ – that is,
where the trust’s rate diverges significantly from the national rate.
Data points falling above the upper 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly ‘higher than
expected’, data points falling below the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly
‘lower than expected’, data points falling between the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit and the upper
99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be ‘within expected range’.
Notes
The HSMR basket of CCS groups accounts for approximately 80% of all in-hospital deaths in England.
See ‘HSMR Toolkit’ for full methodological detail.
28-day readmissions
Metric
The ratio of the observed number of non-elective admissions with an emergency readmission within
28 days of discharge to the expected number, multiplied by 100.
Denominator
Non-elective spells where the day of discharge was a weekday, linked into superspells.
Observed
Denominator superspells with a readmission to any provider within 28 days of discharge where
readmission is an emergency admission:
ADMIMETH:
21. Emergency – via A&E.
22. Emergency – via GP.
23. Emergency – via Bed Bureau.
24. Emergency – via Outpatient clinic.
28. Emergency – via other means.
Readmission date minus discharge date < 28 days.
Expected
Expected number of 28-day emergency readmissions derived from logistic regression, adjusting for factors
to indirectly standardise for differences in case mix.
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Data sources
SUS–CDS for the financial year 2012/13.
Statistical methods
l Logistic regression: the expected number of readmissions is derived from logistic regression, adjusting
for factors to indirectly standardise for differences in case mix. Adjustments are made for:
¢ sex
¢ age on admission (in 5-year bands up to 90+ years)
¢ interactions between age on admission (in 5-year bands up to 90+ years) and Charlson
Comorbidity Score
¢ admission method (non-elective or elective)
¢ socioeconomic deprivation quintile of the area of residence of the patient (based on the
Carstairs Index)
¢ diagnosis/procedure subgroup
¢ comorbidities (based Charlson Comorbidity Score)
¢ number of previous emergency admissions
¢ year of discharge (financial year)
¢ palliative care (if any episode in the spell has the treatment function code 315 or contains ICD-10
code Z515 in any of the diagnoses fields)
¢ month of admission
¢ source of admission.
l Relative risk: the ratio is calculated by dividing the actual number of readmissions by the expected
number and multiplying the figure by 100. It is expressed as a relative risk, where a risk rating of
100 represents the national average. If the trust has a standardised readmission ratio of 100, that
means that the number of patients who were readmitted is exactly as would be expected taking into
account the standardisation factors. A standardised readmission ratio above 100 means more patients
were readmitted than would be expected; one below 100 means that fewer than expected
were readmitted.
l Control limits: control limits tell us the range of values that are consistent with random or chance
variation. Data points falling within the control limits are consistent with random or chance variation
and are said to display ‘common-cause variation’; for data points falling outside the control limits,
chance is an unlikely explanation and hence they are said to display ‘special-cause variation’ – that is,
where the trust’s rate diverges significantly from the national rate.
l Data points falling above the upper 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly ‘higher than
expected’, data points falling below the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be significantly
‘lower than expected’, data points falling between the lower 99.8% Poisson control limit and the
upper 99.8% Poisson control limit are said to be ‘within expected range’.
Meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infections
Data on MRSA infections were obtained from the Health Protection Agency (HPA) mandatory surveillance
reports, available at the following website: www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb_C/
1254510675444.
Data used for analysis in this study were the sum of MRSA infections reported in financial year 2012/13 for
each trust, found in Table 6.
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Meticillin-sensitive Staphylococcus aureus infections
Data on Meticillin-sensitive Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) infections were obtained from the Health
Protection Agency (HPA) mandatory surveillance reports, available at the following website: www.hpa.org.
uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/HPAweb_C/1296684635609.
Data used for analysis in this study were the sum of MSSA infections reported in financial year 2012/13 for
each trust, found in Table 8.
C. difficile infections
Data on C. difficile infections were obtained from the Health Protection Agency (HPA) mandatory
surveillance reports, available at the following website: www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/
HPAweb_C/1254510678961.
Data used for analysis in this study were the sum of C. difficile infections reported in financial year 2012/13
for each trust, found in Table 3.
Escherichia coli infections
Data on Escherichia coli infections were obtained from the Health Protection Agency (HPA) mandatory
surveillance reports, available at the following website: www.hpa.org.uk/web/HPAweb&HPAwebStandard/
HPAweb_C/1254510678961.
Data used for analysis in this study were the sum of E. coli infections reported in financial year 2012/13 for
each trust, found in Table 10.
Organisation patient safety incidents
Organisation patient safety incidents data were obtained from the NHS National Reporting and Learning
System at the following website: www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/patient-safety-data/organisation-patient-safety-
incident-reports/.
Supporting information about this data set can be found here: www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/resources/
?entryid45= 135145.
The data used in this study were for the time period October 2012 to March 2013. Two types of data
were included for organisational patient safety incidents:
l volume of organisational patient safety incidents: the total number of organisational patient safety
incidents per trust over the time period
l rate of organisational patient safety incidents: number of organisational patient safety incidents divided
by the number of admissions multiplied by 100 per trust over the time period.
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Day case to inpatient conversion rate
Day case to inpatient conversion rates have been calculated by dividing the number of patients who were
intended to be managed as a day case but had a length of stay greater than zero by the total number of
day cases. This rate was then multiplied by 100.
This metric was calculated for each BSAQ respondent trust for the financial year 2012/13.
Never events
Never-events data are not freely available to the public; however, the BBC published NHS never-events
data for calendar years 2009 to 2012 on their website at this address: www.bbc.co.uk/news/
health-22466496.
Analysis for this study only used never events from calendar year 2012. The total number of never events
that occurred at each trust in 2012 was calculated by summing the number of incidents reported in the
spreadsheet. If a trust did not appear in the spreadsheet, it was assumed that no never events occurred at
that trust during calendar year 2012.
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Appendix 8 Board observations: time spent on
different activities
Skye
Meeting 1
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Minutes Procedure Board administration 1
Chairperson report CCGs Commissioning Monologue update 1
Chairperson report ward visits Quality Monologue update 1
CEO report Reconfiguration Monologue update 8, 6
CEO report Strategy Monologue update 1
Waiting times Capacity and demand Performance targets 12, 10
Complaints Safety Quality 15
Falls Safety Quality 3
HSMR coding Safety Performance measurement 3, 3
24/7 care Quality Safety 10
Staff sickness HR Cost savings 15
C. difficile Safety Quality 15
A&E operational performance Capacity and demand Performance targets 15
Safety performance Safety Risk 10
C. difficile penalties (finance) Safety Finance 4
Tariff emergency admissions Finance Performance measurement 8
Data clarification (finance) Finance Performance measurement 3
HR procedures (interview panels) HR Recruitment 15
Policy summary (CEO report) Strategy Monologue update 6
Expenses policy HR Cost savings 23
Subcommittees Board administration 1
Actions from previous meeting Board administration 3
Governor meeting summary Public involvement Quality 3
Summary of meeting Board summary of meeting Board administration 4
Total (including breaks) 226
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Meeting 2
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Minutes Board administration 6
Chairperson report Governor elections Monologue update 1
Chairperson report Commissioning Monologue update 2
CEO report H&SC Act chairperson report Monologue update 1
CEO report Board administration Monologue update 5
Appointments HR Recruitment 2
Reconfiguration Reconfiguration Strategic partnerships 5
A&E performance Capacity and demand Performance targets 4
Pathway review Safety Performance measurement 15
Safety performance Safety Risk 10
Friends and family test Quality Performance measurement 8
Call for more in-depth discussion Strategy 5
Pathway review coding process Safety Performance measurement 10
C. difficile Safety Performance targets 23
A&E demand linked to bed plan Capacity and demand Patient flow (beds) 20
A&E demand linked to 30% tariff Capacity and demand Finance 10
Finance underperformance Finance Performance targets 6
Everything Counts policy document Performance measurement Strategy 12
Strategy plan development Strategy 10
Policy and strategy update (monitor) Performance measurement Regulation 6
Subcommittee business (audit) Board administration 30s
Actions Board administration 3
Board summary of meeting Board administration 7
Governor response Public involvement Board administration 3
Total (including breaks) 192
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Meeting 3
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Apologies, minutes Board administration 3
Matters arising Board administration 3
Chairperson report Board administration Monologue update 5
CEO report Board administration Monologue update 1
CEO report Quality Risk 8
CEO report reconfiguration Reconfiguration Strategic partnerships 4
CEO report Francis Inquiry Quality and safety Monologue update 6
Organisational performance no staff cover Capacity and demand HR 13
Mortality performance Safety Risk 12
Complaints data questioned Quality Performance measurement 5
Report summary pressure ulcers Safety Performance targets 2
Report summary FFT Quality Performance measurement 90
HR sickness levels HR Workforce 1
Cancer service development Strategy 1
Staff survey findings HR Workforce 15
C. difficile Safety Performance targets 21
A&E capacity (demand, beds) Capacity and demand Patient flow (beds) 20
Central support unit cash finance Finance Performance measurement 13
Tariff Finance Performance measurement 5
CEO policy summary Policy update Monologue 3
Reconfiguration proposals Reconfiguration Risk 5
Safety at particular sites Safety Risk 9
CEO monitor compliance Regulation Performance measurement 5
Actions Board administration 30
Governor response Public involvement Board administration 15
Total (including breaks) 104
FFT, Friends and Family Test.
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Meeting 4
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Minutes Board administration 1
Matters arising staff levels HR 3
Matters arising Safety 2
Chairperson report Governors Monologue update 1
Chairperson report Quality and safety Monologue update 3
Chairperson report Regulation Monologue update 7
CEO report Francis response Quality Safety 30
Coding issues monitor HSMR Safety Performance measurement 15
Quality report Safety Performance targets 10
HR sickness levels HR Workforce 5
HSMR presentation Safety Performance measurement 23
Coding Safety Performance measurement 10
C. difficile Safety Performance targets 15
CQC Quality and Risk profiles Quality Performance measurement 4
A&E beds Capacity and demand Patient flow (beds) 45
C. difficile penalties (finance) Safety Finance 5
Tariff Finance Performance measurement 10
Policy board assurance framework Risk Regulation 10
Monitor compliance Regulation Performance measurement 3
Strategy development Strategy Monologue update 10
Policy information Strategy Monologue update 2
Committee update Board administration 5
Actions Board administration 10
Governors Public involvement 7
Total (including breaks) 270
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Lewis
Meeting 1
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Pre-board briefing 30
Public Finance Initiative issues PFI Estates 40
Service reconfiguration Reconfiguration Risk 17
Any qualified provider Commissioning Procurement 11
C. difficile target/penalty Safety Finance 9
Academic Health Science Network Strategic
partnerships
5
Provider competition Competition Risk 9
Multiprofessional education and training
funding reduction
Education Risk 4
Women’s services Quality Risk 5
CQC visit to neonatal Quality Risk 2
A&E finance 30% tariff Finance Performance
measurement
3
C. difficile (finance) Safety Finance 7
Friends and family Quality Performance
measurement
12
Falls Safety Risk 7
Board self-certificate Regulation Audit 3
Health Care Supply Association Strategy Board administration 1
Medical revalidation Workforce Board administration 2
CEO report Board
administration
Monologue update 9
C. difficile Safety Finance 5
Quality report Safety Quality 11
CQC score card Quality Performance
measurement
4
Procurement Procurement Commissioning 2
Finance surplus Finance Risk 14
Land sale Estates Finance 12
Drug funding Medicines Finance 1
Chairperson report Monologue update 3
Total (excluding pre-board briefing) 211
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Meeting 2
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Apologies, welcome 2
PFI education PFI Estates 18
Car park development PFI Estates 10
Reconfiguration Reconfiguration Risk 10
AQP Commissioning Procurement 2
AHSN Strategic partnerships Board
administration
9
C. difficile penalties Safety Finance 8
CQC Quality Risk 1
Reconfiguration Reconfiguration Risk 3
Clinician accused of fraud Finance Criminality 1
Governors Safety Risk 7
Friends and family test Quality Performance
measurement
9
24/7 care Quality Safety 5
Local education and training boards
commissioning arrangements
Commissioning Education 2
CEO report Commissioners,
reconfiguration
Monologue update 8
HCAIs: C. difficile and MRSA Safety Performance
targets
11
CQC inspection preparation Quality Risk 4
Finance readmissions, RTT Finance Performance
targets
5
Quality report, finance falls penalties, sharps
needles, ulcers, lost data
Quality Risk 10
CQUIN, target performance, dashboard readings Quality Performance
measurement
15
Finance CQUIN, C. difficile Finance Performance
measurement
4
Finance capital investment Finance Risk 4
Appraisals HR Workforce 2
Land sale Estates Finance 10
Water system problems Safety Risk 5
HSCA Board administration Public engagement 3
Total (including breaks) 182
AQP, Any Qualified Provider; PFI, Public Finance Initiative; RTT, referral to treatment time.
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Meeting 3
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Minutes Board administration Board administration 1
Drug costs Medicines Finance 10
PFI building PFI Estates 21
Reconfiguration Reconfiguration Risk 9
Procurement landscape Procurement Board administration 5
AHSN Strategic partnerships Board administration 3
C. difficile Safety Performance
measurement
7
HSCA governor elections Governors Board administration 12
Women’s services Quality Risk 3
Research and development presentation
and discussion
Research
and development
Finance 20
Commissioning landscape Commissioning 28
GP surgery competition Competition Estates 37
Finance litigation costs Finance Litigation 5
CEO report Monologue update 10
HCAI coding disputes Safety Performance
measurement
15
RTT performance (finance) Capacity and demand Performance targets 7
C. difficile penalties (finance) Safety Finance 10
Water system Safety Risk 2
New MD appointed HR Recruitment 8
Total (including breaks) 210
PFI, Public Finance Initiative; RTT, referral to treatment time.
DOI: 10.3310/hsdr04040 HEALTH SERVICES AND DELIVERY RESEARCH 2016 VOL. 4 NO. 4
© Queen’s Printer and Controller of HMSO 2016. This work was produced by Mannion et al. under the terms of a commissioning contract issued by the Secretary of State for
Health. This issue may be freely reproduced for the purposes of private research and study and extracts (or indeed, the full report) may be included in professional journals
provided that suitable acknowledgement is made and the reproduction is not associated with any form of advertising. Applications for commercial reproduction should be
addressed to: NIHR Journals Library, National Institute for Health Research, Evaluation, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre, Alpha House, University of Southampton Science
Park, Southampton SO16 7NS, UK.
157
Meeting 4
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Pre-board briefing DVD Patient experience Quality 25
Matters arising Board administration 1
PFI building PFI Estates 15, 3
Reconfiguration Reconfiguration Risk 10
AQP Commissioning Procurement 6
AHSN Strategic partnerships 3
C. difficile penalties Safety Finance 11
Land sale Estates Finance 5
Electronic patient record Information systems IT 30
Francis response Quality Safety 28
Information encryption Data protection Board
administration
4
Annual plan development Strategy Board
administration
1
Contract tariff negotiation
with commissioners
Commissioning Finance 15
HCAI results Quality Safety 10
Quality report Safety Quality 10
CAT Quality Risk 10
Provider competition Provider development Estates 6
Serious untoward incident Safety Risk 14
CEO report CCGs, reconfiguration, Health and
Wellbeing Board
Monologue for
information
1
Business performance RTT Capacity and demand Performance
targets
9
Finance Finance 6
Appointments HR Recruitment 1
Land sale Estates Finance 6
Primary care Market development Estates 21
CEO update Board administration Monologue update 13
Postgraduate training budget
reduced
Education Finance 8
Total (excluding pre-board briefing) 242
AQP, Any Qualified Provider; CAT, clinical assessment team; DVD, digital versatile disc; PFI, Public Finance Initiative;
RTT, referral to treatment time.
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Islay
Meeting 1
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Patient story Patient experience Quality 12
QI Quality Performance measurement 45
QI update Quality (CQI) Performance measurement 10
HCAI Safety Performance targets -
Chairperson report Board administration Monologue update 5
CEO report Board administration Monologue update 5
CEO report Capacity and demand Patient flow (self-referrals) 11
Strategic Advisory Group Strategy Reconfiguration –
Monitor compliance Regulation Performance measurement 1
Finance report Finance Cost savings 8
Finance report (trauma development) Finance Recruitment 5
Corporate Governance Framework For information Board administration 1
Terms of reference For information Board administration 3
Early action research contact Commissioning Risk 5
Audit Committee minutes For information 1
Integrated Care Board update Integrated care Strategy 5
Total (including breaks) 142
Meeting 2
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Part one
Patient story Patient experience Quality 4
Presentation community nursing Community care End-of-life care 35
Operating theatres Safety Performance measurement 25
HCAI report C. difficile Safety Performance targets 85
CEO report Strategy Monologue update 6
CEO report Staff ratios Workforce 4
Annual plan Strategy 25
Board assurance framework Risk Performance measurement 55
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Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Part two
Matters arising Commissioning 5
CEO report Reconfiguration Risk 33
Firearm found Risk Criminality 2
Change Board meeting frequency Board administration Strategy 49
Finance Finance Estates 8
Away-day Francis reaction Quality Safety 10
SUI Safety Risk 20
Total (including breaks) 304
SUI, serious untoward incident.
Meeting 3
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Part two
Patient story Patient experience Quality 12
Chairperson report Board administration Monologue update 6
Minutes Board administration Patient experience 6
Liverpool Care Pathway Quality Patient experience 21
Quality dashboard Quality Performance measurement 14
Falls Safety Performance measurement 11
Infection control Safety Performance measurement 5
CEO report Quality Regulation 4
CEO report Quality Strategic partnerships 4
CEO report Reconfiguration Capacity and demand 16
Integrated care Strategic partnerships Reconfiguration 20
Business development report Regulation Quality 4
Environmental health kitchens Risk Quality 20
Patient discharge letters Risk Quality 5
Finance report Finance Performance targets 4
Finance report Finance Income streams 2
Finance Capacity and demand Patient experience 5
Chair report Board administration Monologue update 3
EARC Risk Monologue update 4
Audit communication Board administration Board administration 2
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Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Part two
Matters arising Finance Estates 1
Matters arising Reconfiguration Risk 18
Finance report Finance Risk 11
Environmental health Risk Quality 29
Matters arising Procurement Contracting 2
Board action sheet Strategy Reconfiguration 18
Total (including breaks) 305
Meeting 4
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Part one
Patient story Patient experience Quality 5
Introductions Board administration Board administration 1
Chairperson report Board administration Monologue 3
CEO report Integrated care Update 2
CEO report Kitchens Update 7
Nurse presentation end-of-life care Patient experience Quality 14
Orthopaedics update Quality Performance measurement 26
Community care Performance measurement Risk 10
QI presentation Safety Performance measurement 5
MD report Safety Performance measurement 10
CEO report Regulation Quality 13
CEO report Reconfiguration Quality 22
Finance report Finance Monologue 5
HR report HR Workforce 15
People strategy HR Strategy 6
Board assurance Risk Estates 4
Governance Risk Safety 15
Part two
Monitor Regulation Performance measurement 8
Integrated care Strategy Reconfiguration 43
Integrated care Strategy Reconfiguration 15
Total (including breaks) 235
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Arran
Meeting 1
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Apologies, minutes Board administration 4
Matters arising Board administration 0
Capacity and demand Quality Service reconfiguration 30
Chairperson report (visit on use of social media) Monologue update Miscellaneous 1
CEO report
A&E performance Quality Performance targets 7
Dr Foster performance rankings Quality Performance targets 9
Public Accounts Committee Finance 5
National cancer patient experience survey Quality Performance measurement 4
Monitor KPI governance ratings Safety Performance targets 10
Pressure ulcers Quality Performance targets 11
Performance report
18-week breaches Quality Performance targets 5
C. difficile Quality Performance targets 3
Workforce HR Safety 1
Quality report
C. difficile Quality and risk Performance targets 3
Clinical audit Quality 1
Finance and contracting report 0
Financial performance Finance Performance measurement 2
Tariff Finance Quality 0
HR and communication report 2
Review of occupational health services Service reconfiguration Quality 4
Safeguarding Quality 0
Audit report Finance and performance 8
Total (including breaks) 102
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Meeting 2
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Apologies, minutes Board administration 1
Matters arising Board administration 1
Chairperson report Monologue update 2
CEO report
Francis report Quality and safety 15
Emergency admissions Quality Finance 3
CQC visit neurology Quality and safety Performance monitoring 2
Clinical negligence scheme for trusts maternity Risk Finance 1
Liverpool Care Pathway Quality Service delivery 6
Information governance Risk 4
Performance report 15
Genitourinary waiting time breaches Quality Performance measurement 8
‘Safety thermometer’ Safety Performance measurement 5
Quality and safety report Quality 2
Finance and contracting report Finance Risk 17
HR report – consultant revalidation HR Appraisal 5
Audit report
Internal audit Finance 5
Whistleblowing HR Safety 15
Total (including breaks) 80
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Meeting 3
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Apologies, minutes Board administration 1
Staff survey report HR Workforce 27
Chairperson report Quality and safety External visits 5
CEO report Quality and safety Performance management 17
Service development Finance 6
Strategy Performance management 5
Finance Philanthropy 19
Executive board report Service development Strategy 6
Research and development strategy Research and development Strategy 19
Maternity services Service development 1
CQC registration Quality Patient safety 1
Workforce HR 3
Performance report Performance measurement Patient safety 12
Quality and safety committee report Quality Patient safety 5
Finance and contracting report Finance 2
Total (including breaks) 129
Meeting 4
Topic of conversation
Primary coding
(foreground)
Secondary coding
(background)
Time spent
(minutes)
Minutes Board administration 1
Matters arising Board administration 2
ND special presentation
Safe staffing Patient safety Quality 32
Chairperson report
Education development framework visit Safety Quality 5
Quality and safety report Quality Safety 5
CEO report
Monitor compliance Safety Performance indicators 25
Quality Governance 5
Executive board
Quality Performance indicators 7
Performance report Patient safety Performance measurement 8
HR report HR Workforce 5
Finance report Finance 10
Audit committee report Finance 5
Total (including breaks) 90
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Appendix 9 Project outputs/looking ahead
A longside this report, four papers have already been prepared for publication and several further arelikely to follow.
Papers published or currently under review
Millar R, Mannion R, Freeman T, Davies H. Hospital board oversight of quality and patient safety:
a narrative review and synthesis of recent empirical research. Milbank Q 2013;91:738–70.
Mannion R, Davies H, Freeman T, Millar R, Jacobs J, Casteridis P. Overseeing oversight: hospital board
governance of quality and safety in the English NHS. J Health Serv Res Policy 2015;20:9–16.
Freeman T, Millar R, Mannion R, Davies HTO. A dramaturgy of hospital board governance in the English
NHS [published online ahead of print 4 August 2015]. Sociology Health Ill 2015.
Millar R, Freeman T, Mannion R. Effective hospital board oversight of patient safety: a stakeholder analysis
exploring the role of trust and intelligence. BMC Health Serv Res 2015;15:196.
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